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"I believe when the history of this decade is viri tten ·the 
changes now ooou,.:':t'ing in Australian-JapaneBe relations, 
and v<h.at I hope vlill happen in the ne;..."'t ten yea.rB or zo 1 
will prove to be one <·f the most significant dove lopmonts 
of our ·time • 11 Th~: Prime Mi:nhrter of Australia, 1971. 
The Australian-Japan J3asic 'l':rea:ty of Friendship and 
Co~ope:ration, the first of its kind Australia has concluded 
with any country, was ratified on 21st July 1977, when Mr. 
Olr..a'!!Iara Yoshio, Ambassador of Japan, and Nr. Andrew Peacock, 
lilinister for l~'oreign Affai:rs, signed the Protocols of Exchange 
at Pa:diament House, Canbei'l~a, thereby giving formal recognition 
to the friendship, oommuni·ty of interests and interdependence 
that e st behmen Auz::d:;ralia and J·apan. 
Despite contac·ts bet-r1een Australia and Japan that go 
back to 1859, this nm'l' relation ship has happened so quickly t 
·that, according to Arthur Stock-win, Senior Lecturer in Political 
Science at the Australian National University: 1 
"a fairly major readJtlstment of a.t·titudes seems to be 
:r·equir'ed (and has ·to an e:&·tent "b ·en taking place) in 
both coun1;rics. 11 
l1eo:ple in government 9 journalism and business in this coun·tr'Y, 
vi 
who deal closely \·lith Japan have publicly recognised a growing 
need to find ways of successful communieation, as \'lorking oonte,cts 
incroe,se between the ·hlO countries. r.J:his is needed. because not 
only are there great differences in :national po·der 1 differences in 
histoJ:•y and social trad:i .. tions, brrt as Sir Nilliam Mcliiahon 
tes·tif:i.ed after his experience as Prime Minister and Foreign :Minister, 
"there are differences in the decision-making processes in Australia 
2 and in Japan€11 
One might have expected these difforenoes to have been 
explained dui'ing a course of Adrn:i.n.ist:r.ation studies in uh:i..ch 
decision-making and the theory of organizations have such prominent 
place, })~trticularly as Starbuck3 ma:i..ntains that the facilitating 
.T .A.A- Stock'<1in ( ed.), ~m~;I~!! .. Au~t:f.:£!-li;~in~~i;,ie~, 
Sydney, 1972, preface p.vii. 
2w. ~~IcHahon, "Aus·tralia and .Ta.p<'111 11 1 :i."~.Lid., P·5· 
~,J .H. Starbuck "Organizational Grovrth and Developmc1i't in 
HoH. St<.:trbuck (ed.), i Gro1rrth a.nd 1 Hiddlesex, 
1971, p.so. 
a gr·eat deal among cul tu.re f3. An example is given :i.n Al;ogglen's 
( 1958). IJ.1h:i.s is the~ only time in :JJ-our years of 
Adminis"tr<:i.'\iion atndiea that my atten·tion has been d:i.:t.•ecr~ed to the 
adminirsrtrative r:;ystern of Ja.pe..:.n.. Though I might hesita.;e to 
include myself in vJhat Oa:i.ger calla~ 4 
~~'the smal}. mun1:;er of Australj.ans daring enough to take 
an ini'tia:\ti ve in cuJ:tu:ral contact" 
v:i.i 
it B'l.trprises me that studi.es on Japaner~e administrat:i.on are not 
already part of every Adm:i..nistration course conduc·\ied in Jnu:rtral:i.a. 
J~ittle justification seems necessary to demom-r\irate the significance 
a study of Japanese business p:ract:i.ces has for Australian::,, not only 
for €WOl'lomir:>ts vJho appear to be l-Iell-oatered for5, but .also for 
Aus't:rc!.lian busi11essmen, politicians, public servan-ts and those 'ilho 
wish 'to J!.JlO'N mo:r-e of ·the aspirations and 'ifay of life of those t-•lw 
are nNeigh"bou!'t.~ on Long:i.tude 13.5° 11 (as the Australian exhibit at 
Expo '70 ex:p:t-essed it). 
The possibility of attempting ·this study c>ccurred 1e1he:n the 
oppor·tu:ni ty was given for me to er .. G·tend the Sophia Uni vers:tty' s 
Summe:t'' Scho()l of Asia:n. Studies in Japar1 in J"uly-~Augu~:rt 19Tl ~ 
Though few direet reference fJ are made to the p:r'Ogramme on ~1a.nagenH?.n·t 
in Jt:i-pan undertaken there, the insightB gi VOU by Japanese business 
leaders and academics, together \'lith ·that of fore:i.gr1ers many yem.•s 
l'~Hddent in J'apa-11, helped to illuminate the reading that formed. ·the 
basis of this clisE:ertation. 
~1y thanks are extended to Mr. Tony McDenuot·t for the \'lebster' s 
Travel Scholarship to Japan, ·to the State thnister for Educa:tion for-
financial asF.dstance for the journey home, to the Public S<n'Vi.ce 
J3oard, who con:Linued my fi.nal-year scholarsM.p vJh:i.lst I wo,s in J'apan, 
a:o.d who provided me with the freedom to pursue an Honoui'S course full-
-time. 1 am gra:teful also foJ."' the men·ta.l stirm.tlation and <:!.sshrt.ance 
&;1. ven by lec~tu.:rerf.l and tutors in the ILi.s·tr>ry and Admillistra:tion 
J)epa,rtments, p~::u:·ticularly Jlrs. l!iaida Coalch·ake, ~1r. Bruce Davis ancl 
Nr. HaJph Chapman. Above all I am indebted to Iilre Chapman for his 
e1:wouragernent to a mature-age studen·t to embark on a Honours deg:coe, 
and for h:i.s pat:i.e:nce in supervising this dissertation .. 
4J., Oaige:r, nr~ducational and Cultural J1spects of AuErb:ralian-
Ja.:pa:nese Hela:tion~rl 11 in J .,A .. A. Stock>·ri:n, .edt., p .. l27· 
5A bi1Jl:i.ograph;:r of Auatral:i.an a::t.'tic1et~ a1)out vari.ou.s aspect£• 
of eco~'lom~c. :r..x:·. wi·th ,Japan i~> g:lvon by n.u. Arndt, 11 Aust 
J.ilcononu.c RelatJ.ons with Japan: Deptc;n<hmo;-, or p.,:rtnershj.p'i' 11 1 
CHAPTI!m 1 
niTE PLACl~ OJJ' 13USDll<1SS IN JAPAN'S 'NA'l'IONAL LIF'm 
Amonr;; the factors that are considered to have bo0n 
important :i.n Ja.pan• s economic po(~t~·war recovery, the co-opera·!;ion 
1Jetvwen gover:::1ment leaderB 1 bureaucra.tic administrators and bi.r; 
1Ytwiness leaders is often mentio:ned1 . At the same time many 
\~esternorH 7 inc:t.uding some Australians, feel that it has g;i von 
JapaneBe lmsiner;smen an unfair <1dvantago in negotiations. li'Ol~ 
example, the late Hex Connor, v.rhen Minister for lhnera.ls and 
1,, . .:1 2 :J:n.e l:'gy aaJ.u: 
11 \~e 'i'lill at all times closely monitor the mineral industry 
to scouJ:'e mftximum na·tional benefit, just as the ,Japanese 
government docs $ •• 'I'he major policy aspects of fu·l;ure 
mineral and energy negotia.tions with Japan wi.ll take 
place ~lt a governme:r:rt-to-government level, with d.e-tails 
to be settled by discussion between the industrie::< of 
eaeh ccrun·tr:v and their counter:pa.rts. Henceforth, 
Auf::·tra.lia and ,Japan rdll mt.H.>'b at the conference ta1Jle 
i.Ji th rnutu<>.l rc :c:pe ct and unde rrrt,ancl:l.:ng. 11 
He fel·t th<:1.t gove:r'Timen:t support rJas necessary because :i.n the 
pt"t.st Au1.:rtral:i.a had come off second best in its dee.li.ngr::,; vii th 
'Japa:n Incor1)0rated 1 • 
t . t !Jb 1 
3
· b This ·term a tr1.bu ·ed to _c~. egg en u; ur;ed. y fore:i.gn.ers, 
\·Jho consi(ler Ja.pan as a single economic unj.t v>hich, in :i.t:s 
co-ordination of decdrdons and purposefulness of action, resembles 
- 4 a, well-managed singlcl co:cporation. libeggJ.en sta-t~~s that in its 
various variants 1 the t Japan InCJorporated' h;ypothesis attri buteo 
the following charaeteristics to the Japan government-·business 
relationship: 
carefully designed aclv<:mced strategies for industry development, 
central allocation of financial resources a.nd ho.:wy governmen·t 
subs:i.dies to :i.ndm:;try, · 
smoothly function.ing tnteraction. among elements of government 
and l1usiness htc:ed on a unity of objectives, 
expor-t master plan, including allooati.on of markets. 
rman Yahn, 
is one such 
2 
J'apan Supplement, ;;~:::;.;;;,~ ... ~.;;.;~;.;;~.~ .. ::.::;.;.;;.;;:.;;;,;.:;? 19th Uay, 1975 • 
3Attri'bu:ted to Abee;glen by ,T ~A.A. f3tocbJ:i.n 7 
·-·--·····~-·-~··,···-·~·-·~-·--··~·-·· .. ··~.,···"~··~~-·--·:.r..' Lo:n.don, 1975, p .. l17. 
:Bonton Conrm1 ting Group, 
.~;.w;·..;_.~c;;,..;c.;;:c;:·c;,~;.;,;;.o:;.;;,M_:;c.,~..,;,;_..;;;.,;;,.;.;;;,_,.;,:,;,;,.:.,.;;....;;;_:,,;~,-•;; •• ;·,,,_.;;.~·-~;.;.;~;.,~.;;:. f J~ 0 n d 0 n , 19 7 4 f p • 
2 
relationship is not r:~o f',imple@ llecause of ~Jho importo.ncc of 
understanding ·the linkH£S1£.' 1:let\·Jeen gove:rrunent <.md businGss, and the 
place eiven to business i.:n Japan's :national life, it seems to ·be 
important. ·~o devote this chapter to account fo:r' that :-celationshi.p 
in its historical setting. 
The tradi tiona,l attitude Jcovvards merchants and moneylenders 
in Japan l-Ias one of cond.escension~ 1llhrough seven centuries of 
feudaJj.sm, they were looked down upon by the governing ~!!E:.r..~·.!. 
class as parasites, tvho lived off' society at the expense of not 
only the people but government officials as well .5 Hmvever, 
during the long Tokugavm era of peace, the rigid hierarchial 
dt~yisions of sl?:\.!!11£ (feudal lords), ~2'E:.:!:. (warrior-administrators) 1 
:peasants, artisans and merchants in that order bore less and legs 
:r:elat::l.onship ·to economic reality, for the merchants accunm.la:tecl 
weal·th and were the creditors of many of the ~~~~. 6 IJ.1he:t'e was 
a slow but steady grmvth of educa·tion and commercial insti tutions1 
so that tne country was not ent:i.roly tm.p::repared for a pe:~:-iod of 
modernization and innovation once the old regime ended. :i.n 1868., 7 
The mn" :r·egime known as the Ivleiji Restoration w.:ts able to 
undergo moden1ization vdthin the fram<:nwrk of continuity. Nobutaka 
Ike 8 s·tresBes the poi:n:t thut it 't..ras the E.~'U'J::i elite, responding to 
external rJt:i.mulii, that came to power and were responsible for the 
programme of purposive modernization. 'l1hcy mcu1e the adverse 
comparison bet\ileen the state of their nation and that of 'the \-:!estern 
pm~ers. As a result, they were determined to catch up vlith the He st 
in ol--der to aehiev<2! equality vd th the great pmvers. Implicit in the 
goal of catching up with the \lest was a commi·:;ment to industrializa.t:Lon. 
5Yanaga Ch:i.toshi, B:i.f!7 lsusiness in Jn.pa:nEH'lO Polit:Lcs,New Haven, 1968, p. 
6 J .J\ 0A • fl to cb~I:i .. n 
7 
~m.·~~ C jj_~·~) • ;;·.------:-----~~~--
7 'l'he Tokugawa Shoe,unate had legitimacy from the Jiimperor to rule 
the coun:try only 1)y ~v;i.rtue of his ability to subdue barbarians ( reho title 
Scd.lt..-'l 'l'ai Shogun means 1 barbarian~·subduing Generalissimo 1 • In 1853 the 
Arne~r:Cca:tlc"'()t;}'n~od-ore Perry left a message cal1i.ng for the opening of Japan. 
As tb.e Sho,c;un possessed neither the military stren[',""t.h nor the support of 
the d<l~.!t!;:z:£, he Has forced "to nee;otiate a treaty Hi th Perry. 'I'his led 
his enem:i.eB to rally around the I·Jmperor unrJcr the slocan: 11 Hcvore tho 
:E!rnperor; e:xpe 1 the barl)a:-dan! 11 l~vontually in 1867 the •:Polmt;aila Koiki 
dc,;clared tho Shogu.n::vte at an end, returning h:i.f; r;word to the l:impc:ror • 
IJ.'he 1'~mporor Meiji h'D.S thus 'restored' to a ce11tra1 por.:it:i.on, hence the 
new regime 1vas knoun as the He:i.j:i. Hestora·tion. 
8Nobutaka Ike, 1 How York,1957,2nd edition 1972,pp6-·7. 
3 
rr•he sta;to therefore assumed an act:tve role in economic development 7 
involving itself' d:Lrectly in some form of enterprises\for instance, 
:r•ailroads) 1 but for the most part encouraging :p:ri vate ent:reproneu:r.n 
b;r setting up model faotoriost sending students abroad for training, 
hiring foreign advir3ors, giving subsidies to rms:i.ness .md so on. 
Ishida Takeshi, Professor of PolH:ioal Science in the 
Institute of Social Sciences at the University of rrokyo, places more 
stress on the bitter e:x--pe:rience of having· been forced to sign 
une-qual treaties 11ith Western countries, v;hioh made the Japanese 
leaders of the Meiji period feel it was necessary to '']inrich the 
country, and strengthen the mil.itary!n, a slogan popular at the time.9 
Various achran"l.iages co11.sequently were given to emerging industries. 
At first, the government itself operated factories such as spim:dng 
mills and munj.tion plan·ts. Later, many of these factories ·Here s:id 
to private businessmen at relatively lo1...r prices, although the 
muni ticm :tndu~rtry remained in goverrunent hands. 
One important development, to l'l'hich Ishida makes mention, is 
that the capital to be invested for industrialization was obta:i.ned. 
internally, mald.ng it easier for Japan to maintc:d.n her independence. 
A major source of finance was a heavy land tax, three percent of the 
land value, as determined by the government. In the process of 
rapid ind.ust:rialization, there was privileged industry on the one 
hand and underprivileged agrioul ture on the other. I shicla sees 
another similar dualism between the larg"' enterprises and smaller 
onest vlhich remains to the present ti1:1e.10 
It 'l'?as the larg'e enterprises that received government financial 
a,id a:r.1.d :patronage, for these \'/ere regarded as best able to modernize 
Japan industrially. l'Ien i.n charge of these 1n•ivate business intererrts 
were often closely connected to tho government leaders by previous 
' R . h ll 1 ' background or marr:u1.ge.. else 2A'I.er admi·ts that such co lus:ton 
i>Tould by contemporary stanclm'ds be considered scandalous, bu·t claims 
i·t did help produce rapid economic growth. It also set the pattern 
shida Takcshi, ill,anes~.-~~";z, Ne1v York, 1971, p.17 
10pJ2is1, pp.l8 1 19. Sub-contracts behieen larger and smaller 
factorieG have formed an inseparable link beti·wcn the tvJO, makinc:, 
it pN;sible for large enterprises to expand their busj.ner:;s by 
incl'easing tho number of their sub-contracts Hi.thout •wrryinG VBry 
much about doprosdons, to v.Jhich they can partially ad just by 
dec:r.·easing the number of su1)·-cont:r.acts. I<urther actailH about tho 
dual ot:ruo-turEo of the economy are given in chapter 3 of thif; 
dissertation. 
11
'Jt:dHin 0. I?.eisehauer, ,TtLpnn 1I'he Stox'v of a Nation, 1!cH1 York, 
197 0 7 19 7 4 cdi t ion 1 pp .15 4-l)'t)"'---·---00··-·~--~<------~· 
for the unique Japanese institution of ~~~.£, combines or con-
12 glomera·Les • 
It Yvould be a mistake to imagine that. all the finance for 
rapid industrialization came from the government. Yasuzo IIo:r•ie 
mex1tio:ns other rneasures.13 Through extending su.br~id:i.E. s and 
otheJ~ pri vi loges, the government sought to persuade wealthy 
4 
people to el'rtablir;h ouch firms as exchange banks, trading companies, 
marine trading firms, land transport agencies, and similar bodies. 
Not having a tradition of la.issez-faire, and being accustomed to 
control and patronage by the State, businessmen looked naturally 
to the government for measures of protection and active support. 
\>lith all the revolutionary changes in values and techniques 
that began with the Restoration, the one thing that persistod 'l'ms 
na-tionalism. According to these men of Japanese spix•it lvith 
lies-tern knot.;ledge, i·t was in Japan's oNn national interests for 
the~ government to support rn.pid ind.u~:rtrialization, and this is ·the 
reasons for the linkages bet>..;een government and big business interests. 
e.:__E~!2::t~:_ .. tr.~~]'2:1~r~~;E~~ a!ld . lb.~.~~·b ~~.: 
.~s industrialization proceeded, a \<;estern type of government 
graclually took root, and political parties emerged. The increased 
influE':.:nce of the business world 1 together vd:th popular demand.s for 
a more democratic government, led to the breakdown in 1913 of the 
oligarchic adminintration beaded by General Ka:trmra, one of the 
- ( )14 ~£ elder statesmen • A popular movement, led by party 
··~ 15 leaders and called the' ~~~1~2. democrac~r movement • l'C sul ted in the 
passa.ge of the Uni versa1 Hanhood Suffrage Law in 1925 ~ The electore/te 
£rttdden1y expanded from three million to thirteen million votc~rs. 
Pol:i:tical parties did not have funds to launch an election campaign 
on such a maE,rnitude, and therefore sought financial assisto.ncc from 
tho I that had greatly prospered curing i{orld 'l~ar r. The 
great Kanto ca:r'thquake of September 1923 had destroyed hro-thirds of 
Tokyo, most of' Yokohama and the naval base at Yokokusa, so the 
ibid., pp.l55,156. lh.mally there was a central, famil.y-
controlleCf'llh'olding company'1 , whioh through large blocks of share a 
control major indust.rial and commercial firms, rrhich in tux'l1 
controlled J.e sser affil.i.a:te s. Reischauer suggests i;he ,,;hole atntctu!'\i~ 
l':as not unlike that of tho rrokugmm shogunate, tvith its fiefs and cu1:J. ... 
fiefs. The zai 1)D,t su com1)ine it,ms not concentrated in a single ficYl, 
bu.t \'\laB sprea~r·rf;i:::-ou/~hout the whole of the moder'11 Beet or of the economy • 
l3Yasuzo Horie 1 111,1odern gntrepronour:ahip in Hei. ji Japa.n11 in 
tl .. I1ook:vrood (ed.), e and , Princeton,196:). 
14r h · ' · t 2· 2 )t:: .!3 l.O<'c\ 1 .£P_:!.SJ:l....:.~v P•-
·.JrraishO' is the name of the peri 0d 1912·-1926 
5 
f!.O"'.''(0l'nment had needed ·their' assistance \-ri th the reconstruction. 
,. 
ri1l1ough thore 't-Jas conrpotit:i.on of a kind behreen the za.ibatcu. the~r 
• ---·~"'"'" ..... , t! 
"together could ·oring povmrful influences to "bE)ar on the government 
t!J.at r·ol:i.ed so h.;Javily on their fi:nancial aGsistanoe. 
I ~ "d 16 . Srll. a commentn o~l D,nother aspect of th:u; olo:;c 
relationship between partiua and lm.siness. It b:r0d corruption 
vih:i.oh was eventually exposed to the :fl1l1llic and attracted a c;~ood. 
deal of po1,:m.lar attentio:n. Among the most effocti ve weapons in 
election campaig'!lS were accust.Lt:i.ons of corruption and lack of 
patriotism; one party Nould aocuse another of not "conducting 
themselves properly as su1)jocts of the JDmporor 11 • 'l'his undermined 
confide:n.ce in party government :i.n general, and led tc, the formation 
of n flsupra-party" cabinet in 1932 in pre·-Har Japan. The cabino·t 
vJas unable to oontrol the erovling povwr of the army, vJhich by a 
series of aotn o:f violence at home, demanded an aggressive 
e:x:pam:J:i.on to filanehuria and China. Despite a eono{liatory foreit.,"l1 
policy of the civilian J):i.et, the militaristic o:xptmsionist policy 
'~tlas successful. 
It har:; been suggested ·that this v:a,B partly due to the f'aot 
supported tM .. s polio;y· as a means of obtaining 
ready c:;,ocoss to rav-; materials. Though adr:;i tting the possi bil:i.ty, 
CoaJ.drake 17 considers that their purpo~~e i:Wuld have been better 
served. by commercial expanrJion free of military overtones. 
II 1 • t ]' 1 '.:1 18 "'l~. • t ' • • ' th ~;~.ccor< :tng o .. sru. ... la , uiJ.BJ.neBsmcn co-opera ea :tn organ:ts:tng e 
ecoromy for to-tal war because of their m~n i:nte:c'est in increased 
prof:its from munition produc·t;icn. The high rate of military 
e.x:pcnd:L"ture, iiJh:i.ch reached 47 .2:~ of the anuual budget in 1936, 
oon-tri"buted to rapid industrialization, but inh.ibited bala.rwed 
economic development. rrhe low purchasing power of Japaner.-;e at 
hon:e required tho country to find markets abroad. '1'he G:reater 
E<:wt Asia Co-~Prosperi ty Sphere 1 pla.n announced. by the Prime H:i.nis·t;Gr 
in 1938 laid emphasis on ~fapan t s eeonomi.c J.ee.der~:lhip <:'l....nd J.:i.bera:ting 
po-tential19. rl'he possi·nility of' gaining: accetJs to raw materials 
and to market outlets vias considered to ha.vo bean a strong factor in 
rmpport of the wa.:r effort t and ·Lhe reason for the OecupQ:tion 
autho:r:'itiesr detorrnine:cion to difH:>oJ.ve them. 
, .2.E..!!2 .. Lt · ; P ~ 2 3 
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· Coaldrake, 
Hithin a month of their arrival, American Occupation 
Thsy removed 
former managers from their posts, sej_zed the holdings of the 
lare;est firms and fa.milie b 1 and broke a own the cong1omor8:ces 
20 in-to smaller, presumably less odiouc:: par·l;o. 'l'o protect the 
new business environment, American officials established a 
Nonopoly J3oard to police reoonsolidation. However, according 
-!.. Ct 1 • 21 • 110 ;;) ·oc cvnn , the slm"lnoss of Japan's econom~c recovery vms 
proving an umvelcome drain on the poekets of the American 
ta:J..r:payer, and such things as the ~~£t.i:!E dissolution programme 
and the demandn for repa,rations by various Allied powers \•wre 
contri but:i.ng to economic uncertainty and lack of initiative. 
This led to a modification of Occupation policy. 
In December 1947 a La\'V for the Blimination of E:xceBsive 
Concentratj.on of Economic PoHer \'Ias enacted. According to the 
6 
Japanese political scientist 1 Yanaga 
22 
7 <:m important modification 
vias made in the original draft so that the lmv, as passed, 
concentration only. He clainm that thiG 
modificat:Lon 1w.s made at ·tho insistence of 2:;"';;.~1;.ai 1 the neH post~· 
\'Iar ·term for l1ig"-business pov,rer group. If this is so, one can 
see bmv quickly big business in Japan v1as a bJ.e to reassert itself. 
In this they \'Jere supported by American busineBsmen \'rho v:i.sited 
Japan in late 1947· rl'hey informed authorities in Uashil.lf;\;on 
that the an·ti trust activities of the Occupation vJere ill·~advised. 
The J"ohnston Commi ttec, wh:ich represented Americ£m. big l)Usir;ess 1 
made a similar report in 194.8 7 so that in December the United 
States govBrnment wi thdrevt its plan :for de concentration of economic 
IJ:'he :number of firms to be split or divor:rted of nome of 
their factories \"lias reduced from 325 to 225 a.11<:l then to 100. In 
the end. only eighteen firms 11ere ordered split 1 but seven did not 
have to comply. Ily the end of 1949 the Occupation policy of 
deconoentration of economic pov:er had for all practical purposes 
ended~3 
'11he Communist ·takeover of mainland China in October 1949 
gave a pov1erful impetus to the policy of rebuilding and f3trengthening 
Japan, while the outbreak of the Korean. \·iar in ,June 1950 made Japan 
·~--20aar;··~l~~on, :L<:J2~:ns::.£s.JJ:re,~;~·st!! 1 Ilerkeley, 1975, P .124 
21J· ~ A s·t 1 • 19· 7 ... · '· 5· 6 • .~,~ll.o oc~vnn, ), .2,J?_::...c;t:.~.· 1 P• , 
22ym1aga, ~2.:!-.i$, p. 35 23'l'his lX1.ra,graph summarised from Yaxw .. ea, 
an indinpensable supr.lly~ service, and op.s.rr,d.on:::1 baoe for the United 
Nations forcc.s. 
the Ko:roan Har 't'le.s made posni.ble by ent:Lrely new postvm,r economic 
st :rt1.cturo z. r.l.'llo highly eontralised finnnc:ial and <•dministrative 
control formerly exercised ·by ,,c:he zai'bat was now vested in ·l;ho 
State, with governmeJ:J.t offic:L;:t1s, espeoiaJ.ly from the M:i.n:lstry of 
Finance 1 assuming ·the powers and respom:1ibi.l:i.tios thr~t once 1:olonged 
"'· 2.cj ~o man<l..[;Crs. ri1he enti:t·(~ economy beca.r.1e extremely depend~ 
ent on the central gove:cnment, for pri vatc capital \-.ras p:racticoJ.ly 
none:ld~:1te:nt after the vmr. In the 1960s mergurs "Ywre encouraged 
by the government as part of the raii:i.onalj_zation and moderniza:tion 
programme in imhurt:x·y, designed to cope t"'ith 'the liberalization of 
·t:r'ade and foreign exchange and to streng·the:n Japan t s international 
competi-tive pos:Lti.on. 
Du:x'ing ~lo:rld vla::t' II J'apan had tried a basioE1-11y nineteenth~·· 
century ~Icstern policy of impe:rialist:i.c expansion in an attempt to 
25 
set up a 1 eo~·prospority spher·e'. Herman Kahn sees the attempt 
as a nai;·Lnal conclusion to the process of ~<!esternization tha·t had 
cha:ractor·i zed thc':l 1:J.ei ji century. 
process 7-.ras reduced to l'Ubble, and ·t;he cities of the homeland 
d.e st royod. No one vwuld have exvected. ~Ta.}:)an to recover from this 
catastrorJhe, though as has already been noted, the Korean Har 
unexpectedly gave an impetus to industrial development. J3y 1955 
Japan had recovered to i tH pre--t.._ra,r standarcl, and from that point 
onHarcls me.de rernarka1)le economic p:roeress. Many factors 
contributed to this gr·ovrth, some of \'llhich w:lll be discussed in 
future chapters. In this cho,p·'(;er He are concerrJN1 1dth the links 
betv1een gove:mmcnt a:n.d llusinesB in contributing to tl.ds reco·.rery. 
'I~here seem ·to "b,::3 interesting parallclr~ bot~;,reen the first yea.rs 
of t;he r.Ieiji H·:;;;,rto:catio:n aJ:lcl the early yea:rs after Japan regained 
:i.nde:pendence folJ.o•·d.ng the San Francisco Pcaoe 'l'rea:ty. lt viae the 
humiliation of the defeat and subsequent Occu.pa-tion that made 
Japan determined to ca:tch up with the '<lest through eeonomic 
expansion, so that \1That i-t cou1d not gain through imperialistic 
expansion, it mig·ht gain through. trade - the :recognition of national 
status on an equal:\.ty >·ii"th the advanced countries of the vmrld. In 
both caDee national pricl.e was at r-rtake, so i.n both po:rioclr:.> it 'da.s seen 
as being in ·t;he :national interest for the e;ovcrnment to support 
There is a da:nr:;::er of laying too much. Ed;ress on the degree 
of' Japanege unanim:i:ty and co--operation between government and 
bt1sineEJs :i.ntel'CBtst \'Vhi.le overlooking internal competitive 
cl:lffe renee s and hovJ' they ax·0 resolved. 26 Hil J.iam J3ryan·:; 
suggests that it is more ~~.octtrate to ·bhink of an \:)litest power 
st:t:'ucture of conservative politicians, bureaucra:ts, a.nd big 
bus:i.nessmen, loosely united by a common educational backt;;rouncl 
and a common belief in the private c:nter:prise system, but 
differing in ends and means arising from that value system. 
Corlf1ict~::l of :Lrrtcrest are resolved t.h:rou.g·h a gradual conselWllS-
builtting px·oceGo, which 1H:l calls 11 co~-operati ve ccrnpeti tion11 7 vii th 
prooonsultati.on on policy decisions as one of the ground rules. 
He identifies m:~. another ,Japanese characteristic the degree to 
Hhich they have ore;anir::>ed -'Ghe partic:i.pa:tion of bu.sinessmen in 
diplomacy as a oontinu.ing part·~time acti vl ty, with an elaborate 
structure of ::rtan<1ing committees, liaison and publication cha,nnols, 
and even a s];ccial terminolc·gy, namely private economic diplomacy~ 
rl.'hough l:i.fe·~:i.mt:' employr.1.snt :i.B i:l10 gener&.J rule ( a~1 explained 
in Chap·!ier Three), there if1 one noticea'ble exception, <.Uld this 
strengthem~ the l:i.nka,ge 'between bureaucracy and business. 'I'his is 
the p:raetice of ( v descent from Heaven') by senior civil 
("\1"'{ 
servants. Ojimi Yoshihieac::: , a former adminir:Jtrat:i.ve v:i.oo·~m:Lnis"te:r. 
of ·the J'apanesc l:Iinistry of International 'I':r.ade and Indust:t:y, explains 
that the lifetime of a top bureaucra·t is not very long. l3ecatu:He the 
structure i.s py:ramid-s11aped, as one c1im1)Br there are na:tul~ally f<n'lo:e 
It j_s no·!; usual to put a section chief l)elow a bureau chief, 
vJho is the same age or y 1:..nger. .As a result, most top 
bureaucrats re·tire f:t.'om the Ci v:Ll Service wb·:m forty-five to fifty 
yea.:Ps of age. I~ost take :n.e-vr jo1)s in the 1:.cngovornment sphere. 
~:'hey can go immediately to a public organization, but must vmi t t-vro 
yea:r·s to enter a pri va.te compa.ny unless they obtain permission from 
the personnel author•ity. 
'l'he:r.o a,re three ma:i.:n patternB of career transfer for Geniol' 
civil servants. A company may look for a retiring bureaucrat i·ri:tlh 
th3 right personal eonnectionr;. It second vit:J.y, most likely to 
invol V"d cc:t'·:rv:;qy'cion 1 iB vrhcre a, ei vi1 fJi.;r•vant in the course of hir> 
jirrd Yonl.tihiGet 1 
of Interno.tione1l 1l'r<1de a:nd 
Government r,lini~Jtry~ ~rho CaDe of the Iiinidr;y 
I1"JI]t1'''t'J.·'vll ·1·n . .,. Vo,.'"''~l (e,r1 ) • , .~' ~~ ~-· .•,..f<b (j\.-'.,. .,,AC> f 
.;...:~.·'"'·::.~::.;..::;.;.;,;;,.;,,;;:.;;,;..;;.. . .,;;.;.;;.;;;.:._ .. ;;·,,;; ... ;.;;;.;;:;..;.; ... ; .. ::; .. "'~-.~~.,,..,,.;.;; •. ~,~ ~ l3c r J.::;; 1 e ;y· , 19 7 ~) , p .11 0 • 
!'C-l'tiremen·l; from the Gi vil Service, he is able to g&,in a IJOsi tion 
:U1 private business. 
aoti vo ly Hoelu:~ out post13 f'or its retiring civil sarvcmts in fi:t•ms 
vlith \~hieh i.t ha;~ con:nections. 
Gerald. Curtis 213 admits that ~~~0:E:i plays a :r.·c.le in 
faoil:i.tat:Lng ousinc~sfi-eovernrnent connnunic<1tion, but eonside:rs tho 
situa:t:i.on is not free of a.mb:lgni ty, as the initiative for the 
X'()C:rtd:tment of the bur'oaucrai;s does not eome mrtiri.;ly from private 
firms, so it may not be as faeil:i:tati.ng fo:e contact1::1 -vii th the 
29 . . . govornmelTt as Yrmaga had earlJ.or mau1ta:uwd. 
Curtir?.\s e:dtieal also of the '\'ray thai; some American 
govHrnment publications refer "to .za~~J:S€:1~~ 2,£ a dJ.scrBte g:r·oup like 
':1.1 
the lm.lur:t:r-:i.al Problems Hesearoh Council. l~iyo:::;hi :Masaya-
suggests it is more acc:urate ·to define not as an organil'.>a:tion 
but as a collective noun for the senior leaders of the following 
(E.(~~~1~!ll "" the abbrevia 
Japan<';se name) f3et up in August 1946 under the aegj.s of t.r.te 
govornmeni; and the Occupation. AccorJ:i.ng "to StocL'.d.n3 2 it 
in:Ltinl1y included in its membership the J'apBJ:l Chaml)er of Coramerco 
and I.nJlnntry t<,S well as organ:i.zed;ion~> reprenenting small and medium 
industr·y. TheBe groups, hovrever, broke ar..zay about the time thc.d; 
J'apan regained hE:r :i.ndopen.dence. Ya.naga:·U states that its rer.;ula::." 
membership em1n:'ace~{ mo:r·B than 100 ma,;or national tra"d.e aasociaii:i.oxw 
and over 750 J.arge corporatioru:;. rrhe Federation :i.s u.nicrue in thn,t t 
though it :La an organi::;at:Lon fer private ln;.sinezs 1 ito membership 
include~~ both publ:J.e and quasi~·pu"bJ.ic co:r.'vorations, thus helping ·i;o 
ro:i.nfo:r.ce the intinwte bus inc EH~-·governmcnt :relationship. Cabinet 
eonvoy greetings in perr:::on. 
of the bud..:ncBs asoocint:i.ons 
and tho 1eacling nongovernme11t spo:ruwr of private economic diplomacry- 1 
Hi"'Gh three functioXJs: 
(:'L) to ad,just diffe.ring interests of industries and corporations 
on behalf of the butd.noss cotnmuni-!Jy e,s a whole; 
( ii)to formulate and J.n"'Cnent policy recommc:ndationr:; to tb.e govermnent; 
(:i.ii)to promote international exohanc:se. 
~~"'•W">w•·•~~-
~ Ct-:.!"'t:i.r.:J t UJ.}i.(~ J31ISil1CGD El.lld 
• ' Tl ~ /l) • 
Poli-bicc~l Influence" in 
20 
.,..,.Ya.na.r;a 1 • ~ pp .lOB 1109 • ~···''·-·"'''-~-·, P~37 • 1.Q ..; Curtis 1 
3lFli;y<..H3hi $ lecture at Sophj a Univers:i.t;y 6/B/Tl • 
32;:ltocl;:Hin,l975 1 i.~., p.l37 , .2J?~~.£t~ .• , PP• 
') 11'1~-- -····· ~. ..! ,). ••• , ... f'.'"'t 
and he therefore plays a decisive role in business-· 
government :~.~elations. 'l1-..ren·ty standing committees cover every 
aspect of the national economy. In addj:tion special commi tte~:s 
arc se·t up on an ad-hoc basis 'to deal vdth important problemB of 
an emergency nature. 
10 
~~.R~~±,Jl2!!!Eli -l:i ·~._!~· ~l.<?..~~~~~S.Jl~.Y~.l:~£!!.~1 (!S.£~E..:::L~~~) came 
3'-into existence in April 1946. Ya.naga J considers that it was a 
completely ne'i'J organization tvi thout any prewar antecedents. It 
began wi·th a small group of dedicated junior executives, \vho felt 
that a new organization i·Ias nee deli to give direction to the 
reconstrtwtion of the economy. At first, it concentrated on 
research and policy formulation rele:ted to problemB basic to the 
achicWYment of economic independ:mce. It differs from other 
economic organiza·tions in that its membership of 1,500 is made up 
entirely of individual::; bound together by common interests and 
goals and dedicated to promoting the heal thy grm'lth of the 
economy. Though it worked very hard making representations to 
·the goyernment, the bureaucrats did not take them seriously for 
years. Now many of the junior executives have become presidents, 
vice-presi<lent8 or directors of public corporations such as the 
Japan J)eveloprnent J3ank, Japan Export-Import Bank, Japan Housi.ng 
Authority, Japr:m Public H:i.g1may Authority, and the Bank of .Tapan. 
B t 36 ryan considers ·that its function for the business 
community is an in·tellectual function, -Go educate and speak for 
the individual businessman and his relationship to society. 
~3-i contributes to private economic diplomacy ~dth its 
confcre:n.ces and i:rtudy t:;roups des:i.f,".ned to produce joint policy 
statements for pu"blication. It has a strong international 
orientation and sends teacherB abroad and co-operates 'i'Ji th coun:tor-
pa,rt or&anizations in other coun·tries. 
£:_ J <?-:l?w~.~~ed.£Et i2.E;_? ..:!;":.,.;1i!J~p]~Y:?.E.~£~-~ (~0~ - the 
abbreviated Japanese name) v~as founded in April 1948 to achieve 
indust:ei.al peace and increase productivity. Membership of 
£!.:L!S~~i!:~ and. are almost identical, vJith considerable 
overlapping of leadership, so Yanaga37 suggests the two may be 
i:•egarded as the "t>IO Gides of the same 
.oit., p.23. 
~12-~ct~ .• , P•50 
zaikai coin. As 
11 
labour unions, n.nd. promoting laboul' legiBlation. 
lt ma:Ln'tai:ns clone liaison \\lith the l·1inistries of IJabor and 
Helfa1~e 1 the i3ocial ~ielfare Cornmittees of both Houses, and the 
Labor Sub-comrni t~e of -the Policy Committee of the J.,i bcral Dernoora:tic 
' 
Pa:r·ty, holding frequent informn1 meetine;s with government lenders. 
Though Yanaga con::liders it the most po-v10rft:l and unified. of the four 
orc;anizat:Lons, JJryJ,nt doc:::: not mention it, so he nlU.st consider it 
plays no part in the :priva-te ooonomic diplomaoy, despite its close 
liaison vli th relevan-t rninistrie s. 
Chamber of Commerce and (~sho ·= the abln~eviated 
Japanese name) date~:: back to !;larch 18'{8. As already noted, after 
the vmr· it vJa::1 affil:i.ated \..rith Jec.:~::E;.!:£~! but withdrew in 1952. 
Organi:4ed. on a £rbrtct1y geographical basis, ~~".:!:..~ is a federation 
of 445 local a.nd regional charnbe:rs in various oitiHB throughout the 
country. It ropx·e sents all business activities, J.are;e and sma.J.l, 
manufacturing and financial, trades and services. It is the only 
one of the four organiza:tions 1-.rhich :i.nclude f.l medium and mnall 
enterprise..; as members and devotes much of i·l;s enc,rgies to 
strengthening them. J3:ryan·t 38 maintains that it has diffj.culty 
speaking i·d th one voice as the interestfJ of medium and sma1.1 bu.sinesses 
are bound to conflict with that of big lm .. siness., It appears that he 
does not realise the interdependence that exists between large and. 
small l)usineEmes in J'apan. Yanaga39 admits ·that thr:! voice of the 
large chambers gro'V'n:~ stronger with the passae;e of time, particularly 
tha·t. of the 'l'okyo Chamber of Commerce. !Il,s~E-...?. is particularly keen 
i:n promoting expor·l; trade, improving the nation's balance of payments, 
and in international economic co-operation. 
]1. An example of .~~over:t'lmon't·-businoss co-OY)erat:ion: &l>t<fll~"'~....--"M>~""'""'""~"""')i<""'"~--~·"'·"""""~'"~~~"""""""'"-~'--""_.._.,. ................ --... ...---..,-,....,.,~.,$ ..... , __ . __ 
On 4th Augttst 1977, the Japanese Cabinet announced a six-·point 
programme aimed at business Btimulation, for industry was 0:>.'1Jeriencins 
great difficulties, as an aftermath of the oil crisis. 11any of the 
largest corporations >'llere \1orking at only sixty to eighty per-ccrrt 
of production capacity. 
38Brya.nt? .212~~·~· t. , p. 21. 
39
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L an acceleration of n:easures already doc .. ded 1 through the 
implementation of the JJudgetj 
ii. an acceleration of investment in the poHer industry; 
iii. an oil stockpile investment in Holdca:Ldo; 
iv. increased credit for plant and equipment expor-'cs; 
v. increased commodity aid to d.eveJ.opi:ng countries i 
vi. measur<Hl aimed at st:rnctural alto rations of specific 
industries, e.g. textileB 1 alum:Lnium. 
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Nr. Niyoshi 1 tho Deputy Director of the Intern;;d;ional Affairs 
Department of Koidanren used thif:; programme i.n a lecture at Sophia 
--~---..... ~..,.... . 
Univer·si ty to illustrate the influence of btu;:i.ness on government 
policy-making. J)espite the economic receE:Bion, firms had to 
retain workers as part of the accepted lifetime employmE:mt system 1 
so business leaders contacted the governmen·t to provide some 
business stimulation. Of the six proposals listed, four Here 
submitted by thc1 businoss associations, Mr. I~'iiyoshi. having been in 
charge of proposals (iv) and (v), so these vJer(:: explained in more 
detail. It was considered that the emphasis on exports should 
Bhift f:com 'unhealthy' ones 1 such as ships a.nd cars thc~t had 
damaged thd industrie:::: of other countries, to 'healthyw ones. Por 
-this to occur governme:nt assistance was needed for the export of 
plant and equipment~ Cabinet had respOl1ded 1 increasing credit for 
such e::Jrpo:rts. In the al'N1 of aid to developing countries, the 
government had preferred to grant project loans. Ho-v;ever, there 
rlere surpluses in Hteel 1 fertiliser and rice, so ~m.~~~l]; had 
recommended grants in kind. 
There is grea-t concern about ·the use of e11ergy, so ·~he sixth 
proposal 1 initiated by -the Ministry of International ~:rade and 
Industry (1H'I1I), recommended a sHitch from industr:i.es requiring a 
great e,mount of energy, e.gc steel and. fertilisel's, towards 
computer manufacture and allied industries. 1fhe textj.lc and 
aluminium industries were also experiencing difficuH;ies becauoe 
they are no long'Elr competitive on the Horld market, particularly 
because of' the high cost of electrical power, which in .. TaptU1 .is 
three times hicher than in Australia., and ttdce the cost of that 
in the United States. 1H'l1I 't'>l'as endeavouring to encourage the so 
operators to diversify -their operations, and this accounted for 
mea.su.re s aimed at structural alte:r.,ations of ~:Jpecific indusi;:rie s. 
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rrhe:::1e examples not only illustrate the links 'between business 
and ·l;he cabinet, but e~lso the adm:Ln:i.strati ve guidance provided by tho 
•~· . J 1 b I . rl'h '" · · ·t40 · uu.reau.CJ'Llcy, espec~a .. y y Mrr • Accord:t.ng to -~_JcJ~~'lS_ 1 J..t 
is the i:rrt:i..mate connection betHcen the business world and the 
bureaucracy that iH the special feature of Japanese ca:)italiGm, 
onabl ing ·the government to operate its uniquely successful poHers 
f• . d tl 0.. . 4l . o. gul ance over . 1e e co no my. J:LIDJ.. ad m:t. t ted that tho purpose 
of lllJ:II'I 1 s administrative guid.ance was to aid industrial developmen·t 1 
and. thus the activities of industry and the bureaucracy were 
mu:tually supportive. 
Hh:l.lst .recognising that there are definite links betvteen 
big buEJiness, the government and ·the bureaucracy, -there are a 
number of qual.ify:tng factors, vJhich show that the concept of 
Japan Inco:r·porated is an exagg·erated one. 
The interaction bet<1leen government and business pressure 
groups is not unique to Japan, but is "one of the most :i,rnportant 
aspects of ·the growth of the pmver eli:te vihich exists, in varying 
forms, in all advanced industri<'J..l corm,·J.nities 11 , Encel42 maintaLus, 
describing at the same time the political influence of the 
Associated Chambers of Manufactures of Australia (ACNA). It :l.s 
in-teresting iihat he ci-tes as a good example of ACHA in ac-tion the 
Japan-Australia trade treaty concluded in 1957, Nhich gave 
Japane:ae manufacturers considerably grea-ter access to the 
Austr0,l.ian ma.rket. 
Exploratory talks beh1een the triO governmexrts began early 
in 1956r and in .July the Departmen·t of Trade organised e. 
confidential meeting of ACl<lA and o-ther employers' associations -to 
ad.v'ise them of -the eene:r.al outline of the draft trea·ty. 
Immedia·t(3ly before ·the signing of tho ag:Peemen~ lWMA and State 
Cham'be:rB of i>IEmufact.urers, the Australian Industries Developmen·t 
Association, "the rrcxt:i.lc Horkers' Union and other bodies pub1ishe0. 
s-tatement:3 criticising tho proposals. Correspondence and di;scussions 
on a ministerial and dopartmen·taJ. level ,,wre used. to urge -the 
provision of adequate Bafeguards in t.he agreements, so -that before 




announced a syr; L0m of continuotH3 consultation bet1·1een his 
de p::;n·tment and ~. r,du.Ht ry groups. Since 1957 .ll.CHA has b'u.il-t; up 
i tB head office and recruited a steady trickle of officials 
from government departmcutst a practice that has interesting 
parallels t·li th the Japa..nese system. 
Senior Aust :ralian bus:i.n8 ssmen like I11r. 'Vi .. M. T'1orc;an? 
Nannging Director of lliestern !!li:nilJ.g Corpora·tion warn Australian 
audiences: w.iihe close co-operation 1)etween busine<:~s and 
Govornmm:rl~ in J·apan adds enormously to the strength of the 
43 position of the negotiating Japanese company." IJ:1h:i.s may be 
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true, but close co-operation between business and government in 
Australia is not unknown, so the Japanese position is not unique. 
Another qualifying factor, limiting the usefulness of 
the J"apan Incorporated concept, is the need. to take account of 
elements of division within the structures of po11er. Stocb1in44 
refers to the o:x:tont to which factionalism \<Ji thin the Li bera.1 
Democratic Party limits the Prime Mi.n:i.ster' r; freedom of action, 
especially in the formation of his Cabinet. To this he adds 
the :r'Ocepti vi ty of faction leaders 1 individual Diet meml)ers and 
even civil servants to efforts by presnure groups to exercise 
political influence. One featm.'B frequently attributed ·to ·the 
bureaucracy is the entrenched 'sectionalism• of individual ministries, 
aml their habit of 'roping off' (n~i.~ba:f}J their own spheres of 
jurisdiction from outside in·berference. 
Gerald Curtis j_nterv:i.e'l..;ed nume~rous Japanese busintH:lSm(m, 
s·taff members of the major economic federations, jotn:•nal:i.sts 
and. other observers of the business and poli ticCJ,l scene, and 
concluded45 that the ruling elite model of Japanese politics 
makes a number of false assumptions about ·the organi~mtional 
unity of the business community, its unanimity of views on 
specific issues 1 and its involvemem; in a broad. range of governmental 
deoisio:nH. Though there are fev1 case-studies of dec:i.sion--makine; in 
Japan, he assumes that if such studies \~ere ca:r.'ried out, it IIJOuld 
be shmm that different groups participate in the decision--making 
process depending on the issue involved. International :p:ressures 
for greater and faster liberalization and for "orderly ma.rketing11 r 
and domestic pre::.::sures for improving the quality of life l~ather 
than simply e:x:panding i;he size of the econorny are te~:ting the 
eap<.wi ty of the Japanese political and admini.stra:ti ve syr:;tem 
to respond. effect:i.vely to conflicting demands. 
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rrhis difficulty is ack:noHledged by Ojimi 46 7 vJho admitted 
it \>Jas ea,sy for IU1'1 to wo:::k, '.Vhen industry agreed that \'ihat they 
vtere trying to do vms to move things in a a irection that ivould 
benefit indust;ry. Now their job is to direct industry mmy 
from economic groi,rth to1~ards social usefulness, and their 
adminj.rJtra,ti ve gt1.idance may no longer be i'!Clcomed. 
In the past 1 as has been shmm 1 political parties have 
received ·i;remendous financial assistance from big businesses. 
However, the IJockhoed 11 pay-off" scandal has affected the system 
of j)ol:i.tioal contri butionB. Previously !f£..i..~:nr~l had filtered 
money from bus:i.ness corporations to the secretary-general of the 
Liberal Dr:m10cratio Party, officially to be distributed to the 
party impartially 1 but acco:t~ding to Mr. Niyoshi 17 i-t probably went 
to the Beorctary-general' s Oi>Jn fac-tion. Noi'l the law limits to 
small a.moun:ts ·the money that companies may give to the political 
has become a condui ""~ for :i.ndi vidual 
cont:d1)u.tions from top execu·tive~3· It can therefore 1)iir expected. 
that the ability of htu.>i:ness to influence the political parties 
may l)e lessened, thus further invalidating the conce:pt of Japan 
Incorporated. 
~1he linkages bot\-leen Japanese organized business, party 
government an<l the adminiotrative bu.reaucracy are thus far more 
complicated than many viri tors have acknovlledged. Yet even those 
wr:i.ters who tend to exaggerate the importance of these linlcages 
do not consider that this was the first and foremost cause of 
Japanese economic r,rowth. That horJOur j.s given "to:LH3 
11
-the general energy and dedication of the Japanese and 
their capacity for purposive communal action, Nhich 
\\Then ••• foeused on the problem of recovery, performed 
with its usual skill and dynamism." 
It is therefore appropriate to examine the place of 'wrk in 
Japanese society to aceount for such effective communal action, 
and this is tho subject of the next chapter. 
jimi, t., pp.108,109. 
47 during a lec·bure at Sophia University, £J2..:.Sli• 
L1 8n. Kahn, • t p.87 
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THE PLACE OF i'WRI IN JAPANES!S SOCIE'I'Y 
I .A Norlc~moJ•iented. Soeie·ty 
-~--W-~>M-~l~~~·"'"~>'~~--,..,.~-'U;,. 
Oda.ka, Kuni.o is :re ooe,r:rli sed a.s J. apa11 9 a leading lc:.1>our 
sooiol<.)e;:i.st. He ola::i.ms1 that though Japan~ a remarkable eco:nomio 
grot'Jth and industrial p1~ogress since the end of Horld Uar II i~ 
recognised, Weste:t'ners have not known at all well the lives and 
minds of the people who have created this u.ni.que development~ 
It is ce:t'tainly a topic thr.:1.t interests the Japanese people 
themr:;~ol ,,es, as is evident by the number of recently published 
bookf~ about Japanese t"'ocietyo Fosco l·1araini 2 maintains that 
·the 'VOgue of vernacula:r books and artioles analysing Japanese 
society, JapanEH:IO personality, Japa;nese psychology, the nessenc;e 
of ,,dw,t is ,Japanese" a:n.11l so on, has reached e:x.traordina:t~y 
px•oport:i.ons. ~4any of these writings haw been tran£!\latet'i into 
Ellglil&h, fl!to readel'S ax•e not ~lepende:r1t <.m foreigners' inte:t:•preta,t1.ons .. 
lr.t addition thoro are numerous govern.men·t surveys. P1or 
example, the :mconornic Planning Agency of the Japanese Government 
produced r-esults of their e:r.1.quiries to dj.sc.over the aspirations 
and l)ehavioul~ patterns of the J"apanese in the l.970a, oonolu.ding3 
that it is still a wo1•k·~cent:r.-ed society, for people do not want 
to take vacations unless they are very ill; they depend heavily 
on their place of work for medical examinations and care; many-
of th(lHtl :.t--eceive tx•ain:i.ng ax'l.cl education sponsored by thei:t~ employers; 
they use a lare;e part of their leisure time to inerease knorlledge 
of their 1-1ork; many of their I'f2)0reational and sport a.oti vi ties 
depend on f'acili ties 'lrJh:tch cu~e p:x.·ovided. at their place of 
employment. )lore over, peoJJle often live iu company houses; 
mo,;rt of their f:t'ionds are colleagues at the place of work; (),:o,r.l 
there a:r--e many who consume regularly ·the J;rodl.l.Cts of the enterpx-isea 
or inchuiltr:i.al group to which they belong. 
It is not neoeasacy to :reproduce all the statistical ma:terial 
used to r~upport se conclusi:ons, but the matter of annual leave 
may serve to :i.llu.3trate thc~ir attitude towards \'lo:rk. \~hen 
vt..t.<.1-.!l..<;l, Ku.:nio, Cambridt,"e 1NaF.nJ.l975,povii. 
2F'<:HilCIO y,J.a:ratn.i. ~ UJapan and. tb.e liu:l;ure: Some SuggeBtions from 
ra:linl'0 11 in G. Podella (ed.), 
t 
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lei.r;u.:re aoti vi tj.e s .. 
days of paid leave P Ja.pa.n lags far behind \ieatern countries 0 
ln particular1 legally osta'blished paid leave :in Japan i~J one 
fifth of ·~ha·t of SvFed<:mt o.1e quar·ter of France, one third of 
Jl .. u.stralia, <;llld half ·that of the Un:i:ted States, Canada, Russia, 
NeVi! Zealand., Israel or the UnHed Kinguom1 The movement to 
er~tablish five \vorking days a week is ex-tremely slo~-v. 
Yet despite such short leave, they found5 that only one-
fifth of the people surveyed took all of thei:t." paid leave 
enti:tlement in 1969, while for·ty percent took only half or less .. 
When they e:K:aminejd th<::~ reaA:wns for taking annual paid leave, 
they found ·the percentage of those using leave for leism:-e 
acti vi ties was very leN, as the analysis in Table 1 demonstrates. 
TADliiD 1 
• PEHCI\1N'l'AG'!l DISTRIJ3UTION Olf' PUH.POSES Oil" TlliNG ANNUAL PAID ll~t~v:m 6 
Pt:tX'lH> se s 
Illness 13.0 21~7 23&3 20.4 21.7 27el 23~7 
FD/t:i.gue 9·3 9~8 14.1 11..4 12.8 12.7 12.7 
Social fund ions 9-3 9·5 12.1 10.4 4·6 1.9 3e6 
TOUl" 10.2 6 .. 4 4.,8 6.6 18b2 14 .. 6 16.9 
Family obligations 3.1 6 .. 8 9·5 1 .. 0 8.9 2.5 6o5 
Bxcursion 7-6 5 .. 7 6.9 6.6 9e3 4·4 7·4 
Vj.oi t homo-to\m 13.,9 3·3 3 .. 7 5·7 1 .. 9 1..3 lo7 
Nur£:dng illnesa of 
family memberr;; 3·1 8.,1 3-4 5·2 4·2 3.2 3.8 
Spo:t··tf:: 9·9 3-6 1.6 4·2 5·0 3 .. 1 
inxrte r·t a.i:ning guests 3o7 4·3 2e7 3 .. 6 1.5 6 .. 3 3·4 
Attending an e:ntx·ance 
or grad tuJ.;l; i. on {;:erem~ 
mony of o:nei s child. o.8 2.6 1 .. 3 1..9 0.7 
J~oving house 1.1 0.9 L4 1~2 0.4 1.3 0.,7 
Celeln:'ation of one's 
o-.;m child I 0 .. 5 0.3 Oo3 3 .. 8 1.4 
OthC1I'S I 6.8 11 .. 0 7,.7 8.8 7Q3 6.3 '{.0 
No answer 9.0 7.,6 5·9 7·3 4-2 12·7 7 .. 4 
~~-,··----· ... •t---~~-.,~ .. .,._,., --'~"-· -S·t1il _____ ,k_<><~i·>- .,..,..,~.·-~~~~-~~ ......... -,4-
'I'otal 100.0 100.0 100~0 100 .. 0 
.. , p.,88. T.he results arE~ based o:n a f.lurvey of emJ)loyeeo' 
lJe:rcop·~ion of hourB 1 ,jointly ccmdueted by th·a l~conorrd.c Pla:nning 
A[t;t1noy and the tel' I1i. ion Center i.n !iku•ch 197 (.'. rJ1ho 
I'Jia··~.rey qu<~EJti.onn of rihose uges &"rer·e nineteen yearf.l 
or mo:!:'e 1 'J:okyo metropoli.tl'• lllos·t 
O.P ·the .,. i'i'l'(lu'" "'C)"k "f''"'"t -~~ · ·1 1) ..,.1-.J ""' "" ... • " ., ~: J:'"..,.' ····v-~.me on.1.y so , :r;··<3<Ju.nk"""' .y 
tf1is El:x:pla:Lns the of r;tatistica fo:t." older 'tJomeilo 
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\ihen ori.qt'tir:i.n.g ·(he rt~asons fc1r pe01)le not tak:i.ng the:i.r full leave 
enti tlementa, t:li:rly·,onc pe.J:'-·oent said they did. not need it; t'ltrenty-· 
to take the:i.:t• vacation ~;hen their oolle~tgu.es >-Jere working. It oa..n 
therefo:r.e l>e r::teen that their olaiw that Japan is still a work-
orie:n:ted soci<d;y has much eviden.oe to support it~ 
'J:lhe Av.t:~tralian 1n:u:d.nessman or politician, who expects to be 
able to complete his business with his Japanese associates in two 
ox· three days, and then Bpend three or 1nore weeks hol:i.daying with 
hir:J family, :reflects a differerrt a.tt).tude to11ax'C1s work and leisul"e, 
e.:nd this ma.y affect negotiations betv;een Japar.tese and Austral:i.ans .. 
On the one hand, the Amrtralian may oocome impa.tient that ·the 
business is tald.n.g so long to compl.e·tEl ~ On the o~Gher hand, ·the 
Japanese may doubt that the bu.sines~::~ is important to the .A:ustralian, 
~:.r::tnce he seems f;;o roluo·tant to spend the time to enr:>ure i ·ts 
suooes~::!ful completion~ It is the:r>Cfore important to understancl 
Japrmese atti·tudes towards t~oi•k. 
When Mr. 1>1organ was preparing his paper for a.n Australian 
audie11ce i11 19717 , he said he had relied very heavily on Ruth 
J3e~;:v:;d:to"c; 0 s { l.ondon 9 1947) • Thi r:; 
based on p:.t-e-war research 
t'tn.d intervie\'IS ~lith Japan.ese living in the United. States during the 
Senior Executi~a Officer of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company 
8 cormne:ntf~d: 
n .... the ne£~da of a visiting l:n..ts:tnessmall in 1971 are 
diffel'ent from the needs of Occupation troops ill 1946 •" 
'.!!he aJ:ternative list he <.lffe:rs, tho·ugh an imp:rovtHil1ent, is limited 
to h.i.fJtory a.nd economics, and does not include any translat;:i.ons of 
Jo.panose ~n~i·&\~rsf writin.g of their o1rm society.. If we would 
unde:t'·s't;and he>\'l' tho Japar1eso people 1rl·cn-e able to \'lork to achieve 
the:i.l" (~conomio recovery, l:'e<.~ent l"!l'ii;:Lngs should. be examined. 
rrhe J a. pane so Government t 
· :l.n itEJ a:x1xiety to correct E'ome current Western mininter:px-eta:tiona 
about their o1m people, has gone to the extent of' produc:i.ng its O'llm 
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English t:t•ant~ltttion of a Bocio-cultu:ral st;ttd:r of the Jap~'l'l.ese 1 
Ullde:rtal<.en 'by N0,kane Chj.e, the :fir~:r'~> 1r10man professor of the 
Un:i.versi.ty of '11okyo (P:t•o:fes~:;or of Social A.nthl'<'Jpology at the 
Inc·titute Orien·ta.l Culture). She is cri~ll:i.ca.l of the wJ:y 
tha.·t \rleatern scholars and ~apanef';e counterpa:t'ts "VJho have ovpied. 
their ·theoJ:•ies, h<we dispo of Ja.pruu.:H::e :phenomelta that did :not 
fit 'He stern theories by 1~1-belling thE)m a.a Japani s 'fe·u.dal' o:t' 
'lnwbnJ.rd' elernents.9 She suggest£~ tha·t the description of 
Western cou:n:triet:i as adv'allced nations refe:rs to the historical 
fac~" that industrialization started there at a :r-elatively early 
date., 'J.1cd.erni.za:tion' anr.l 9 industriHlization' have tended. to be 
equ<!l:ted, l':>l.Jld \~Jere certainly linked ·togethel"' by the l•iei.ji lea.ders .. 
Forme:x.• theories of modernization. l'Je:t.•e gove:rn.ed by the view ·tlw:t 
Japanese t:Jocie-t;y would the same as tha·t of the West if 
'11hough the le·vel of 
indT;tstriali~>ation is ncnoJ simil~~r ·to i'Jestern advanced coturtries, 
th:Lnks it only mrtur~:"tl ·that Japanese society, vihich is remtYte 
g>e<.)graph:l.cally ~:md dist:.i.ngt1.:l.shed from the 'illes·t l)y markecl his·toricz£1 
and cu.l turn.l f~ee~.~iiure s 7 should face fairly di.fferent types of 
problerns, and refore produce phenomenat which ·though diff'e;t'en:t 
from the He s·t, ought no·t to la1>elled as 'feudal' or ''bt.~,cbmrt.P ., 
Nakane10 obser·ves that k:i.nshi.p outside the immediate 
hounehold. is less important in J"a:pe.n than in I11dia9 south-east 
cou:ntr:i.cH'.I, and even in r~ngland. She considers -tha:t ldnship, which 
is no:t•mally :t•egarded as the primary and basio huma:n attachment seems 
to be compensated. in ,.Japan by a personalized relation to a. oo:rpora"'~.;e 
group based on 'l!~ork, in which the major aspects of' socieJ. •md econom:i.o 
life are involved. She e:t·tri.butes thir.~ to the fact that the vitally 
impo:r·tant unit in ,Japanese socie·ty i.s 1)ased on fx•.ame (:iJe. a common 
Ei'bua:tio:nal pord t:l.on) 7 rather than on a:ttrihu:t;c~ (i.e. some speoif:i.o 
Cfl.lali"ty of ·the irJ.di vi(lual). She ci terJ as ar1 exa.mple the Japanese 
custom of :tntrodu.cing· -'~::hemsel ves by saying fi:r·st the :n.am{il of their 
oompany, :rath~n· than t.b:ei:t' name or pa:rlicular oocupati,m. 
· '11l:1.ough it is oftr;n sa.id that the tz•adi·t:l .. ona.l fam:l.ly (?::~) 
• 
1
' • .!. t' 1 • • d ~T-1 11 t tt· t tl • J,,:US"!J:l. liU J..o:n :~.aa ct:J.sapp<:Ja:\:'e , l';u.~ca.ne no I'.HII .:ut 1e compa,ny :tl21 
a.ll its employees qua,lifying as mmnbers of the 
tmmmary J'ra.ru:~le/tion of' 
~cs, 'rokyo,l972~chaptci" 1 
Middleaex,l974 edition,pp.6~7· 
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its head., 'J.'his 0 fa.mily 9 envelops 
the employee~ a p~l:"nona.l ft1.mily; the employe:t:> :t'Ba.dtly taking 
responsibiJ.:i:ty for hir:l employeeu~ frun:tlie~;, for whichv in turn, the 
:p1•ima:r'Y concern is the company, rather than I'Clatives "rho r<::side 
elsevthere e 
Nakane12 (:lmphaair:~ea the vet""tioal na:ture cf Ja1'~11.eae Booiety, 
wJ.tioh sh<:~ explains in terms of an relationship. 
~~1~ means the l">erscm 1rli·th the s;rtatus of £,~~ (parent) a.J:ld ~~ll 
means 1od th .. ~;he status of 1~2 (child). The 't:.t'aditional .21:~~~-
ko 1mn r-e lationsh:lp took the form of patron ar1d clie:rrt;, la.lldcnmer 
lli!l'.I®.W>""'M'......,.,~r-.. ll" 
and te:na:rrt 1 o1• master and d.i soiple. She say a that the e:x:pJ:'e aaior1s 
are still usecl todayf although more :i.nformallye .~.~ may ~~ one 
in. a seniol' pofdt:l.on n,t a mail' r'>~ plaot':J of 'NOrk, \iHh t-vhom has grcni:1l 
a cloae personal relation~c>hip over the years .. 'l'he ease nt :i.al 
el('~men·ta in the r-elationship a:roe that. the .!s£1?!:31:! l"Boei vea benefi ta 
or l1el:p from his g~]?.?;;!:,E;' such as assista:noe 111 securing :px·omotion 
or advice on important decisions Q 
of'fer his serv:tcea whenewr the requh"es them. 
G d U' 1 .3 . . . u k • . -'· . t tl t ecrge .e vos :tn rev:tevl::tne •. ~a·a.ne a WJ.':t.~:u1.gs sugges a u:. 
l'lhat is impl.ioi t rathel." than e:xplic:'t.t throughout her a.naly8is is 
the fact tha.t emotional needs for interpersonal ha:t"lnony, aff:i.liat:Lon, 
nurtursmoe (dependency) t:Uld Hense of being personally appreciated 
aro fa:r• more i.mportant to many Japru:!ese than ind:i:"t•i>duated 
instrumental goals. 
tiha:h i.s implicit ill Nakane is ex:r.Jl.iici t 
in the ovJri tings of the Japa,nese psychiatr·ist t Doi Takeo, who uses 
the te:rm 
!';!E,~~ can t)e de:fined as a need for p<H'lf.dve lovet a presumptio11 of 
1;enevo1eno';} on the part of' others, which ie enjoyed at its maximum 
by ·the child :i.n the a.rrns of his mo·ther. is a verbal fo:rm 
of ·the llOUtl meaning to ·behave self-indulg~nltly, presuming on 
f;Jome special rclationshipo !.~£. then is an attempt psychologically 
to deny the fac·t of e<:Jpar·ation from the moth.er~·4 
The J'apanese speak of 'fatherless households', fol' ·the fa:l;her 
is so involved wiH1 hit3 1'<l'ol~k ·~hat ·the mother x•uns the household. 
Moat .homea ax•e so small th.at ·the Pl"e-achool chilfl is alt<Jays in 
v·ery clol'3e p:ro:idm:l.ty to its mother and a at:~:•ong bond dem-;lops .. 
·-""'-·~··-~· ~,19741 PP§44~45· 




with. his em})loye:r. 
F · r:r 15 1 • 1·1 ranc1s .su exp a1ns . e 
,!~,<.~}?2~~ l~·ala:t:i.onf,lh:lp bett"reen employer and employt:le as being rrim:na.r 
ctlld his d:i.FJCip1e. In e sserwe iemo·to i.s an 
4:t'UI14.,.__ 
Ol."ganization consisting of a mas·ter of some art o:t' skill, (such as 
pot·tex·y rnuki:ng, flo'iftmr arranging, calligr&phy, judo, No dl"ama and 
so on) .:mel his disciples., He maintains that iemoto-··like 
organizat:i.ons are not limited to schools which use th:i.s name, but 
aJ.~e the pl.'edomi:riant f'o:r."m of social grouping in J'apnno lle uses 
the term to 1--e:fc:'lr to a fixed and unalterable hiera:~.·chical 
a:t~rangement voluntc:tr:i.ly entered into amor1g a group of human l:>eings 
iiho follow a. common code of behaviour undel" a." common ideology fo:t~ 
a set of common objectives. He lWuld the:t'Elfo:r.-e inte:r•p)."et a worker's 
allegiance to his compa:n.y as that of a disc:iple keen to advance the 
inte:N.HJts of his master, being jealous of the l"'eptltation of his 
eeu~y to fi:n.d this i,~!!}9t,2_~-like relational ·tie in t:ru.ch Japanese 
f'Jocial org:anizations as the compan.y, university £md many other 
publ:to EU:l.d :p:d V'<9-·te instj:l;ut:i.ons 9 hut considers the concep-t is 
not enough to E.l:xpla.in l'Jhy the Japanese have ef:1'tablished ~1!!212.-
like sooi;::d gr<mps. He adrni ts that J)oi ~ s contri bu.t:i.on is 
:i.mpoi"tant in supplementing the studies of sociologists and f:10Cial 
an·thropologistrr,•/li'Eho ~rere :\.ntt~rested ilt the social struc;tu.re of 
He cons:i.de r£~ that Doi 0 s theo:r:-y might be 
effec·ti vc~ in intc::rpreting Japa:aese endemic mel'l.tal disease in 
psych.crt.he:t~apic field.s, but clai.ma :i.t is nc>'t the only significant 
a:ttitude :i.n Japa.nese in·te:rpersonal relatimlshipih 
One ctmld ah~o r:JeJ:•iously doubt ·that Doi t B theory d.oEH:I 
jtu>tioe to the :t'<")marka.ble capac:tty for purposive communal action, 
of \·lhich K.ah11 \>l:rote $ Hhilst granting that the energy generated 
1)y :i.:n:ne:r· tensions may be an impo1•tant cause of the \>I'Ol'k-and-
ac.h:i.evt;ment-~i,:ndrome of the Japanese. 1t1e.rai:ni l7 suvgests th«:1.t the t} "'""' 'I I,;,) _,} 
J'al'anEH'Je over£tll attitude to the world cmd life is more complex. 
New York, 1975r pp.62-69 
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<m.:r.ichi.ng are all fundamentally g<)Od ac·tio:rHJ .. In ·i;he event of a. 
no .. tional c:t•isis, he r;,ltl.in:tains tho .Japanese rally ~d th particular 
en(~I·gy round ·the pos:i:tive pole Qf the:tr personality, and :i:t is to 
this that he "Vwuld a:~·l:;ri:bute +.heir success., 
Tan:t18, recogn:tsing that "the usage of address "tt:::rms toefleots 
sensitively "'che at·t~.tudes in the interpersonal l>ela.tionships of ·!;he 
1rlhile he 'ttir~s able to confirm 
that formal ut:w1.ges <>f address terms had some relevancy to the 
vertical struc;ture of organi.ze.t:i.on e.nd the sense of ascription 
to orga.niza:i;:lonB 9 which Na.Jre,ne poin·bed out as 1:le:i.ng cha:r.acte:ristio 
of th.(:, ~rapaneso social wtrncture, he 1·il'as able also to sho'l'l that 
"'vhere :i.s a h<>r:i.zontal and appositional l"Ella.tio:uship between persons .. 
Though 
heJ:- e:x:pla.n.ation of Jap<:u:lese e;ociety a.s a. vertical st:rttctu:r-e may be 
of use i:n explaining the "bond between employer and employee, it 
does not a.cootm·t fen~ the rela.t::i.onsh:tp between co-workers, despite 
hc~r empha.Ed.fJ oil the importance of the group. In he:t• viei'rl9 groups 
in Japan al.'e formed by ·the ITf!.lltiplication. of a w:r··tical relation 
lle·tl,Jeen t'\110 indi vid.ualsr so tha"'v no matter ho'>-J strong ·the Ul'l.ity, 
11.0 matter ho'llll' 'happy the group' {to use a Japanese expression) t the 
sudden rEHnoval of the lt:ader ia a severe blow, and automatically 
brine;s a 'household rebellion' (the Japanese expression for an 
It seems at this point that the f'amily .. ~like 
sti'UC;ture of the company breaks down. Apart from the feu multiple 
bil-vths, in human families most Ed.blings can be ranked. in order of 
age, bu.t :i.n a large company ·t;h.G:re will be mlll).y l'Iho started woJ:>k on 
the same day, having grr:tduated from the same university or high school, 
paJ.-vticula:t•ly sii:toe :recruitment nox·mally occurs only once a year. 
Sch<)Ol cliqu.et::~ a,;re irtlpo:r·tant factions within an. o:rga.xd.zation, and do 
no·t seem to he:vu been adecruately included in her analys:i.s. 
Tur.1.1ing to a political scientist's 
a:~:1alysis of society, Ishida in his cha,pter or1 V<:dues, No:r.1ns 1 and 
l'Jducation, appears to gi w a mo:r'e balanced treatment to both 
In seeking to discove:t• 
Y>Jhat sort of value-orientation has made .Tapan more dynamic ilt 
other Asian oountt'icr:J, finds an a:ns1111er in 
~·~·--M~~~---·~·~-------~ 
, .£:E.!.£i.::~.o 1 ppo8l·--88.. 19Hakane 9 1974, -, p.46. 
Japn,ne£H3 conformity to a cha.llging si.tua-'(;ion. Con:l:'oz·m:l:ty is 
\Hmally seen as a static a:Ltitude, bu:t as he points out 20 v 
when :people are uneJ:J.:i.mously (}hang:ing ill the same direction, 
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OJ:"1JX.H:dtion to oha.nge is failure to conform. He then poses the 
question as to vsho determ:i.r:.es the diz,.~ction and Hpeed ,>f tho 
change. He admits that ·this is difficult to a.nsv.rer, because the 
change is not neoessarily vli!>hed for "by anyone, l)ut may l.)e the 
result of compe·t1.tio11. It is not ahmys :reali~zed that the:re can 
be oompetition within a conformity or between oonformitieso 
A1no11g company employees a strong sense of identity with ·the company 
and oonfol"mity to its g'Oals is accompanied by a sense of competition 
both e:dernally li:ith o·the:r• companies mt<.l internally in loyalty to 
He thinks that competition arnong the workers 
themHelvos is not destructive of conf'orrni ty, since it is oompe·!;i tion 
in loyalty ·to ·the <.~ompany. In this wa .. y, competition results h1 
mn~n:i.mi ty of effor·t ~ 1l1he ol"'ientation of the members of the &"l'oup 
is not towa:t'd individual achievement, but toward me:dt acquired by 
indi vi<lual con·tribution to ·!.;he goal of the group. He concludes 
th(1.'t th:i.s group conformity, together \ii th the principle of competi tion 7 
:i.s one of the elements :l.n bociety that a.re most i.mportant to an 
ex;pla,n;),tion of J'a.pa11' s "mi:Pa.culousn postwal"' economic development., 
He has no doubt that upbringing i.n general and school education 
in par·ticular play the most important roles in ma:\.ntaining the norms 
and vaJ.ues of a society. Austl•a1ians need no :t"eminde!t• of' the effect 
on. J'apanese ohildl"en daily reciting ·~he Imperial Rescript on l~duoation 
with its call: ushould eme:r·gency arise, offer you.r~elves courageously 
to the S·taten ~ 23· Many of them became the soldiers and sailors litho 
died in battle 11bea.rbnftJ :in mind that duty is we:l.ghtier than a 
mom1ta.:tn, while death is lighter than a feather. 1122 \'.fhile the 
Occupation auth<n"i tier,; banned indoctrinat).on in ·the schools and chan{;red 
the <)ducational system, Japanese ·who took par·t in the poE:rt·~1t<.:U.' :reoover:y 
of -'vhe countl"'Y and those in senio:r· positions today t1ere all subject to 
that educational system and are thus keen to ~'a.dvanoe pu.blic good and 
2~~ promote common interestsn. ~ 
l'le should not be surp:t"ised tha.t a:t the end of \"'orl(l \Jar II they 
liTe:t•e p:repaJ."ed. to endu:re 11the tmendura'ble 11 f devoting their total streng·th 
sh:i.da, 1 Pe37f~ 
Im:oe He script on J~ducationn (J~:ngctrans.) in Tsunoda 
H.yusa.ku et aL~ f3 r VoLXltNevl 1958 1 
1964 edition, pp.139,140. 
2~?~HJmpc Preoe1Yts 'to Soldiers n:nd SailorDtt,ib:td.rPP•l98··200. 
23. "'l'he I mper:lal He script on 1Gducat:ton" .---
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to the conBt:rucrt1.on of the future, to "wo:~k t<Ji th resolution so that 
you may enhance the innate glory of the Imper:i.a.J. Str-~,tt) a.nd keep pace 
l"li th. the progresB of 1;he lr<orlc'L 1124 rrhcy roBe to the occasion, 
fulf:i.lling the 1~mperor 9 s hope& 25 
11JI.cting upon a oo:n::::ciou~mess of solidar:i.ty and mut1~al aid 
and br'oa.d tolerance i:n their civic lif'e, ·they ~lill prove 
·i:;hemselVCS \1TOJ:"1ihy Of 'f,b.e:).r 1)0St tra,di tiOlle II 
Those young men i'Jho took part in the post-i'la:~.• reconstruction of 
thei:r.• courrt:ty are :no\"1 the senior e:x:eeutives negotiating with 
foreigners. It is l.mder~:l·'f;a.nde,l)le then that emotional sensi·ti v::i.ty 
and group Bpiri t are two <'H3pects of Japanese behaviour that Hot1ard 
Van z~mdt cons:i.ders26 influence their negotiations. 
In la,te 1969 the t~n~m 'economic animals' began to be l<;idely 
used ·t,o describe Japa,n.esc~ pre-occupztt:ton tii.th economic grm11th .. 
· Though appa.rentJ.y fil•st used by a. Pakistru1i minister to deplore 
Ja:pan° s la.clc of foreign policy, it has been q_·uickly used by 
South-east Asian countries to refer to Japan• s exploitation of 
their rzn\1' mater:i.als, a:n.d l'li thi.n Japan :i.s v.sed to criticise the 
coun·try' s lack of wellfare :provisions* 
H . y h. k. 2'' 1 . 'l ~ . t "J ag:~.wara OIJ l.yu :l exp. aJ..ns ·t la.\, :tn :pos v1ar a})an, 
democracy and economic progreBs have been considered almost 
synonymous, and economic progress has been ·the sole pu.:rpose of' 
government e This kind of government owes its succens to Et- strong 
popular conviction that eco:nomic progress alone was a suffic:i.ent 
goal. He cons:ldel'S that the gowrnment should have set :i.t~~ ol'm 
goalsf f'or the 11ew Constitution guara.:ntee~:1 that 1>asic huma11 I'ights 
\iill protected, ·that .. Tapan will not re-arm, a.nd that she will 
follo~i a, peaceful course. 111hese tasks {so beyond simply deciding 
appropriate ra·t;es of grOi~th .. 
He oommEmtf;; that f:t'om 1955 to 1965 the.:i.r annual rate \lfas aboV<~ 
ten :p-c~r-cent; thei.r trade balance turned from unl!Yavourable ·l;o 
favourable;· in those yea.::NJ thei:r gross national prodttct increased 
threefolcl so they can boas·t 11.ow of hav:i.11g the thi:rd largest GNP in 
thc1 \·JO:r.1d,. 1l'his progress he maintains "ras achieved by advancing 
tcnvardB the old goal of "catching up "rlith and surpafJr:d.ng the l·lest 11 ; 
24 11 Imperia1 He script on Surrendertt14/8/ 45 (T:~ng$ tr<:ms.) in D .J. J.;u, 
Vol .. IIr Ne-vJ York, 1974, pp.l'{6,177· 
,.,; Hescri pt Disavowing His Own Divinity", 
New Yo~~r'a J)ay 1946 in DaJ·., IJct, ~t pp®190,19l. 
26.n.I•' .. Van , 11Ho>-J 'to iato in ,Japa.n 11 :::,;;;,;.::. • .:;,;;~;;;;.,;;;;....;;:;;~;;;:.;.;;.:.;;;.;.;;;,;~.= 
.-DE!O" 9 1970 1 PP•45-·56 
Ioohiy':ki,w ~.' '!Tioo~om:to An~.;mal" Reconside:r."ed 11 
,No.2,Sprlng 19{2, pp&l~U-149 
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e:n:terpr:i.se 11 instead of ur:;trong army11 .. 
1:•r 11Rich cotmt:t~y, strong 
But, just as before the 't-Ja:r 
'there lurked in the 1;;aokg:round pove:dy-~st:rickon farmers and labouro:t's, 
today indus-tl•ja.J. pollution, j,nadequ.ate \'1elfa:;.-e facilities, and g'l~mdng 
aliena:liion among the peop:.e Elpoil ·the pictm:'e. He sugge'l!ts tha:t 
Sapan may bo c:;r.ea~dng a ll(.'JW zone of emptiness. 
Prof'esso:r Hirsohmeycr of Nanzan University is repo:t."ted to have 
mMe tho follo111ing summary of three charac·!;er:i.zations of modern Jap<:1.J:l: 28 
i. Japan is the first country in the ivorld to have given modernizat:i.on 
the sta:lius of a nai;ional policy. Leadership under the nEn1 po\'rer 
eli·te \<Tas strong, using ideology to push development. 
ii..Aided by hi.gh standards of education, the Japct."lose pursued 
economic development, assuming they need learn only the technical 
layer• of He stern knowledge, for Japan had its o\m system of. ethics~ 
Rote l(~a:rni:ng of foreign technology wa.s emphasised wi-th no ert:.ress 
on. the implications it held for society, or on the values it embodied. 
iii-People exhibit a ·tendency of nsociety-centrednessn where the 
:i.ndi_ vidual ·~oo easily succumbs to the demandfJ of his g:t•oup or 
group leadr:l:ra, changing his op:i.nion and course of action 
accord:tngly$ As a !'(1sult, the whole nation can be manipulated. 
I::~h:i.hara Shinta:ro 29 goes even :f:'u:r1;her, at·trilmting thei.r 
troubles both at home and abiVoad to a decline of morality among 
thei:l:• people" He p:ropom:.~s the hypothesis that behind Japan's 
fa1ntlous rush into modernization \•tas a 11hunger mer1tali tytt, sustained 
by a far~~reaohing inf'eriori ty complex tolvards aclvanced ~Jestern 
civilization" \ii thout the hunger syndrome l'JOrking on :pe01)1e a.t al1 
levels of society, he conr~iders Japan could never have 'bec.(1me a 
modern indust::r.:talized nation in one hundred years. The sheer 
prac"tioali ty n:nd n:alism of economics :provide the perfec·t yarda·tick 
in the coltlpetition of one nation against another, so he considers it 
was easy to le·~ ·the l"'t:tlea of economics justify the means to achieve 
technical p:rog:t-ess or economic gain. lie c:i.tea government attitudes 
to1~al:'ds Taiwan and Israel, both a1Ja:ndoned because of the economic 
advantages of trade with China and of o:n supplies from .Arab countries. 
He does not offer any solution for the recovery of natiorw.l morality, 
beyond the call i;o exa.mine the:i.r his·tory to see hol-t~ long the 
reservoir of mc.n:·ali'ty has been left empty and lilx-y. 
Shin·ta:A:-o, "A Na:tion ~Iithout lt1orali tyn, 'l1he J'aEan 
7 No .. 3, tfinter 1975. p:p.276-291· ·~~-·--
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Jrukutakt"l Tadaslli 30 equally is cri·b:i.<m1 of the lfact that; 
though J<'1pan has become lL:n economic r:m.:perpo·~-1er, with a GNP third 
in th.a \Wrld, i·t has o:nly ·tb.irteenth place :l.rJ J">t;1l' <;ap:t ta national 
income. He oomplro.nB that the 1ms:i.nes1:1 community, Nhich suppor·ts 
th0 l'U.ling conserv~:'tti ve govE,rnmcnt f has no vision beyom.l short-·teJ:"m 
econond.c :t""a:tionali ty. Though there h!JA3 1)eEH1. disouHsion of 'the 
social res:ponsibil~.ty of busine1:m, he conBiders tha:t social 
development is likely to rece:t ve nominal conrd.deration only fol~ 
some t:i.me to comet and tha.t economic Qevelopment will continue to 
domina·te planning .. 
Na,kamura Takafusa 31 claims i;ha:t the <:ll~a of high economic 
grmith particularly of the 1960s is called a "&.'olden a&re 11 in 
acknowledg1nent of -the St'i.bstan.tial rise in the Dl<:l.te:ria,l standa:t•tl of 
living of the average J"apanese. At ·the outset of the decade, 
families prided themselves on the acqu:isi tion of such co:nsumer 
· i terns as bla,ck-and···Wh::i:te television sets, w~ashing machines and 
vacuum cleaners l bu·t now they are proud of their colour televisj_on 
sets, f<:unily ca:t•s, a:tr coJ1di·tiou.ers 7 and their financial al>ility ·tro 
·tl"avel abroad. 
lt'\tkutake 32 adm:tts that the r~;1.pid growth of the economy 
raised the standard of living of the J"apaltf:JSe peo!)le 1 bttt highlights 
the la,g in social facilities. ~1he hous:Lng crisis con·tinues without 
chane,re, with lalld so e:xpensi ve and the demand for housing so gl""eat 
that many Japanese see no chance of having a decent living em.d.ron~· 
ment. He points to deficiencies in en':ironmental facilities such 
as water :rm.pply, sewac,-e dispooal, rubbish disposal, lack of pt'>,:cks, 
l:i.braries, creches, medical care outside of cities, and the loi'>~' 
leve 1 of social security apa,:rt from tha.t J)l"'Ovided by large 
COl'l)Orations for theil• O\'m \vorke:r.s. 
In 1970 the government finally removed the articles that made 
concess::i .. onG to economic development in ttto Dasic La-v• on Pollut:i.onu 
and es·tablished the J~nvironme:utal Agency. It also announced a 
lie 'it¥ llioonomic and Social Development PlanT \d th the su bhead:i.:ng: 
"Toward an l~conomically Hea1thy Society Rich in Human Values". 
Ft.1kutake 33 considers that this is long overdue, and that even noli! 
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the:~:.·e is no guara.nt,~e that the Japn.nesf~ pco1•le \11ill truly benefit, but: 
111f tho coun·t:ry can concentx·ate on prov:J.ding adequnte f1cili ties 
for the l:i. envirrJnment, part of the Japal'l.ese st:i.gm<:.\ of 
bei.ng called 0 econom:l.c an:i.mals", intent only on economi ':> 
grot>Jth, '-1ill be lif·ted • 11 
It \~ould seem that oncE~ aga:Ln national p:.l:'ide :i.s a;t stake & 
'l~h:is was further a:roused 1>y Prof., }.1aruo3gf Chuo Uni vorsi ty 
who commented that, in the past England i'las Japan's teacher as an 
adv~noed industrial:i.zed nation, and. even :a.ot'lf was Japan's teacher 
in welfare, for it will be many yea;rs 1)efo:re Japan can catch up 
'Vlith ·the advanced. iudustrial,i21ed nations in welfare provisionse 
It seems that once a,gain Japan feels the need to orttch up l'<i th 
some as:pec:Jt of ~·les·tern society., 'l'he Economic Deli be!'a·tion Council, 
a consultative body of the Prime Minister for long-term economio 
policy and impo:r•tan·t pl:;:mning problems stated: 35 
nfiith the development of ·the economy and the r:1.s:1.:ng level 
of living the desires of the people become higher in 
grade. 1l'hel.'l':)fo:r"e it is necessary, corresponding to the 
people'B needs, to develop a nev1 method for the accurate 
measuring of the people v s welfare·" 
I:n l~ay 1971 the Council founded a special committee for the develop,-
men·t of NN\'11, i.e .. the :new Net National t~'lelfare index.. }1aruo says 
·that GNP is in.app:r·opri<:de for the representation of ·the level of 
welfare, 'because GNP oa:nnot shovi movem~£m·!;s of non--economic l\l'elfare, 
as for example, estj.ma:tion of human life, po1lu·tion and destruction 
of nature and envi:(•onment, human alienation and such problems., It 
is hoped that the supplementa-t. ion of GNP \~i th N.NU and social 
:i.ndicators, once el<::1borated, liill be discussed not only in Japan bu-t 
also in other cotu:rt rie s as happened \\l':i. th GNP, so tha-t; an inte r'lw:"donally 
acknm>Jlede,ced index can be ur:~ed. Scheppach36 comd.d.ers the:!; the s·tep 
. to \'lelfo.:ce-grorrth economy has been undertaken on a sound basisr even 
if it :i.s diff:toul:t to proceed under the prevail:i.ng international 
cond:i.i;ions. 
3"{ Onoe I!:i.sao t hm-1ever, points ou-t tha,t the:re are obstacles on 
the \·my towards ~Tapan becomil1g a welfal'e-oriented economy. 
(1977) it is apparen·t ·that f:r·om 
1970···75 improvt~me:nts i•Tere made in social welfa:r"t~ provisions:38 
summa,ry of Prof., Naruo 1 s \ITrj:t: ing :i. B given by ~l. So he ppach, 
"Suppleme:ntatj.on of GNP vlith NNW' in G. Iilodella (ed.) 1 .2J2w!E.3:!• 1 PP•246·~266. 
It appears 'lihat Iclaruo may not have be~m transla:t€id into 1Bng1ish. 
35Heported by Scheppach, ibid~,p$248 .36ibido, p~266 
37onoe JHsao, "Japan: Ob.8-'t'acl(H3 on ·the ··-"1J:'o\'iards a Hcl.fare-~ 
Oriented Eoonomy 11 j_n G., li'odella, cit., pp.239-2LJ.5· 
3Bo t1' f b • J c · 1 r u .::tne o. ;..)oc:ta " , •. )OCJ..a. ..:rwul~ance 
Atiency, ,Jap<;,nes~~ Government, p.l 
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"'rhere have many amendments of thc~se !Jehemea as to 
e:x:tension <If coverage, improvc1rnEmt of benefits etc. 
parallel to the socia1·-econorn:Lo developrn(:nd;. Particularly, 
in 19'73, EIOhemes t-wre amended remarka.iJly rosult:i.ng (in) the 
improvement of benefitt:J and introductton of neu ideas in 
ordez~ to mailTGain 1:JEH'J.efitsf real value and to lighten the 
liability of :l.nsured p<:lr·sons ••• 11 
'l'his 'N'as possible only by inc:N::asing the tax burden~ \l!hile in 
comparison wi-tl:t other countries it is lol't, the Japmwse people 
ha:v(a the fee ling that tho pr~;;; sent tax burden :ts heavy t due to 
the unequal taxation f.>;;.n:rtem, and some readjustmeY.rts will need 
to be made. 
F'ollovJing i;ho oil shock in 1973, the government has 
published several pl.:ms for ·th<~ ada,ptation of ·the industrial 
structu.l'\? in order to economise on i;he consumption of petroleumo 
Thio nul,y lead atmy from the heavy and chemical secto1•s that have 
been so critici::;ed for their destruot:i.on of the envi:romnent B.!ld 
the pollution diseases. Thin will l<>equ:l.re a diversi:f'ioat:i.on of 
i:ndt:u:rtry and some readjustment of labour· x-equiremelrts, so that 
less overtime, shorter \..rorking weeks and longer holidays may 
become pos~:d1Jl~3.. Jl:t the same ·bime it i'Jill be difficult to 
iirumce incr'~:laE>CH:i l~·e1fare p:t"''grammes c, 3 the eco:nomy is readjur:rting 
to thEJse cht:t.nged ciroums·tanoes. 
Kogane !oshihi:r.'o~9 depu.ty di:roctor 1 r~conomic Research 
Institute of the }':;co:nomic Plwning Agency in Tokyo, points ou·t 
that some of the p:t"'esent Japanese problenn,; are common to indust:dal 
society, but as they C<)me from the characteristics of competiti VEJ 
societieB \'Jhic.h do not seem deep~~:t'ooted. in Japan's society, he does 
not expect them to oause a serious socio·~c·.tl tu:ra.l disturbance. He 
considex·s that Japanese specific problems i'l-rise from ·the fact that 
tt-lo differen·t systems of valu,es co~·exist in :i.ndi viduals. They 
\..rarrt del:l.1Jerately tc;~ import ~i;hc relig:ion of "competit:t()n1• and 
"matElr:i.al ~mlfare 11 , but are obstnw'ted by ·~he old I'e ligion of 
"harrno:nyn and "men·tal welfare 11 • He mai:n·tains it will be favourable 
to abandon ucompe·t;itionu and 11mater5.a1 welfa.:r-e" at" l)a,sio valt1.es, and 
to b'~ con.f:i.dtmt of the oonsi,Btoncy, rational:i.JGY and hu.mani ty of the 
Ja:paneBe traditional value syr:rtem .. He thinkfJ the ,Japanese \>Vill 
have to make v,n effort to unde:t•sta.nd the utility of controlling 
competi:tion e.nd me.terial 1-1elfe.re so as to make it serve the vmll·--· 
being of the whole (not of ·the individual), if they want to enjoy 
Yor;;h:l.hiro 1 "VaJ.uc ,Jud.gements a.nd r:conornic Activities 
of .Japaner~e Ji Dynam:ie l~conomy and a Sto.ble Cultu:x'El 11 in 
G~ Ii'odellar -"''"'·~""'"'"';;;;,",•v! pp.l87-J.88. 
.. codayt s fr<:1edom and to live i:n harmony with the humar.l and 
:phyLical \vo:r.ld ~ 
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1l'his would seem to be trying to ju.st:i .. fy policy agains·t 
rl'hough lives of 
hard work and. simple living are ferd;ures of ,Japanese 
tr<:-1rd:i.tion, he doeH not seem to make suffioien·t allowance for 
the fao"'t thai.; through mas:;.~ media, especially television, 
Japanes(~ people haye acquired e,~ taste for the benefits they 
ex:peot an ;;d'fluent society to provide for all the ci·tizens. 
'l1his, together 'li·li th the na:tional desire to show ·that Japan can 
su~t'pass other advanced co1.mt:ries, would seem to make i·t 
inevitable tha·t the country will move towards a wclfal'e-o::!'iented 
economy, so they will n.o longer be despised as 11economio an:i.malst' o 
There \t:tll, ho\·lever, need to be chru1\ges in the behaviour 
of Japanese wo:t•ker£-)t as 1\l'ell as changes in g-ove:mment policy, 
bt:~fore ·the term "economic animals" will be dropped, for it is 
the t'lforker, f.J:pending so long at his work and having so little 
leisure ·that h1:1-s helped the term to become so lddely used .. 
Co:r.·tain minirrt s <md govcl··nment agencies are therefore proposing 
having raised the nwnber of holidays from nine to twelve in 1966 
is :t'CJ)O:rted to i:1e considel'ing proposing five additional days of 
rest. 40 IJ.'he ltabol~ I.Unistry is promoting the fi ve .... ·day wo:r·k week. 
Its plan is to rev·ise the Banki11.g Law to permit only five 'banking 
days in the hope tha.t other businesseB will be forced to folloi-1 suit .. 
Simply c:reating holidays and tttw-day i'Ieekends will not in 
·themselves keep workers away from their place of employment~ The 
problem is one of re·Th·educa:tion, and it is another government body, 
the 1!:oonomio Planning Afi,JYC11(,1Y, that has begun to call attention to 
the issue., In itfJ 1972 Hhi te Pape:t~, (from wh:i.ch statistic::."l material 
abou·t the Uf.:le of vacations has al:ready been given), it is olaimed41 
th.r:t:t the average Japanese tries ·to maximise satisfaction from his 
scant leisure 1)y spending mon~:ly, believing that the more he spends 
tho gl"eater trJ:i.ll bo his enjoyment. In 1963 leisure expenditure 
av•n•aged 18.2 per-cent of ool.'Hlttmption expenditure, but 1Jy 1971 it 
:represented 23 ~4 per-.. cont of consumption expendituJ~e. Increased 
Dixon 111orris 1 "'Jlhe Idioms of Contemporary Japa11" 7 .:£.£le .J~~)~J?.ftE: 
• VIII, 19'/3, pp.l21~·136o 
the .2.£.!,Ci!•t pp.lOO···lOL].., 
ElXptnldi·l;ure is a1. ince:ntiv·e for him to work longer hours and mox•e 
dayn ·co achicJve U1e success that 1·dll bring him a higher income, 
but ~~t the same time reduc:i.:ng tho amount of leisure he \'Jas trying 
to enjoy in the fi:!:•st place. As he t1•ies too hard to squeeze 
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the last drop of pleasu:t:'e out of too little ·time, he d:r<lwns himself 
at the beach or 'b:t~eaks his neck in the mountains. 1J:he l·lhi te Paper 
gives disturbing r:tatistics to shoiv the increasing number of 
aocidcn~rts 1.n ·the wa·ter from swimming, boating and playing~ as -v;ell 
as disasters in the mountains$ It therefore makes a strong plea 
:for a switch from j_ncome-consum::l.ng leisure to time-consuming 
leisure. The .Agency' f3 approach is repor·ted42 to be leading to 
in the Asahi sh:i.:nbun column \·lhioh said: 
'~""1~~-1-
nsince the Neiji :period the governmen·t has told us, 
'l~orld i~ork!. w. • e Now they are taking us to 
ta~>k for :i:t fU'ld te lli.n.g tla, 'Re at t He st! .... v • 
'l'ime s have ohange<l. 11 
It may appear that if Japan is moving :from a \llork-oriented 
soc:i.ety that the Australian businessman may find hiB Japanese 
counterpart shares similar aspirations and expectations to his oim. 
This may he true in ·the future, but as Japanese society is going 
th.rough such a peJ:.•iod of trans:ition, the ohange is far f:t·orn complete. 
The 1l.ustr·alian may find that negotiations are even more difficult 
ths,n before as the .Tapa:uese bus:i.nessman \dll now :realise that Ni th 
ex.pected r~horter hours of work and other changes in working 
condit:i.ons, long:-term contracts may not be as attraot:i.ve as would 
first appear. If th<.:l negot:i.ations concern raw materials, he will 
need to make allot"lanoe for the expensive pollutj.on con·i:;rols tha:t 
vJill be enforoecl in their man:ttfactu.Y'e, so the move towards a wel:fnre·~ 
oriented economy may v1ell make the Japanese tougher negotiators 
than before. 
Apart from thE~se :factors that have been produced by the 
changing societ<J..l attitudes, there are other traditional factors 
tha·t the Je,p<.mro~se negotiator mmrt consider: whether the proposal 
tmder di~wussion rJill afff30t his \'iOl'kforce, hi.s permanEmt employees 
expecting lifetime employment \-Jj:i:;h him; and Hhether the propc)sal 
.-dll be acceptable to his colleagues, uithout whom he cannot make 
a definite oommi tment. r.rhese and other aspects of Japanese 
managenJEJnt are co11sidered in the neA--t two chapters. 
Dixon Morris, 
CHA.l?Tli1 R I II 
I Introduction 
~~'-"'---~-~-·,.,..-
In adapting to the environmental changes to whic~h the 
preceding chapter made :t:'eferenc~e, Japanese e:x:ecuti ves give 
great attention to problema of morale and human relations. 
If Japanese executives have a characteristically Japanese 
approach to tnanagemen-t; v Noda lazuo1 1 Director of the J'apa.n 
Research Im~ti tu.te in ~P.okyo, suggests it is not so much a 
specific body of practices but an. effol~t to create a company 
spirit such that members wish to take parte Seem. :l.n this 
light, the Blow increase in salar:tes in the earlier years 
of an employee's caree:r' and the steep s11lary inc1•eases with 
;y-ea:r•s of service can l:>e seen as a way of ensuring employees 
not only stay wi·th the company, but x-etain a long-range 
id.entification of pe:r·Bonal in"iierests with company interests. 
Company ce:r'Bmoxdes like annive:r·sa:ries, daily ceremonies, 
commemo:r.atives, welcome£>, farewells and openings aN, aJ.l 
consciously de s::i.b'!led ·to reinforce company spirit. In most 
companier::l the mana.gement makes a serious effort to look after 
the long-te:t'm interests of the employee, providing personal 
attention and assistance :i.n dealing '-gi th his :i.nd:i.vidua,l 
problems.. li'r-om the enie:ring-the·~company ceremonies the new 
:t'eo:ru.it is made to feel part of the oompan.y family. 
In the p:t·eced1.ng chap·ter i·t t-Jas noted that the:re 
appeared to be some move away from ~mrk-orientat::i.on. Japanese 
company execui;:i.ves consider ·this a key ma.nagement issue, a.nd 
a.re competh1g for the emp1oyeeB 1 spare time against the threats 
of a,ffluenoe, oar ownership and shorter tJOrking hours. 
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According to Nod.a 7 thiB accounts for ·their effo:rrts to incorporate 
the spare-·t:i.me activities of employees within the range of 
aoti vi ties provided by the company. Company spot-ts teams, 
oompany-sponso:r'Eld travel, company recreation centres, ccnnpany 
facili t:i.es for private parties can all be seen as ways of using 
people t s de sire for more leisure as a l[m,y of further orienting 
employees to the:vr "I'.JO:r.k·-pla.ce, and satisfying their :net"Jd to be 
part of c.;;, t~ou.p t1ith a strong relationship to the leader, the 
Preside:nt o.f the company or tht~ ~::·eotion chief. 
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kpar't from these <:lffort ::J to maintain a dynami o involvement 
• '"1 ~\, 'M ,; 2 • d th t J 'VI:!.'~; 1 ·1;1!e oompan.y, ···oua cons:L t'J!'f3 a apanese enterpr~ses are 
vecy Bind.lar to forej.f;l1 enterp:r.•is,.;;s. However, aocord:Lng to 
Takezai:U:t Shin:Lehi. 31 l'rof<:Hll::lOr of' Industrial He1ations at Hildcyo 
Univert::dty, the fou:r pillars of Jc1.panese management are: 
life·time employment; 
fJ~miori ·ty rsyEttern; 
enterprise un:i.onism; and 
consensus decision-makingo 
Before examining each of ·these af~pec·ts of Japanese ma~mgemen·l;, 
thel'e are qualifyi:ng facto:~.•s that need ·to lm conside:t•ed to 
avoid certain miE<conoep1;ionB about Japa.nese management. 
1 
ThifJ term ia used 
by the Japanese to contrast the laJ:'&,"'·•SCalc firms rih::i. .. ch pay 
reJ.a·~ively high s and h.c:nre good work:i .. ng condi tiona to the maEH" 
of small and mediwn-~:dzed enter:pl~ises, often fam:lly O\·med, l<lhich 
subsidize the major enterprises by the:i.r lo~,rer wages~ longer hours, 
and poorer \1orking condi ti<:ms 0 It is easy to 1--estrict comme:n·ts 
about J"apa.nes<~ management Pl~<l.ctices to those operating in large 
corporations. 
'l'he large firms, in con:trast to the small ones, are highly 
tu'lioni!i;ed, highly capitalized, and ha:ve specialized managerial 1 
sales and perso:tmel org·anizations" J.s defined in the l3asio J.Ja'lrJ 
on Small a.:nd Mec1i.um-Si!-~ed n~ntel'priGes 1 a small or medium-sized 
firm is o:ne \'Jhich is capitDJized ux:td.er· ¥~)0,000,000 or employs less 
than 300 wo:t•ke rs. That they occupy a. numerically dominctn.t pNd.·bion 
in px·~:wtically ev.:-:.x'y branch of the ~Tapanose economy can be seEm in 
Table 2~ They account for more than ninety-nine percent of the 
4,660,000 establ:i.shmcnts, employing 2'[, 750 7 000 persons or aeventy-
eight p~JJr-cent of all employe<H9 in the pr:tvate seotor. Aoco:r.·ding 
to O-tsu.bo1 Head of the I•'inance Di vi Hi on of the .rapm:J.ese ~1inistry of' 
Labour, FJmaller enterprj_se s have been able to hold thei:r O'l·m. 
of I,abou.:r· 
Nc$2, Aug. 
,op.cit .. , p.J.16. 
r at Sophia Uni ~1r::::Ji ty' s 
su.bo Kenichiro, mrhl3 Smaller 
i. on in J'apa.n u t 
pt ol972, pp.l6'{·-18Q 




NmU3li:R Qil1 J3:S'l1ABIJ:SH1i1Ji:H!J.'S BY AND GIPCTOR, 1969o5 
( :i.n "thousand fc:) 
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0 - 4 936·7 2 001.9 B42.9 3 781 ... 5 
) 
-
29 350~6 265·9 123,1 739 .. 8 
.)0~·- 49 45 .. 2 15.6 8.,'[ 69·4 
50 ·~299 48·5 12 .. 1 8.4 69.0 
300 + 5 .. 6 0.,6 0.4 6.7 
'11otal 1 386.6 2 296.1 983a7 4 666~4 
establishment ce:ns1.1f:~ 
The l~ea.son for the mwcesa of ·t.hese smaller C?llterp:t•i.ses :is considered 
·to be due ·to the fac-t that many of them have 1;raditiotH:l.lly paid 
lower 
able to adjuBt quickly ·to fluctua:t:lo:ns in th.e der.w.nda fo:r:• theil."' 
p:roducrts and in. the ava.:ilabili ty of r<:~:fl ma:toria.1B 7 oan readily 
increase or :reduce the siz!ll' of their workforce, and en,joy various 
othcn," benefi:ts, such as spE)ed in"" deoision-mald.ng, i:nherent in a 
6 
small organ:i.satiou. Watanabe points out that ·the Japanese 
governmen·t h<:'t.S t:e.ken a number of measu:NH3 specifically to assi~:rt 
smalle:t"" 
:recognition of the i.mporta.n.ce of these smaller enterprises to the 
tihole economy. 
In vien'll of the lfl,rge numbex• of J~tpanese employed i.n these 
smaller en-terprises, one needs to qu.ctlify ideas about life~·time 
employm0nt a:nd f:t:•inge benefits \i'lhich are features of la:r.&>"e 
corpora:l:; Otsu1)o7 shol"'S wha.t difficult B these c~rnaller 
eu:te:r.•IJri~:KH3 have he>td ill comply:ing t-li th la'bour laws ooverj.ng 
industrial rolations 1 la.'bour proteot:i.o11, manpot."l'e:t.~ and employment~ 
<.md social insurance • However, 'the acute labour shortage has 
:reduced much of the dif:fe:r.erwe in wo:r.•king oondi tioxH:.t o }4a.uy of' 
the smalh)l~ enterprises have had to ll?air~e •mg'E!s o:r• l'€lduoe h'orking 
hom:•a to ath·o.ct lal)oux·. In addj;tion, they a:re endeavouring to 
economise o:o la,bou:~.• by mode1•nin:l.ng ·their equi:pment, ra:tio11.alising 
and i.mprov:ing production and markctting techniques. 
Despite these improvr;;ments, the smaller· the enterprise the 
g-l:"en:ter 'th.e difficulty of l~)oru:i ting the neeessary \",rorkfo:t'ce. 
Ro'ber>t Colo 8 <J/ctri butef:J ·this to the fa,ct thai.; lvo:rk.e:rs :i.n small 
manufac·tu.r:lntt;71 
7 Ot 7 
8 He Cole, 
in 13maJ.l entel:-prises in JapaJ10f3t~ 
Vo1.102 1 No.6.~Deo.l970,pp.53l-576• 
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·'1M3 have l<HH3 job r:;ocurity nnd often must :t-eckon wi'!;h 
the p()Ss:i.l>il:Li;y .. of 'bankru.p'tcy. .. He has noted also that the :Lnc:i.d.ence 
of death and injurief; :f:t"'om occupat:i.one.l oa:oaes for small and 
medium-sized e:nterpr·is(,H'l is a.pprox:lmately th:reo tim~a that of the 
large enterp:r.isee o 
He l'o:inta out that the dual structure cuts acrct~s the blue-
collar/~tshite colla:r clat:H3ificatiot1 to a large extent 9 HO that 
blue-collar tiorkers in major corpol~a"'c.ions view themselves, and al"e 
viewed 1 as memlx-)rs of an elite which includes the salaried employees 
:i.n these fir·ms .. At ·the other end of the apec·trum are ·the salaried 
employees in often less productive small and medium-sized firms. 
These d.iffc:rm:lCEHJ a.ct as deterre1rta ·to young people seek:i.n.g 
employrnent in smaller e:o:'cerprises, lmt not at the other end of' the 
ag~\ structu:re. The official retiri.ng age for men is fifty-five 
and for womf:m fi:f·ty (though lack of child-care :facilities and 
f~ocietal C'tu~rtoms t.um.ally cause women ·to retire upon marl~iage or 
prio1~ to the 1)irth of their tiirsi:: child)" ~".Phe life expectancy has 
been raised ·twenty yea.:r•s in the past twenty years, so it is noli 
sevel'J:ty-six for -rwmen and seventy :for men, so people \'<Jho have, 
r:~maller enterprises. In ~;,,,dd:i.tio:rL rnnalle:r• families a.nd more labour-
saving devices in the home are attracting Japartese \eiomen back into 
the workfo:ece. li'ew1l' are able to return to their former employment, 
so .. they find work in the smaller errherprises~ The noticea:ble 
a.e;,reil1g of ennployeElS in smaller ente:r•prises ir:1 therefore understanda.1)J.e., 
IJ.1hEHJe wor·kers oo·uld be in x·ather Vll1nera1)le posi·ti<ms, but 
.. c;wo lal,our ha·ve been design.ed for their pro·tec·tion. 9 iJ:ihe first 
is the Smalle:r· ]!:nterpriae Hetiremen·t Allowance :Mutual Aid Law, which 
f':roes the~1e f~nterpi'ises from the l!l'or:t"ies involved in paying retire-
ment alloi,;anoes l:::r.1t also entitles "thE}m to a loan from the CorpoJ:a-tio11 
or association for the esta.blishment or j .. mprovement of workersv 
li'Ellfare facilities., 
cont:r.i bu:tions are supplemented by a government subsidy and because 
the whole a,llc:nmnce is f':t'ee of tax.. The Indmrtr:Lal Home \vork I.a:w, 
1970, aims v.t improving the working conditions of home\'rorkers 
(estimated to be around 1,400,000), a11d sta.bilising- the:tr li.velihood 
by special measures to prot<C~Ct t:r .. u:nn in their l"'<0lations vJith the 
principal (the person manu.facttl:res, proc(H.lses or sella goodB 
entrt:u::rtB "~<li.th the mnuufao·tur.e <Y.:n~.:t procosBing of these 
35 
goods) .. Regular· labour· inspection supervises the im~)lomentation 
of these special measures, and severe penalt a are Pl"efJcril)Cd for 
violations of the lali'J .. 
Though differences in the dual structure of the econonw are 
br.H:t.king do'l'm., the Japanese, a.cco:rd:i.ng to Cole10 , tend to see 
thems~lves as faced \'lith &. unique problem with such differences 
in vlork:i.ng oondi tiona dependent on the size of the enterprise. 
IIoweverf he reminds the :r-eader that every ;.ndust:rial economy has 
its advanced and backwa:r'd sectors, but considers the Japanese 
version is characterized by j:ts pervasiveness, by tho nation's actde 
consciousness c•f the systemt a,nd. b'y ·the commandin.g grip of the 
The number of 
employees -vrorking for the£Je smaller enterprises, as well as 
J'apanese consciousness of the dual structure of the economy" should 
serve as warr.dn .. gs agaim:rt making s-r.reeping generalizations, based on 
I'ractices operating only in large firms .. 
l:.!.--~-2~].:. st?Jl(Y~re_9.U.!~Ji'ap~e .. J2£~~~~: According 
·to a l"Elport em female employment produced by the Japan l~:x:ternal 
Trade Organiz<:l:tion, the t:eadi tiom:tl system of pe:~.•sonnel ma."'J.agement 
in Japanese firms is characterized by its dual structul'e, one for 
11 
men e,nd another for t~omen~ From 1950 to 1975 t'l'omen rep:resentecl 
thirty-nine per cent of the workforce. ]eoause of the business 
recension follordng the oil shook of 1973, which affected female 
workers particularly, ·the propo:r.-tion of \'wmen in the working 
11opulation has since dropped to thirty-seven per cent~2 'l1his is 
st:Ul a. sit,rn:i.ficant proportion of the ~Jorkforce. The difference 
:in. ·theh' treatment is not due to their lack of numerical strength, 
but due ·to the p:t>emise that l'JOmen WOI'k for a short period Of time e 
Takr;;~.hashi Nobu.lco;3forme:r JJil-ector-General of the \~omen's and Minors• 
l3ureau of ·the Ministl"Y of La.bou:t~ sho~~s how traditional ma:n.agement 
pre.otices make full implementation of the principle of equal pay 
for men and l·rolnEm a distant target. 
-"~---1~~-~:·:~~i 1$ ' p. 39 
i2"1i'emale l'~mployment in Japanu, Now in ,Japan Uo.19 7 December 1975,P•9 
·urr'h<::J Homen of Japann, ~\bC?u"L.i!.iE~!l '1rerfes5, Fore:i.gn Press 
Center, 1flokyo~ J\lly 1.977, Pe9• Por-eign £>ress Center was inaugwated 
in OctolJEJI' 1976 against a background of grmij.ng awareness of tb.e 
irn:portance of having Japan accurately r;ortrayed in the t,wrld pl-eBs. 
It pendent :non~•p:r-of'i t foundation financed by the Ja.pa..nese 
of Equal 
Nor.>H:lpaper Publishe::t•s and }~dito:rs Association and 
ing to its publicity folder. 
s in Japan and the Question 
"""''i.~~~~";.;!."'"'-··Y .. ,Z,,.),_~~~''''-"'~~;;;;.::: .• -;;:..:::;;:-_,._~.;;.;:;;..:::.;::;.;:..:,:t Vol.III ,No" 1 ~ ,Jan .. l975, PP ·51·~68. 
rrhe J,aboU!' S·tandard s Ac·t. of 1947 la1.C', dol'm the principle 
of equal for men and vwmon, in Etccordance l'li th Article :nv 
of Japan's por;t·~·•·~a.r Consti tut·:i.on of 1946, ~.,rh.ioh proclaims tha·t 
there "tlOuld be no discrimination in political, ecc.nomio or 
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social conditions. 'l'h.ough i·t may be possible for girls from the 
same C}laso as beyr.~ to 'be l"ecruited by the same company and rece:i.ve 
the same ing "L<la.ge r the principle of equal pay for etrual vwrk 
is :t.~ather mean:i.ngloss a.s the vmge structure is influenced by 
lifetime employment, rwnior·ity system, a.nd enterprise unionism 
t~There wages a:t."e determined by collective ba:t•gaining bet't'Ieen the 
inr.li vidual en·tel"'priBe. a,nd the ent,:n•p:ri se' s union.. The wa,g(1 
d:i.ffere:r1'llial becomes more marked w:i:th yearEl ,of service, fo:t• the 
a,ctual vJag'El pack(!lt eons:i.stB of a number of' components vlh:i.oh have 
little ·to do 1r::Lth the No:dcer' a actual job pe:do:tmance 1 thus 
permitting a legal differentiation between a v-.roman 8 s and a, man's 
wag'e. 
Anti-,discrimi.nation legislation 1vas embodied in ·the 
Horki:ng lJomenw B iielfare Acts of June 1972t but let;rislation cannot 
ha effect l.Jithout a change in societal a·l;t:ttudes.. A questi.orma:tra 
su:t~vey on Jomfmt s Sta;!;ua irl Ilusi:ness1~ax·ried. out by the l.'!inist:ry ci:f 
l1abor iu 1973 founcl tha·t, on the whole 9 the principle of \'llages 
a.ccol'd.:tng to a man• s family commitments is considered more 
satiBfactol'y than 't\l'ages ba,sed on "'~>he principle of equal pay for eqnal 
l':ork.. In ·the same su:t''\rey lrwk of \llomem• s oppo:r>tun:i:ties fol~ 
:promotion ca:used more concern. \Uth life·~lo:ng emJ,>loyment us the 
accepted lnu3:i .. B for men in la.rge corpox•ations 1 firn1s ensure th£:l.t 
promising :;:>eo~'l.li ta are :t::'otated regula:t~ly to gain experience :Ln all 
a.l."'eaa:J of ·t!J.e work, and a:r.-e given oxt--the~-jo1; t:r·aining. It gives 
all ·t11.e s•mior e::x:ecuti 'IJ€:S an O}Tportuni·ty to ·Natch the young peraon, 
so they ar~~ al;le to rEH'tCh a consensus a11out which ones to promote, 
aH this is not left to personnel staff. Since li'oroen are expected 
to remain vJit.h. the company for cl. limited time onlyt it :i.a difficult 
for them to gain the necessary experi~HJ.ce ru1d on-the-·job training, 
a.nd they will not be as \'Jell knmm to all the senior executi.ves Hho 
dc~oi.de on the promotio:ns.. 'rhor:~e women who contin:u.e in their 
cax-eers (notably school tea.chers) then face the p:roblem of earlier 
:r'Otireme:nt 'NhiGh preven·ts them gaining senior positiorH:I such as 
:principals or departmental heads. The dual structur·<; of Japanese 
perr.Jonm3l m<:mt:1.gement cru1 ·t;h<~:>:refo:re s<;en <W posing many prol)lemr:1 
fo:r.• in theil" employme:n:t. 
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pillars of .Japa:r..ese manage-
men.t may be called 11tradit 0 .1 1 15 . .:1 ' • f. t ua~a luen~l 1CS WO 
in Japanese induf.rtry~ Om:) of them al'gu .. es that these I'ract:.i.oes 
retainer and tho rola,tions of th<1 patx·iaroh .. al family .. 
v 
According 
to thiB th€lory l·Jhich ho calls 11uniform develcrpment 11 , :i.ndm:rtx'ial 
ization and. economic developm~Cmt prog7."''3ss in e,eco:r.<:l \\lith a uniform 
The fact ·that traditional 
practices are st:tll in force in Japan :lr3 seen as an obstacle to the 
dernoOl"atizati.on and mod<'l:rll:i.za:tion of Ja.pa:nese industryo 
The second viev-1 ·that h~a calls uplurali~rtic industrialismn 
mai.n·tainE{ the,t ·the e:dstence of ·t:r·adit:l.onal :practicE:s docs not 
ne<.}I.'H.!i':lar:Uy mean baokward:nesB 9 nor a.re "tht~y obstaclefj to the 
· mode:r'll.izat:i .. on of Japanese industry. On the contrary, they aided 
the unusually rapid and ~mccessful development of Japanese industry. 
'J.lhe t:r.'aditional social a·trnosphere p:t"Elserved within the indus·l;:~:•ial 
enterpx·ise an ideal for t..ro l'S, \vho ~rere able to fit 
thf:imselii"BS to the ne\>1 esta1)lishment w:b;h comparative ease. ln 
o·ther \>JOrdE! \~es-tern countries' industrial developme:nt wa.s ce.rr:i.ed 
out by breaking up feudal:i.sti<; and traditional practices, bu.t in 
Japan it has been achieved by preserving, and to a certain extent 
utili zing them. 
Odaka ad.mi t s that the theory of pJ.uralistic indur~rt:t•ialif>m 
is a more f:ru:i.tful ba~lis for explanation and a more rea.listio 
However, he colHliders :l:t 'tend~1 to ovorstress the 
particular ~;.spects of industrial :i.za:tio:nf and this can lead to 
some mis:i.lrterp:retation of the facts.. lit<''-' example 1 Abegglen 
16 
tr<:Jats as 11 the cr; •. tioal diffor·ence 11 bt.:.ltWeEn:~ J'apa.ne::;e and Heste:r11 
indu:;:tr:i.a.l orgaJ'l.iza:tio:ns the syE1tem of life·time commitment t •·rhich 
he cox·u3:i.ders to be a feudalist:ic remnant of the rrok:ugawa period. 
Yet, acoor'\ling to Odalm17 , prior to the 1920s labour mol)ili ty VIas 
fairly high even in large enterprises~ so he thinks that Abegglen 
neglect:o1 fluctuatiom.~ in tho h.iBtory of Japanese ind.ustrial 
developments and rof1ect8 thr:O\ p:t"'acticefJ of only a part of the 
Japaneso busine!.:H:; firmf:lo 
Xunio, 
16Jamos Al?e 
1959 Indian edition, 
17 . Odakt1- l( tmJ .. o , 
Gloncoe,III,1958, 
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.Another o·b,jectiOJ:l OdmJca rairZlea ia that ·bhis theory ].(~ad8 
to the s:i.mplistio conclusion i;ht:::J,t 1fJ3:ast is East a.nd tc.lest is Uestn, 
overlooking or a1; lear:~t UXJ.derestimating the rapid ·tran::fbrmations 
that have been taking place in Japan since the end of \~orlcl \·Jar II, 
and pa.rticula.rly t.;ince the latter half of the 1950s. There is a. 
danger of fe.J.ling ·to reali!:le that modern mc~dia·: and fre\rue1rt contacts 
with 'the vlest are producir:.€_; an interchange in solutj.ons to :problems 
many eouuh•ies h.ave in oommon.. Peter Drucker18 , ~Jhilrrt admitting 
that manae,rerial policieB are d.eeply rooted in a country' a 
tradi·tionB and ottl tu:t•e, con:.:1iders that the principles underlying 
Japanese marmgement deserv-e closer a·ttention, ar:'l ·there is much that 
l'le:::rt.ern ma,nagera m:i.ght learn from thorn. Richaro Tanner Johnson and 
rhll:i.am Oucht9 mao e a £rtudy of many J'apane se and United States 
operatio:ru-1 in both coun·tricH:: i and concluded that some elements of. 
Japanese man.:'1gement 'tvero succeeding in the United Sta-tes. 'l'his 
sugt,:l'$lJts tha.t an own··~emphasis on oultu:t•al specifi ty can lead not 
only to a mioin·t{"rpre·ta.tion of fao·ts, but to a.n obscur:i.ng of those 
insigh·ts \'IThich might be of value in another setting. As this 
dissertation is ooncE~rned l>~i't;h h:i.ghlighting those a.t{peots of 
Japanese mana(Sf.3ment "'Ghat may be unfamilia:~.~ to Australians, thel'€ 
is obviously a :r-cal dange:t~ of such a distortion. 
~~aking l'H.>'te ·~hen of the dual struc·ture of the Japanese 
economy, ·the dual frtructure of its pa1•so1mel management practices, 
a!Hl the dangers of an over-emphasis on cultural specifi ty, 'l'le may 
a,n.alyse aspects o:f:" Japanese management. 
This refers to the practice whe:relw young 
people, par-ticularly boys and young men, are~ l"Elc:r:t:d.·ted by large 
comp~u1ies to join t.hr:dr firm with the expec·tat:i.on that they \<J'ill 
remain uith that comp<.t:ny until l~tirement. 
R J d 20 t th . . f ,.t.h J ] t ona . l'aoe s e orlgJ.n o ..; e a pane se emp .oymen· 
Bystem to its P!'"e•mt<tar corporate paternalism of the 1920s o The 
most important f.ac;tors that lod ·to its f:i.:nal crystallizatim1 he 
cc:ruJiclers to have been tho gre!tt aocele:ra.tion in ·the paoe of 
Japanese industr:.i.aliz;ation during th£0 First Horld rlar, the 
of 1:.-m:dcel•s, the (1,'!'0\llth of t·wrker organ:i.za:ti.on, 
~~~·Jha;t,. l·m can lE.;arn from se managemerrt; 11 , 
.. ~.;,;,.,;,,~.;,;:;;,.;;;,,:\;"':;~;;;:;,;;;,;;;.;;.,;;,;;,.,;.:;.;;;.,~.,;;;,;;.~;:.;;;;,;.;;~.~~ t r~al"Ch~w A pri 1 19 711 p p" 11 0-··12 2 • 
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:inflation and the inc:r~ £l..S :.tng resort to at rike s. 
and. t.woke loyalty in the lH>rk:force. 
ar'0 conventionally ae;o-related - a,s they <::ame to !Je - there liafJ 
c~ll obvious rationali"'cy in :p.refor:t'ing a young rocru.i·t vi'l.o could be 
Pt:tt a;i; the bottom of the s<:>ale to an older one \"Jho ha,d to be 
fi·t·ted in higher up, if ·ooth -v¥e:re equally without relevant training .. 
According to l)ore, i·t l1Ias a long time bef<:n'e employers came to 
recrui·l; f:Lfteen-yea:t:'u~olds and ·train them, :rather tlw..n :recru:i:ting 
skilled men from the market.. 'rl:l.is happened only ·Nhen: 21 
{a) other large employers lJecame more successful in holding on·to 
wo:rkex·s who vve:r-e already tra:l.ned so ·that there t~Jere fe-v1er 
seeking ~jobs in the market; 
(b) ·teohno1Cl67 becoming diverse and comple:Jct employers needc1d 






its own independent momentum a:nd l'\"Jinf'orced 
pl~1yed 011 loyal·~y and long ser·vioe and being 1 born 
firm a,t an early age; 
tho need to :preach loyal·~y to counter left-l~Jing -tendenoi.es 
placed a premhun on getti:ng tvorke::rs young enough to instil 
this loyalty; 
(e) the cultural unity of the ooun"t:t'Y, and. the strul<la,rds of li tel'acy 
reached the po:i.nt at which reo:ru:ttment of the very young f:L•om 
rural areas to urban fac"c;c:t•ies became easy; and 
(f) the I>eri.od <.)f schooling l.engthcmed sc1 that it became ret:l,sonable 
to move stra,ight from school ·!;o fao·tory a:1d tho fzohools became 
obv·ious recruiting grounds., 
!Jifotime employment -vias upset by the \'Jar ru1.d its aftermath .. 
Immedi.a:tcl;y af·ter thtl Second lior·ld \var· there \i'<'!;S severe unemployment 
with vast numl1ers of.' demobil:l.sed soldiers, civilians repatria·tcd 
from aln:-oad and workers laid of£ from \lfa:c> indufrtrif:Hl oro'Viding on t-n 
.. che labour mar).:.eJc. Inoue :Keiohi 22 shoilis hoti this labour ElUl'Plus 
H~ta ohang\~d to a labour ~Jhorta6te economy during tho investment boom 
of 1956···61. During "this period thc~re wa.s a sharp rise in the 
personal sav:LngB :r·atj.o, (already high by iutenuttional standa:t"<ls). 
ln the:i.r f:i.:nancing activities the comme:t•oial banks gave priori·t;y 
to the big entex·:px·i:x:~-~a with which they had a special rel.a·t:LonsJ:dp 
' economy: caLo;e of ,Japan 11 t 
. No.2, Ma:r.0-.Apr.1976, PPQ 
surr1ltH1 to labour shortage 
~~~!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~:~~~:~ .. ~~:~~r Vol.113, 
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and poured a. t:t'emendous amount of invEHrtmer;\ capital into them. 
The labou.r mark~~·t g::radu.aJ beoame tig·hter evon i;b.ough the total 
nu.mber of .,Ghose t·Jho vm:r.'e employed upon completion of theLt~ 
education oo:n1;i:nued 1.;o fairly nt~;adily throu .. ghout the 1950s 
and ·the first half of the 1960s. Af·l;er the num1Jer of sr:.~:1ool and 
rapidly, ~::md thir1 contributed to ·the fu:r"ther tig:b:ten~· 
i11.g of the la'bour supply and to the mai:ntemillCe of the lalJour 
13y 1966 the lvlinis"t:r.•y of l.abour repo:r.ted ·that some 360,000 
Jilarch graduates had more than one million o:t~eninge available to 
them or 2 .. 9 jobs per person. :By 1970 middle school graduates had 
1 . . . 1: ,f.' , 1' \. 23 .nea:J:' y fn.x JO ">S ~or eac,l app. :.tca.n\. • Hot>~"evel~, as has been 
previ.ously no·ted, many employees work wi'th small or medium-sized 
enterprises, ancl ·the competition for employment in large corporations 
offeri:rlg <~areer employment is still very keen. I,ifetime employmen:t 
, . . . . ~ 
has ad.va.ntages for both employer and c~mployee, as Nakano J:•eports c ~ 
Fo:t' the employel' i·t l"'Eltains the services of skillc:d r1orkers again.st 
t:lme s of labour sho1"iiag-e ti F•or the employee it g:i. ves secu:r.i ty 
aga:i.nrrt su:t•plus le,bour oondi·tions; wha:tever the market cil~cumste..nces, 
there is little likelihood of the employee find:i.ng h3tter em:wloyment 
:Lf he once leaveB his job •. 
According to the Japan JI::xten1al Trade Ox•ganization l1epol~t 24 
the main advan:t.ages are: 
(a) the syst<EJm crev:tes a nra.ch longer ·t:i.me ho:r:-izon in the mind, of 
co:r•pox'ate plannel"S and mauagerst for deoi.sio:n.s are mol:'O likely 
to be made on the basis of long•~te:t.'ln prof:ttability, rather 
than shoi"'t-~term; 
(b) :tt tends to force fi:r-ms ·to seek nevr grm·Jth oppor"tuni ties .. 
'l'hey cite e,s €lxa.mples, companies in the coal bn.s:tness 1i1hich found 
·their mfJ,z•ket d.eolini.ng and were forced to seek oppor·tu.ni:tiE:•S :for 
d:i.v€~r~:>ifico;tion. Some firms diversified :tnto the hour:dng and 
leisure indurrtries. In this \iay ·they avoide(l staff layoffs and 
oonti::rmed ·to expand. In the case of the coal industry this \'l'as 
accompli~:lhed with government assistance, but similal" transitions 
have of·ten been carried out wi the»u·t such asBistanoe. l!'ox• irH:rtance, 
in the rayon indusi:;ry spent much mo:n.ey l:tllrchasi:r:tg pa,ten·i;s 
thus lng liquidation of opex•a"tionse 
s in J'ap~.m", 
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Acco:rd:tng to a repo:t"t 28f a lecture by N:i.r;hi;yama, l)rofesoor 
of l~conomicf3 at H.ikkyo Univers:i.ty, lifetime employment p:ra.ct:i.oes 
All employee 
might ga:i.n a 'basic education i:n li'tx~ral ar-ts at a university, 1Yttt 
h5 s teohnolog:i.cal deg:r-ee iL earn(~d through studies 1:Jithin the 
compr.,ny" He maj.ntains i;hat rican indut::rtry usually puts an 
emplo;'/'(~e th:t~ough an :initial t:r.•aining programme and then relies on 
on-t1J.t::#,,jo1) exper:ionce" Japanese employer~s are usually em:.'olled 
in trai:t1i:ng programmes ev·ery tvw or th:ree years. In addition, 
he ex1)lai.ned 1 that job transf(~:c·s occur oil. a tvw to ·three year 
ba~df~ expr-tnding the employee 9 s knowledge of the compa:n.y, a.nd enabling 
him ·to co-opfH•a·te with othe:N3 in maintainiltg qua.lit;y control .. 
'I'lle ad·v·an·tages are r:rlireast~d rn"eaumably because foreigners 
tend 'to see dit:>ad.vantages only. It is easy to see tha·t it oould. 
be one of the mairt causes for tensions vd·chin a joint ven.·ture .. 
\'leertE~:r·l:ters \'muld tend to stx.·er:~s short-term prof:i:ttfl 1 while the 
Japanese ma-n.ager may be mo:r'e interested in the sales volume, wh::i.ch 
is more i.mpo:r·tant in fully utilising his 'iJOrk:force. The :possibility 
of a wo:rh:er l;eing- f'h-ed. can be a poue:rful mem1a of contl"ol, so 
\iE:Hrterne.rs f:Lnd it dif.fiouJ:t to imagine ·that workel'S can be 
r.-m.fficierrtly nH.Ytivated without such a th:r-eat. 
It is easy to o:x:aggera:~e this aF.Jpect of lifetime employment .. 
Ccn.··tainly, beca:u.r~c~ la:rg;;;1r companies fully expect to keep the:t:r 
pe:rrnanent employees foJ:o their -vmrking life, thercl is a strong 
te:nd.e11Cy to give as much importance to character and pe:r.•soru1.li ty 
ar;;~ they do to education qualificatious :i.n the emplc>yee-selection 
pr.:lCO~H:Ic IJ.1he use of psychology tesJtsf ·the reooro.:.'l'!endations of 
IJJ:>ofes::::ors and teachers conoerning the candidate• s personality 
and. at·ti'hld.es are important factors. 'l'hen some \'feeding does occur 
during the proba:tio:n. periode 
dev).c:es falling short of d:i.:t~eo·l; fir:i.:ng that managerM.mt can use to 
fol~CE} 'I"JOrkers ~tJho are incompetent or agi:tators to quit; or ·they 
rnay simply t:r•nnr..d'fn' them to h<:n:·mless positions rJb.O:t'e they do not 
interfere \'Vi th Pl'oduct:ion .. 27 
Career employmen-t; is of course :not unkl1mm in \·JeErtern 
ma.ne.gement practice. Bur:ru:J and Stalke.:r, l'Jrit:i.ng a,bout J3:dtish 
firrtHi$ could be de sori'bing ·the ... Tapane ~Je t~ystem 1·lhen they ,,n:•i·t;e: 
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"Competition among employel:-s for maJ'lagumen·t recruit<:> he,3 
r;tnr-ting s, 'bu.t r3ince in.ve flltment in a 
recru.:l:~ has to fox• many years hefo:re yj.elding a 
return, :L·t iH l1eceDFJa:ry bo·th to select the nt and "'Go 
hold thE:lm ., , G much uge is made of sclec·\J:i.on techniqu~H1 
dew~ loped during Ho::el :l VJar II in the cho:toe of candiC'a:tes 
for officer t courfHHh A.!1d <..:ar·ee:r.'s thus 'begm 
a.:re pJ:-el:1entcd as enclosed for life w:'i:thin ·!:;he corporation. 
Indeed in ·their endeavours to a:ttrac-:; ·talel,:t:od cand:i.dates, 
corporations c;1a:.reers rather tha:n posts o •• u28 
a:r~· writing abou.t manag-erial staff, bu.t the vlhole 
apprenticeship system of tradesmen can be seen as ano·the::r form 
of career employment .. The ponsibili.ty of mar::sive lay-off'f~ in 
tlestern industry i~:: no longer acceiYta'ble 1 especially in large 
corporations, as JJt1rnB and Stalker e;;cplai.n: 
11Firms employ:i.:ng thousands of' people ca:rl.not cl.or:.:E~ doii:U 
ii':i:th.out Nrecking lar~;"El areas of r3ocial organizat:i.on. Suoh 
concerns must be ali vc, a.nd in ord.e :r "lio keep alive 
they must become adaptive§ change must occur within the 
organization and :not t.hrough its extinction a:nd :replacement 
if' it is to occur a·t alL. Survival of the individual. firm 
becomes a more Bignificant criterion of economic activity 
the closer tbe app:ro:::cLmation to monopolistic conditions .... u29 
I·t is not \tnk.no'fm for gov-ernment intervention to te.ke plane li even 
in OlH'' ow:n country in order to assist la:~.~ge companies fl"Otn need.ing 
to have maBsive si.;a.ff lay-offs .. 
Still it nnurt be ao1~ovxledged that the ,Japanese practice 
doer1 make it difficult for a forei.gn firm to engage staff., 
Students leaving r:whool a..nd universi·ty ;vill be reluct;mt to join 
a foreign firr;1 1-1hose 1o:nf~:"""term sucCElBS cannot 1Je f;rttaran·teed. It 
It is not 
im:possi ble though, for· some well qualified vw:rke:rs may :feel. th<:tt 
promo·t:i.on opportuni·ties al'e limited in their own firm beoause of 
firms of·ten :rema.in \·lith for!}ie,rne:r£{~ so the ambitiou~l Japanese may 
30 
no·t benefi·t 1)y taking such a £rtE'~p .. - 1J:here may be promising 
""Ol"ke:rs in the medium or small-sized onterprim.Hi 111ho did not 
succeed in g-etting to the top universities to be r-ecruited. by a 
la:t"f!;'O company., These may Elee some ac1vantages in joining a 
pres·tigious foreign firm, prov:i.d.ing inoent;ives aJ'O made high e:noue;h. 
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11'hr?J oommonest method c, f 'l<rat,-e-f:i..:ldng in Japan 
( li terall;r 11Wage 'based on ).()ngth 
C>f se r•vi ce 11 .) • ading in that BEmiox·:l:t;y 
level, since othe:t• fa,cto::rs does not aut;omatically determine the 
such aB education, , Bex: ru1d :i.ndi vidual ability are ·ta!~en in·to 
1
· (< k' 31 J i .b-1 .J. • 1 . ~--h . accou.n:~. i)t't!OU J. e:x:p .a ns 111ao.. ::~.n common pa::t' an(:le ~; e expr,:ss:t.on 
i:.:J u.sed to cover any method in which the 'basic "ri te:ria in wage·-
fix:i.n1~ are seniorj:!iy, <.~&-e and educational lEnrel ra:t;her than -the 
du:tics i.nher'Elnt in the job.. 01;hel"" co11d:i:tions c;f employment, such 
as fringe benefits and opportu"n:i..ties for promoi;ion, also depend. 
directly or ind:i.rectly on a 'f.vorkor' s seniority .. 
Suz;uki iden·tif:i..es t-v1o interpx-ei;at:i.ons of the Ol'igin of ·this 
method" 'J:he tra.di tional interpretation sees its orlgin i:n ·the 
special rmci;;t.l settin.g of Japr.u:l? typ:tfj.ed by the loyal t;y of the 
Wol"'ker to his employe:&'. 111his loyalty has its counterpa:t-t in the 
pailer:naliam of the f::lmployel~, who increases the wa[(.J propol'tionately 
to the ma:t~;rial need,B of the worke s family, irrespective of the 
tasks he performs ·the firm. Suzu.ki maintains thr:i:t if this 
i11te:r.•px·etation is oorl'~H~t, the me .. ,hod haB hi.stox·ical and social 
roots, l:rt.rt iB ir~ratio:nal from an economic po:t:nt of vie't'l .. 
The second interp:t•etation that he favours sees this me·thod. 
of l'!iag-e~~fb::ing as h.a:ving been adopted after the li'irst i'iorld rJar to 
cotm·te ra.ct t:~ho:t"tat;,'e s and eJr:oe ssi ve turnover among sk:D.l.ed wo:rke:r:•fJ, 
fo:r·oing the big oompanioa to set up t:raining schools ·to ·train theil"' 
own f3k:i.11ed manpower& '11hey therefore had iutex'ElHt in 
a method of romttn(;lr<:rt:i.on that \"l'oul.d encourage workers 
trai11ed by them to stay with the companyo 
aenior:VIiy1 :tn combina,.c :Lon with ·the practice of lifetime employment, 
l~conomio justification is to be found in the 
fa<..rt "tha:'c -l;:ca:hling ts given in the firm, and in or\le:r• to securE! a 
maximttl.n !'(~tu.rsl en th:i.f~ int(1rnal ·braining, \vages are fixed acoox'd.ing 
to seniori.·ty.. IJ.1his 1rmu.ld appear to reduce competi ti venesr3 if 
),"'l"omotions w::;.re determ:i.ned 'by r:.eniori ty. HovJever, this is not the 
only factox· ·to "be con£-d.dered ~ just a·s age-based wage ::wales do not 
mear1 that :t'Elnnmeration is exc1tu:1i vely determined by age o:r· sen:Lori ty. 
Sttbjecrt ·to a 11 floor 11 fixed in the oolledi v-e agreeme11.t ox· inte:~~:.na.l 
:t•egt.tlat:i.onr; according to age and educational q:ualiflcat:lons, person::nel 
each worker to the post moat suited •'n 
, H ~, nAge, sen:i.o:r:l.ty a:ncl v<<:l.ge s" t 
ww"·"~:~, .. ,;"~"·' VoLl.l3 9 No.,lg Jan.·-l~'eb.l976, pp&6'(·-a4~ 
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h:i.s :individuBJ. ab:i.l:i:t.y~ Se(m in thi.a light no 
longe:r looks o, l1.on~··economic method ·to Stumki, for age and. eeni.o:ri·ty 
are used as or'i-i;eria. f'or oalou.lating vJag"Cs :in the place of factors 
tha,t are d.iffiouJ:t t<) ovalua:te, such as experience c1r :'Lndi.vidual 
p.r.·ofioiency. 
Perhaps it is the prao·ticc of giving fringe 1xmefits that 
l'e:fleot~1 the speo:i.r~.l social se·tting of J"apan more ·thr.m being based 
on economic grounds~ That the wage packet consists of a num1Yol' of 
oomponon.tf.> ~·qhic~h bave li·ttle to do \vith the \V"Orlmx·' s actual job 
:pe:l"form<-moe is appa:rt:mt 'by ex<e•.mining Tal)le 3..32 
l'.ER.C:E:NTAGm JJIS'l1RIJJOrr!ON OF' GO!Yi:P0li£Ii~NTS OF AV:'t:HA<l~ 
MOWJ.I~Il'jY GASH 1\:ARNDWS, SGP~.'}f:J;.1133!R 1971 
(En'terpri.set~ "ted th 30 or moX>e <:}mployees) 
Ce>mponent of e<u'nings Percentage distril:nrtion 
To·tal earnings 
Regular earn:i.ng~J (excluding overtioK'1) 
J3asic 
l'lf:l.g'\3 'ba~Jed. on ,jo'b-relate;d :fao·tors 
via.€:,"0 on pe fac-tors 
'bafled on a com1)ina:ti0l'l of factors 
Incentive 
Duty lmmnces 
Alloi1~3Anees for living costs 
Othe:~:- allowances 
100 .. 0 
89 .. 8 "" 100.0 
83 .. 5 




Ove i.me and miscellaneous irregular earnings 10.2 
'l'he firms to provide many more and larger a,llol>'?an.ces. 
I:n 197 2 family allo>1anees l>~ere provided 1Jy 89.5 per• cent of the 
:firms employing 1,000 or more 'Vtro:x;ke:t's, c.md by 64.2 per cent of 
'J.Ihe table above shovH:l the e:we:rage of such 
Apart from these allol.rances :tn the wage packet, Nish::i.yama 
on inve r;;tigatillg seve:t•al fi:rm12: in the steel induetl""Y found that 
spendfJ as. much a~3 US$1 1200 a month per· vwrker for 
edu.co:t:l..on, housi.ng, medicare, and othe:t' 'benefits :i.n addition ·t;o 
the avertt.ge monthly wag~::: of ~~900.00~ He explained the reason: 33. 
11 He look urxm httma:n he ing~1 an capital, a:t the r;ame time ·~hc1 
mcnrt irupox-tant capital$ r.Nw:r-efox·e ~ vle invest heavily in 
capital it :i.B ou.r top prio:r·i.ty to J~aise the 
of Cl%}1:1. tal e ~ • 11 
P~58 
.... .,_~._,,_~:;e Busi.ne ss Pl~k),Ot:i.c~:H3t1 r .o,;,~ • .;~,;:::,;.;;.w p.l5 
O:ne of the most meaningful of fringe henefita3~B a housing 
allo-vranoe, i1&F:doh is non~4a:xable. In Japan's la:t"gor ci·~ies, rents 
for apartment 1':1 and houses can be very expensive :ln areas located 
l'ii thin ea:sy oommut ing dhrt anee. Nar1y of the tUUitarried live in 
company dormitories; whiJ e the married may pay nominal r<m"c for 
company flats Ol' receive a housing allmmnce .. ll'or staff c.,t 
higher 1eve1s 1 assistance in the pu:~:~chasE' of a house and la:r;.d izy 
becoming the loan guaran·tor provides a means for the employee ·to 
realize a lifelong dream of owning a home, and g'i ves another 
incentive .to remain within the company. 
Almorrl:. all firms in .Japan g'i ve an alletianCle for commuting. 
Th1.s can be paid. on a tax-exempt basis to ·the em11loyee, a:n.d is 
equal to the co~:rt of pu,rchacdng a commuter pasr.1 on a rail or ·bus. 
For ·~xecuti ves it if.~ common practice to have a car at their 
d.isposal & 111he full coat of car, dr:i. ver, maintenance if~ bor.ne by 
the compar1y. I~mployees, par-ticularly at and alJovo the section 
manager level, access to entertainment ftl.nds, which a:t'e used. 
to <m-ter·tain customers and guests. 
}<lost cr.>miH:l.nj.es also provlde a number of leistu-e facilities 
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f(n• ·their employ<~e a e The ·t y]::Ji cal lai'g'e company 1 for example 1 \<dll 
Oi'in sever·a.l :t·~~Bt houses in th.e moun·taim~ or in beach :resor·t areas 
wh:i.oh employee a a:r·e permitted to use, e:i.ther free of charge o:t:• for 
a. small upkeep e~'Cpem-;~e.. It :i.s also usual practice for compan.ies 
to take groups of personnel away to resorts for two or three days, 
not or:tly as a uay of s-t re:ngthening company loyalty, bu·t also for 
assessing potential for fu·ture promotion prospects. 
!iven in the matter of fringe benef:i.-ts, company hous5 .. ng <U'ld. 
subr:dcli commun:tty facilities are not unique to the JapanefJe 
system 1 for they are provided in many Aust:eaJ.ia:n m:Ln.ing to~J:ns. 
A salary based on need l"'ather th<:tn on the rate for the job :i.s, 
ho\'l!eve:t·, not a familiar concept since equal pay for equal work 
was a coopted o 
It can 'be 8een that the foreigner vdll find it difficult "'~o 
compete for labour v-1hen .Japanese management he,s Bo effectively 
!'l:.~in:forced orientat:i.on to the company through lifelong employment 
ancl a soniox•i ty system ~vi th fringe benefits :t'elaterl to a mant s needs. 
of fringe benefits on thLs page are Bumrnarim:~d from 
the J1<: 111RO :r·eport ~ • , pp.,l4"~17 e 
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Sapa:nese \~'orkers before the end of l'lo:r.'lcl 
i'i'a.r II enjoyed virtually none of the advan·tages of tl··a1e urdonisrn~ 
':Pl:te:Lr wa(~1s we:ee l01·1 by any lTestern Btanda:rd, and the numerous 
con:t:rolt~ intr.:)dUCH3d during the war produced a s:i:Luatio:n boro.ering 
ort forced labour. To ':roc·~:i.fy this numerous laH!3 jaere enacted 
by tlh~ Occupat:Lo:u authorities, five of the more i.mportH,nt i:r1g:35 
( i) '.Vhe Trade Uni.on I1alil' of Decem"be:r 1945, 'Nhich set out the basic 
:right of ,,1orkers in private industry to ox•ganizc~, barga.in 
oolloc·tively, and to strike; providing for demoo:ra·tic 
proceduret:t ill all u:zJ.ion aotivi esta1)1ishing the I..abor 
Re1a·tio:t:1s Commis:::don; a..:n.<l p:t•ohi 1?i ting unfair labou.r p:r."acticas. 
( ii) 1l1he l;ar>o:t• Helai;:i.o:n.B Adjustment J...;.u~ of Oetober 1946, 'Nhieh gave 
pl~oceduJ:cer:J for conoilia:tion, mediat:Lon, and arbitration in 
pri vc:rte industry, and for cooling-off pe:riods. 
(iii) !J:1 h<~ Eml')loyment ;:zecuri ty IJaw of liovember 1947, \'lhich gaVf:) 
authority fox• the J:.-nment to operate f:t•ee public omplo;y-ment 
ob·tain employment., H; outlmved labour bost.:.HH'I and other 
tmdemoox·atio forms of labour x-eo:r'ui tment. 
( :i.v) 'I1he U11omployment LaH of November 1947, which pl~ovided 
a oyr,d;em of fit~:~ for unemployed industrial rwrkers, coveri:n.g 
the majori·ty of employers of five or more employees. An 
amen.dme:rrt of :May 1949 provided. a ay;tem for day laboux-ers, extending 
oove:r:·ag;e to cons-t.:ruotion worke:t•s and li OO:L'alizing the b~mefii\o., 
for admini l"'ative costs. 
( v) 'I'he IJabo:c St&.udards :r.,a\•J of April 1947 1 't'lhich prohibi tt'ld all 
forms of irnrolunta.ry f.:Jervi tude; established stax1da:rds relatin.g 
to '·mgeB, hours of 'ivork, r,;Hrl; days, overtime 1 vaoati.ons, saf'o·ty 
and. sanit;::ttio:n., employment of \•Iemen fll1d minors, apprenticeships, 
lvorkers~ a.ooiden:t ccml_pensation; provided :for an inspection 
organiza:t:i.on and pena1·!;y :p:x.·ovi sio:na for viola;tions e 
'l:he union movement qu:i.ckly mu.t~hroorned. In January 1946 thor~ 
were 1 1 179 uniom1 Hith aJ.most 900,000 membol'!e~; by June 1949 there vlere 
34,688 u:nio11.s vdth 6,655~483 mcJmbers. 36 A·t the same "time thrr3e 
labour rations \'Wx·e organized, being pa:r"'tly revivals of 
ned from Yama.mu:t'a :Kozt1, 
:Be;rk<:;leyt 1967, r one, p.15f'., 
., p.l7 
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In October 1946 art extremely le:t't-·vli :Lg (the 11.11-
J«:t:pan CoxJ.g:ros~1 of In.duatrial Unions) ha,d led the so~-called Ooto1;er 
offenr:d ve, which develop\~d into a highly po1:Ltioal movement. 37 
After a oeries of str:i.kes .r.md Ho·-·oalled p:roduotion control, 
---· .. -
called fo:t:- a gene:r·al nat :i.e 1al strike in February 1947 o 1J'his 
:na:tiom.Jide strike, wh:i.c:.h would have paralyf?Jed the exhaunted. :n;.'l:t:i.onal 
econ.omy, t\lai:1 ba.nned by the dire ot order of' General ~iacArthu:r. :By 
J\~.ly 1948 his policy tvas to fo).•bj.d all strikes by government 
employees. JaprulEH:lO poli tioal leade:r·s, i:t:i.tellectual:\:3 a:nd executives 
of large firms began to qu.estion 'i;he basic policy of economic 
democratization as being inco11si.stent wtth ·the economic recovery of 
the oomr'G:t::'Y• By 1949 many of the hastily organized uni<ms~ a:nd 
those lvho join~Hl them merely ·to follm·¥ the tide of d<;;mocracy, had 
lost }Jtl.'blio support beca:t:tS(:l of th'~ exoel:H3es in the demands and 
tactics of the polit:l.oally ambi tiou.£; leadership in the u:n.ions. 
Hith the consent of the Occupation a:u·thoritiest the Trade 
Un:i.<nJ. J~a'!;~ \~as amended irl 1949 so that the urlions officials could 
no loneor l:'Oceive salaries and be pl~ov:i.ded ~lith offices by the 
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company. r.rhe stated J:'earwn was to ensure the independence of 
ttt1.ion~1, buc g:i.ven. the fact nearly half the u.n:Lons i'lere nonfeder.:J:t.ed 
oomp1:1.ny unionst the :t'evisions struck hard a··(; .,che existence of Hmnll 
unions" l)Iembership Hhi.ch r:3tood at over r:lix mill:i.on in 1948 dvdndled 
to three million by the end of 1949. 
fl1he violence that ma:t~ked the development of labom~ unions 
was repla,ced by a, gradual rapprochement bet\i'een unions and company 
managemerrt., lllrom 1955 OllHards employe:rs bf3gan to ac.icept unions 
and to i'1To:rk to ga:l.n their co-operation~ At the same time 1m:i.on 
leaders on the company level r·ealised they could prosper only if 
their companies pro spored. Causing a company to go out of business 
l'Jould deprive the wox•kc~r of his employment, Hhi.le even reduction in 
:Many considc red 
tha:t ·tho idetJ. that the aims of laboul" and management are :r ..... s~,tura11y 
oppcH3ed i.s an imported ideology that does not readily fi·t the 
·tx•adi"tional Jap~.lese social syE:Jtem~9 
Aceording to Pt1.kutake '10 , \<fhen he \..ras writing in 197 41 thel"'e 
vte::t•e 11.early ·t"vel ve million union members, but t.he pe1•cen.ta~:;e of 
Be·hmen 1960 and 
Tokyo,19'75,P·9 
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1970 the: number· of individual un:i.ons increased from abotdi 40 1 000 
·to over 60,000i as manuf<:te"!Jm::>ing, comwo:r.-ce and the B\:1~-:-vice indurrtrics 
grew. into u:n:tons wc:re proportioru.;l.toly 
lvlost unions are organized 
in a way l1'uk.utake findB chttractcristic to Japan; tha·t is, by 
individual enterJn~iBe s, ana emllr<wing 'blue-collar and white colla:t•, 
factory a:n.d office 11orkers in. the sanle unions., T.hi s fi.t s th~3 
paternalif:ltio idea of the en·lierp:rif3e as one big family. The 
'Horlcers too see no eontradi.et:i.on in be:i.ng loyal to bo·th their 
company o,nd "the:i.r u:rdon ... a :fact tha;t; conl\'rtitu1>(HJ a buili;-in 
limi:tation to union effeC"t;iveness .. 
This dual all.eg:i.ance is examined in g;reat detail in ch£~J.Yl;er 4 
He :r.J.ote s that the lead.e :rs of both unions and 
comr>aniea often compe·ted :i.n t:t:-ying ·bo forc:e-develop t..rorlcers 
with u:rJ.:iJ.a:tcral types of allegiance" Not muoh 
good has come out of th:is competi·t:i.on, and he th:i.nks e--11 earne~rt 
effort chould be ma,de to ·transform \vorkers of disco:ntented 
inol:l.nation into those 'lrdth dual a11egimwe ~ He ma:1.nta:i.ns th;;l,t if 
<mly the rs of 'both pa!"itilil f:j <?.pp:re<'i.ate this :reqtli:r.-emer:rt. 1 :!.t 
will help industx•ia1 rela·tion~> to "bE~come Jnore constz'Uctive. 
:Fiighty-fi ve p,cn• cent of individual company unions ha"\\'"El 
their Oim permanent l,"''),.bor lllal:l.agemE>;r.tt Council, made up of members 
and disou.ssEHJ any issue pertinent ·~o -the union or management. 
Several stteh meetings a:re held "before ·t;he 'two sides enter fonna.l 
b.'SI.l"{Sa.in:i.ng Be S Si ons e 
Each local union is ox·di:naril.y af':fil:Lated vJi~iih a national 
. . . . b . 1 ~ 41 :t.nctustrJ.r-.1 union, Hhich l.s, :~.n "t.u.:rn a mem er of a m~:t1ona cen·vre 0 
'I'he tTapan Council of Industrial Organizations 
a·bb:t'EJvia:ted t<:> most 
:t~ship was transfe:t:-red to the General 
Counc:i.l of tTapanese J:,abor UnionB 
al)breviatcd to .§j}J1ciD.. In 1950 f:i~~;y.£ 'I'Jas o:t"":i:t;:i.cal of left-wine; 
politics, bu·t it 11.01:1 Empportl:1 and co-op~)x•atHs r,Yith "the Socialist 
·- -Party" ~.'he Japane so Confede:r<d;ion of I,o,'bo:r ZcnniJwn Sodomoi ~~.~~~~~--~~~·-~·-···~-~--~ 
a,bbreviated to Dornoi h;su> a rightist tendency, and Fmppo:r.ts the 
mod<:::ratt> J)emoc:r•atio Soc:i.aList Party. 
and Dome wld.le politically active in rival 
oa,mpEl, oompe·te \ii th each. other in their efforts ·to push for 
1 . 42 1 .ugher tmgen. 'J.lhoi:r efforts take the forrn of annua. Spring 
nr;rl;ruggl~:H> 11 for pay increasfi'·•s and larger summer and yea,r-end 
bonuses.. A nEnll ass€H~sment of the por;;itions of unions in 
Japan :reveals a grNJ:i..ng feeling of common identity and 
oo-operat:i.vene EJs on a g:t'assroo·ts level. In the paat mos·t of' 
the agitation for higher wages came from federation J.cader·s. 
Now union rnembeJ.'S in the Bmall lower-paying industrial 
enterpriser:l are part:i .. ci,pa:ting in the annual spring offensive, 
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The effectiveness of concen:&rating bargaining 
e:ffm:•ts along vJitb. th:r."E>.a:toning action cannot oo doubted. A 
tl'ienty pc:r cent j.no:reaS€3 in wag-es won in 1973 was offset by 
:raging inflation that l..Zi.dened social :i.nequa.l:i.ties, so in 1974 
th<::~ lal)ou:r unions coupled their ovm wage hike r:rtruggle wi·th 
national campaigns aga.inr1t inflat:lOn in orde1• to win sympathy 
43 from ·the peo111e at large • This resulted i.n rises for vwrke:ra 
in non-gov~::"'l:t''.ament employment amounti-ng to thirty--·two per cent, 
setting a :new record. :Ln Japa.nose his·to.·;}t• 
ho~-.ravex·, na\v a much more moderate increase of thirteen per cen·t. 
'l1he economic recession has 'llmakened the effect:i..velless of this 
concentrated br.:trgaini.ng effort, and in April 1976 and again :tll 
April 1977 un:l.o:ns have S(~ttled for vu:~.ges hikes that did not 
mrttch the rif;e in the co£~t of living. 44 
Mor:rt of' ·i;he sirly~·four per cent of :i.nd.mrbria.lized workel~s 
who a:'l.'e no·t un:loniuecl are from ·the smaller enterprisesi but as 
has been ncrtt:>d, their vrork.i:ng condi-tions '\-Jere~ improved during 
the la1:;our sho:r"'cago. 'l'here i.B ru1otb.er olafJS of workers t'l!ho 
are not tm:i.onised, and these are the temporary employet~s on 
AT lim:i.ted. contl~acts. ,) Unions are not :real:i.y interested in this 
floa·ti:ng employment pool, and perhaps illur;;rtrates the fac·t; that 
enterprise unionism i.s more inclined to accept management policy 
than to seek confrontation. 
f:r'om l'' .J'o:rdan, op. cit. 1 p. 7 
43. tiJ:,a.bour undel' Almorrnal Inflation" ,:fc:JJ?2::!L£~~.:!£!J,1y, 
V<>l.Yu"<l, No. 2 7Apr .-,Tn 1974 v pp ~ 127~·131.. 
44 rn.lian, 3 ... 4 Deceml)er 1 19Tl, P•9• 45 .,.,.~.,,.:··~··~·~·····-···~·-·····~"··~········ .. -:··:-"·~: .. ··~· Cl'l.torpr:i.r.;e;s are able to vary 
their 
'l'cmpo ra..r;lr 
monthr:> 1 jus·tify 
s acoord.ing to ceonomic fll.tctu.ations. 
employee a are engaged on a contrv.ct 1xl.sh1 for 3 to 12 
employment. 
to the 
:have their coni; renovJed ·if economic ci:r.'cum::>tn.nces 
are olde:r.' women who cannot pn:r·mamnJ.t 
Furthe:t• details in my papeJ.' 11'I'h~; colTtri but ion of ~vomc:n 
SCil economy." 
s that "\ih<:, practices 
of lifetime employment and. pay accord:i.:ng to Bcmiox•i ty in service 
com1)ined t·lith company unions ht:1.:ve supplied ·t;he mo"~:tve power fol' 
J'apant s high :ro,te of economic gx'm-Jth.1 l)Ut cruesticms ttrh< thor these 
em:plo;y·mcnrt practict~8 ~:;hould be continued as the ,Ta.p<.mese eco11omy 
is chtmgi:ng from rapid. to mode:t'ate growth. O~:te school of 
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Opinion Hould do ElO for the sake Of continued Co:nciliatio:n b<:::tvmen 
employer and employees* The other school hold.B that these practices 
uou.ld. be i.nadvisable "the coming era of moderate growth. 
In a poll of employers condu<Yted by "the General Labor 
R.esearch Inc.;titu·i;e in June 1976, · sixteen per oent saicl they l'Ia11.ted 
to l>eduot"l :porsorm.el of middle age and up-vlar(ls in their employmen·t f 
. l-Ihi.le s<:n.re:nty-one po:r oen:t said ·they \<Jould keep them on the:i.J.' 
payroll try to find new useB for them. 
estimates 11 t?mrpluB 11 oorpora:te employees at 300 1 000 to 400 1 000., 
rrhough bu.silHlSB har~ picked up to flome e:x:ten·b w it is not suffic:i.ent 
to convert surplus omp1<:>yces into needed workers. 
A't the same time, as lift'l e:x:peo·tancy has no greatly iuoreased, 
there J..s pre~:H.:mre to increase tho mandatory :~.~e·tiriner age~ r.rhc r.abo:r 
lhniBtry has m11de an erlension to sixty as one of i·~s goals. The 
Japan J?edero:t:lon of' Employers' /u1sociat:i.onEi (!:!J..ft~o_l1;) suggest8 
longer employmEmt at reduced pa.y. It \'lou1d f:t•eeze the cost-of-
living :par·t of 1:1 at age fifty ol' so, a:n.d thereaf·tor replace the 
automatic:.: yearly raise wi'l:;h an efficiency wage. 
sugger:rtio110 as ·u.nrcali.st:io, as 1;he worker of fifty to n.fty-f':.i.vl;".: 
ye,::.rs may still 1Je paying fol~ chil<lre:n9 a expen:;dve u.niver~~ity 
ed.ucation <:1s 11<1ell as high payments on a ho~1r~e in \vhich to live 
lt is di:ffi cult to ~:my what the out oomt9 may be. Cole47 . 
f~ces tvw dH'f'erent proo,;Bses operating, and ~~~hey pull in opposite 
di:r.eot:i.m:us. On "the one hand 1 the age:i.ng of the Japanese labour 
fol'CC seems bound to hold do>m any major i:n.o:r·ea.se s in ·the amoun-'~ 
of inte:t•firm jo b•oool:m:nging, Y('\ft Ul.C deoli:ning nu.mber of nevJ school 
g:t.•adu.ates is forcing companies to hire la:cgo nm:nt!i'.'!rs of 
oeoupa'ticmally e:xpe:t'ienced. employees from smr::t.ll firms, thuH 
:r 1I:mplo;ymen.t H:i.th Pr:i.y ]':x.'eez~) After 40 11 , 
Vol ~x.do:v r Ho ,, ~ ,Jan~···J:Iar.19T7, pp~&'""·lL 
4'711@ st 
H.x;; s 11 :Ln. IJ.. )\:u r::rt ::i.:n. ( o d") , 
New Haven, 1976, p.210f. 
Im};;act 
str:Udng a:t the hf.H1rt of th(j perma.nent emp).cymont practice. 
TheFJe occurKt:tiorw.lly exp~c1::t.•ienced :t"ecrui·~s can drav1 upon .,;:;heir 
pa~:rt o:xperi(:'lnce in vmys that make them more :r:·esistan't to con;pany 
ideology. He expedEJ th.:LB to lead to the establishment of m·n1 
norm'~ of tJGhav:tour of mam .genH::'3n't and employee. 
:c·~ oan therefore be se(:S:n that Ja.pa.ne se management iB nnder 
g·reat :prom:m.:re in a ch<:mging si·tua:tion, r;o if the Japanese 
btu.:.d.nef.:>sman seems reluctant to mak.e a firm decision1 it may be due 
to his unce:rtaini;y a.l:)ou.t the labour rnark.et. On the o·ther hand 
it may bo due to the Japanese method of decis:i.on-·rnaking and 
thei:r t:r~ad:i.tional a·tti·l:;udes ·towardB contra.cJGs, and ·l;heso ax-e 
e:Jcaminod in the ne:xt chapter .. 
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.TAP.AN1i:S1~ CONS1~HSUS DE~CISlON-MAKING 
fJ:'ho Japtt!'),Oso bus::iJ1essma.n i~::1 faced with chang:tng econom:i.c 
condi t:tons and c;hanging societal atti·tudea to"t,ra,rds economic g:t•o·wth, 
'i'Jork and leisure, as 't'lfell as governmEHlt demands for pollution 
control and ·the 11eed for di wrsif'ication. 
At ·the 
same 't:lme there :i.s an. u:r.•gent need to onstl!'O corr&inui:ng supplies of 
raw materials., In ·the walce of the 19'{3 oil Cl"isis, the Japanese 
eonvinced. thomf::elves that the vmrld 't'\l'aB <pxickly running out of 
o·vernight l'e £1ourCtl s diplomacy came into 
vogue r one re being urgent roqu.est~J to Australia to contir.tue 
to :i.rwn:ase beef exports and another v'rhat Gregory Clark1 calls: 
"a Wl'Y foolish contract to :lmport 600,000 tons of Australian 
sugaJ.' fo:r fiVi':) years a.t a price no•·r more than double the \'JOrhl priee .. 11 
is to just the f'mttasies of 1973 ... 74 to the very differ·ent :t."eal:lty 
of l9Tf. He ha.vB Been sdth \'<rhat difficulty these adjustments have 
l~::en ma.de., On the one hand the P:remier of Que<msland sa.id.2 the 
J';:tpanese at·titude tot·~Tard. t:he.ir sug-ar contz·act was questioning their 
credita'bili ty throughou ... ~; the world. On ·U.te othe:t:• hand Clark 
maintaius it calls into question whether Atu:;tl~a.l:i.e. ca.,n ever learn. 
!ww ·t;<# do busilHHJS properly with Japan., 
It io uot only ·~he c.~hanging situation that is causing difficulty. 
Much. of the compl~l:td.ty :i.s due to the ,Ja.panese a.pprt;ach to decir~iolt­
maki.ng \V'hich rol s Juore on pe rso:nal c:ommi trnent fJ than on w:r•i ·I:; ten 
rrhe commitment is made on the 'basis 
of personal. con·tt:J,ots and d:i.scuss:i.ons un·t:il a consensus is reached. 
As this aspect of Japa..:neF~e manageme:rrt has such effects on negotiations, 
the se attitude ·i:;o\'JardrJ con·t:rao·~a and dec:i.~don-~making j.s 
exam:i.ned, togethe:t"' with the strengths and 1rleak.nem>es of the methods 
used to achieve consensue o 
l 
G:r't1gor·;~r Clark.1 11tlho:N~ 1·1e are going wrong" in HThe N'ei:t vlar 
with Japan", 1 3:cd-8th October, 197'7 9 p .. 4 .. 
2A.B.,G .. Radio In·~ervieli NovembEli' 1977. 
Contr·acts are based on a~:Hmmpt:ions about ·the 1 rights' of 
each pa:rty, whe:r.·\ll:l.S Japanese soo:i.ety 1.s organised aoco:t•ding to 
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c1e:arly def:tned 'obliga:t:i.om1'. 'I'ho se can be t x·ace d 1)aok to the 
Cc)nfuoian Five Relati.<">nships tha:l; defined obligcttiona ·:·>etwecn 
e111peror and su'bjeot i bet~u~en father and son; be·t-..1een hu.uband 
and tvife; be·t;,.;een older brother and yom:1ge:r brother; and 'bettqeen 
older f'rie:nd. a:nd younger fritmd. 'l'hore were obligations and duties 
·tol'larda one another, not merely from the aubordina:te to the super:i.o:t•, 
"but in both di:t:ec·t:lons. .As Nco-Confucianism liaS the underlying 
philosophy of J·apan throughout the 'l'okugawa period, the concept 
of 1 rie;htet :i.s •~lien to the traditional tiay of life.. There was 
not even a v1ord. for 'rightB' in the JapanesE~ la.n.guage until they 
came ·to translate F:r.>ench lat"i las-t century. 
F:t"anciB Hsu.3 explains the cont:ract principle in acco:todance 
wi .. th different types of human grouping. 1>'1ernbers of any society 
l)eg:i.n life in some form of kinship group. IJ.1hey e:i.ther continue 
·thei.r rnembersh:i.p i.n that group for life or they have to seek 
entrance to o:t' form some o·ther kind of se<..:ond.a:r.y gr·oup. The 
Chinese secondary gr·ouping1 the clan, is founded on the kinship 
principle and ·~hue a di:rec·t extension of this bat>ic unit. He 
oon:tras·ts ·this: -vdth the American secondary group, the club, which 
i~~ built on the contract principle, sj.:nce effect:i.ve membe:rsh:i.p in 
it l"'Bquires disengag'ement fl~om one's: kinship affiliation since its 
mem1)C3l'S are equal, a-nd since entry an1l continuan.ce are voluxrli<.l,l'Ye 
He maintains that the J'apanese kinsh:l..p E1ystem is fundamentally 
f.l:i.z;:ilar ·to H;s Chinese counterparts~ How·ever1 tls has been noted., 
Nakane 4 sees life in ·the company taking the plaoe of the extended. 
family s;.n:rtem -v•hich iB a feature of Chinese not Japanese cturtom. 
rr•he relationship between employer and employee is not 'tJO be 
explained in contr-ac·tual ·terms, she expla:i.ns, for ·the ne.,,r employee 
becomes part of the company fa:mily. n~ven if lifetime employment 
:i.s a :relatively recent phenomenon, the fact that the most modern 
eni;e:rpr:i.ses prefer it to a oontra<~t ~~ystem :rehtforoes the claim 
that the concept of con:traots is still alien to the modern .Japanese. 
• Hsu 7 
~qak.ane 1 
~~-~~~~·, PP~59t60 • 
.;;_ot_;,_..;..,_• ' PP .14-17 .. 
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c~an "bo W8'2'n :in. colloci;ive labou:r- mon"ts be·ti"i.r~en co1r.}1anies and 
their 11.D.i.o:ns" A;;: oxpl1'l.ined "by llanarni Tadashi5 7 ·~h(~so aJ;'e C011ched 
:i.n n:!Jt:r~rac-t and general te ~.~ma open to Ni.doly di.ve:rg"Eln·t 
interpreto.:i;i-:ms, the J:'<:H:~.son fer th:i.fJ amb:i.guit;}' going back to the 
Japa:tW£?.e soc:iologi<::aJ. eon".:.~£:l:x:t of e.ny contraotua.1 :re1a:iionship .. 
their x'cla:tioru>hip itself, the c.:L:;:·oumBii<'i.ncos tha:t 1n:·ought them 
togethert ·the '\:;aol-:::ground n.ga:i.mrJ.; which ·!;heir rela:tionship h<:ts 
blished between thee. It ;;.s 







r:d.ng out or' thi'J rp~('€~ta:tion and implementation of 
l:f thj, H 
a mu.::rt 'be solved by mutual unde 




to c r pa:rtyn 1 ~Ghi!:J 
p, it should t;hen a.me:n\led to ;comove sueh 
'be in eluded 1 'the 
·t;'ho VJewtern style of cont:t'<J.ct 
1 of :i:t, thui'J. 
mr:1.ter:i.al de 
and ·the:i.r 
~ 1969~ Pe2o 
i.n 
J:n.trt ~ 
8 f3,fr18JJ. i 1 
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the:t:.:· 
t lengthy legal 
contract. rl'h:i.£\ frigb:tc:ns "c;ho Jap.a:t1tlf~C SO he :tmmediately 
ident 
\•leEl'terner~::: '1-lcUl'l; 'the.:1 corrtr<':l.ct ·to ind:toate commitments, cono.:i.~cions, 
ancl :t'est:r<Lot:iom~ in p;;::<eeioe language, Hhich ldll not be liEt.1l1e ·to 
that i;he 
~1 the 
technology or services lp/h:Loh the :fore company iG expected to 
P:t'ovi.do. He 
oon.ce 
I·!; :i B 
sts each may fiJnd it n::JCl<HH3rn:y -'~to make some 
·the othEn~i s v:l.En:llpoi:i:rt :i.:n. thio l'{.lgpeot. 
and tho end of llf: 
ty to for 





·top m;;:m r:~ not noo.cHHCi'.ir:l. 
·l· ~ Dl~"'",~""'.,,9 11v .... , .. J:,.,,,, 1 much of i;l10 
, this 
group i.1 they hav'(~ 




sa lB due to the fact t 
of 
of "consen8us deci 
maki.ng t.bo f'ac·t "that Hesterners concentrate on the t~nswer to ·bhe 
question: r,Jha:t should be the decis:i.on, hu.t the Japa:nr:.ge 
co:noent 
stt~p ir:: to decide \vh•~th.~:r there is l111H3d fo:r.' D, decisio:...1. It is 
the focusing on the problem that is the ensen(;.e of the deoiB:i.on. 
lt is in this step tha·t J'a:panese aim at attaining consensus. 
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'l'he ans'if}.:':lt' to the question (what the \'/ef.lt com.ddera -the decision) 
follows its definition. 
During the process that precedec the decis:l.on., no mention 
is made what the an~rwer might 1:~e, so people e.~:·o 11o'l.; forced to 
take sidetZ:. The 'l<<~holEl :p:rocEHH> is focus.:>d on find:i.ng out whaJG 
the d*E!o:Lsion is r'eally about, not what the decision should be~ 
Only \'i'he:n all of the .People who \·Till ha:vc to ca1•ry out the 
ag:t~eement have come together on the need to make a. decision will 
the deoi vc1:i.on be made to go ahead. IJ:'his means that many of the 
crtaff in ·the Japanese firm neecl to 1Je involved in tb.e discussions~ 
this s a long ·time.. l:'effl;E.ll"!H'H'a become very 
especial :i.f t as })rucker t€3stificu;~ diffe:t:'Em.t teams of people 
fl"'m diff'€1!'(nd; art'ias of' the company are b:t•ought in:to the 
discussions, each appearing not to lr...now anything of lJ).:-eced::Lng 
Hh.e:n the J'ap:;t:<1esf~ reat.1h the point \'Je call a de<(.::ision, t.hoy 
say they rtXB in ·the action stage 1 lll'hen top management; :refers ·the 
deoisimr ·~o .what tht::;y· Ot"l,ll . napp:rop:r.·ia.~e people 11 • Uho ·tlHHJe 
d:i .. soussiom:~ leading up to the con::Jensu.s, ::l.t h<:'l,s become cleaT· vJha"t 
basic appl'oache s ee :r:"t a in people or g:t·oups "V!OttJ.d ~~:al;;:r:~ 'to the 
p;r·oblek1io ~:o}) ma.nagt:HlV:.Hrt in the ehoioe of the group :i.n effec:t 
piok~s: the anBl·~·e:r·, 'bu-t ii; is an ans•~er ·th.a·t ~~ill noi'l B'Ul'prise no <me .. 
Drucke:r' o1a.:tr:xs t.hl'l.t the advm1tai,i.~ of ·this pro<:e:Bs is -'chat. i;t 
makes for very effc~ctive decisions. Having had all the oorwc:~."ned. 
people .:i .. nvol~:.Hl :i.n the decision-making, execution c:x:·12~at•es no p:roi)lems .. 
ln the kle :t'r.L nystem on the d•~o:ision haB 1:.>e<m. reached, time must 




i·t; :tB po~mi'ble for the dt';OiEd.on to D'') sabot·t,_;ed by the organizaticm. 
or to l;e delayed so lo:n.g in the execution that it is no longer 
If the period prior to th(:; <l.ctio:n stae,.oe iz frustrating 
for \festerners 7 the length of time in executing decisions must be 
frustrating for ~fapanese. 
step is unde:rs·tanding the altorna~Giv-eB available, nruckBl' oo~1side1~s 
that: the? J'apaneBe mo:t-e zer:i .. c·usly exa.mine the various option:::~ and 
are thus less likely to lr.acome priBone:x.·s of preconceived answer·s ~ 
According to Ballo:n11 the benefits of consensus decision·-
making are: 
(i) 1•1e~1e:r aspec·ts o:f decisions are overlooked, fo1• more people 
are involved, including those in charge of the execution 
of the decision. 
( i:i.) IJ.lhe traumas i.;hat accompany change are reduced, for those 
affecrted are familiar tvith the ne1.·r decision and its consequence::.o. 
(iii) Pa.rticj.pan'ti1 f€•el committed to the im:plementatiorL. 
(iv) 11older decis~.ons can 1)e made. 
In the 1950s Japanerc;e businessmen favoured American menag::Hi1EHlt 
techniques, o.nly to find that many could not ue adapted to Japa.nese 
customs. The fault \'Ias not necessarily that of the Japanese P for :i.t 
SEHnns that many of the earlier ti1eor:l.es about hierarohioa.J. lines of 
command in the process of dec:i.sion,-mak:l .. ng havt; now 11een modified by 
Wesi.;ern rn.:iters in favour of ;3, more realistic asscsBment of the 
illfluence t)f informal groups 'lvi thin the organization. Such books as 
(1960) with its 
emphasis o:n. the need fox· group co-operat:i.on nms-t o..ppear to the 
J'apamHJe to be a vi:ndd:.catioJ.l of tlH:d.r method8, and it was in"ter(Hrting 
to see pa.per·.,·back copies of' McGregor 11 t~ book in ~:okyo bookshops. As 




c:ri·ticism 't<ihen Amori.ca.n-style mana,gemont \\l'a,EI :.in"croduced into 
10 
.Ja,;;>an9 Arai c. 1ie.veo ·trw:t such cr:i:ticir.;m ignores th<o;~ 
historical and n~r:):Lal basea of' these praoticeso Though some 
companies have discontinued ·the use of 
ma.nagBrial conse:nfms in busi:tt(HH:J matte:rr;1 1 the underlying rin.~-p.-
"' --....,..,.,~ .. "1'11i 
style of management ph.iloso})hy rcm~:dns with the essence of its 
application in business lyin.g :·.n the invol vemont of jun: .. or a·ta:ff., 
li'or the purpose of analysis it is possible to id•mti.fy 
r::evex,al aspeci::z in the rin£;i-~r,rtyle of manarmment. b.y which 
.._.. . ...,...,_,.).;,_ 0..... I' 
consenrms deoision~-ma.king :i.s achieved., 
A¢. The proce BS of _rj~~s;2,;; 
These are: 
B .. 'l'ho .ri~;i is often preceded by informal discussions - ~£':1!~2:.· 
C .. 'fhe informal di.soussions may be follol'Jed by a formal conference 
~?£1 - to "pull the threads together" to start off e.xecu-'d.on 
of the policy. 
:Each of ·these aspects is e:xami.ned in mol"El detaiL 
!:._.'!~l]..§'",.~12:!:2££~!L.2.!~e.~: ~ :i.n :i.ts literal meaning is 
a system of reveJrential inquiry about "''· Buper:i.or' s intentions .. 
This a.rchaic term, Tsuji l\:iyoaki 13 claims, is scarcely comprehensible 
to many postwar J'apanese 1 yet :is commonly used in academic and 
prof~l£lB:i.onal circles to clescrii:Je a method of decision-ma.king t.hat 
ha.s b1i:iO!l extensively employed in Japanese government and private 
ag,~ncies since thE': early days of the f,1eiji era ( 1868-1912).. Arai 
Shunzo14 suggests that .=£.ill!i?i may derive from the T• a."lg governmental 
system ~tJhioh. was brought to .Japan from China in 645 A .. J). 7 coming 
into the spotligb:b especially af'tel~ the bleiji Restore/don l'lhen :i.t. 
He maintains that 
modern manag'0ment specialists sl~.u.n the wo:rd rin.<:d. b.eo<mse of its _ ... _ ... ~
st:~;ong connotations of soc:i.a.l l'<:lnk, au:tho:l.'i ty and l.:n:l.reaucl'ac;y .. 
American wa.nagement special:t.ato considered to l10 an. 
ou.tstanding example of anac;hroni.stic; feudali.>'llm, lm:t 
every-thing except the topmost policy decisions comes from the 
documented sugge::rtioml of su.bord:i.natese Af"lier being d:ra:fted by all. 
off:tcia.l of low rank, ·the proposal is circulated among other officials 
in the min:i.ntx•y or agency conce:med, and they a:t-e :required. to affix 
their r~eals if they agree with ·the policy proposed. The documen·t 
TrJorkB its way by c:i.J:'Ctti·l;ous pathn until it finally reaches the 
A Study 
lllod0r~1 
11De Qj_ s:i.on-1Ylaking in the 
'') }"' 11 p ~ ( • , ) 
.h .. " !~ • ~' artt o a • ~ 




( c:t:.t.•(.mla't document), -!;,he de~c:tsi.on j,s rnad.e. 
11) 
According to Tsuji "' the most inrportaJ•t attributes of tho 
~~~~ process are that the initial draft is pr,opa,r,3d by a low~,, 
ranking (.\fficial \'l:i.thout authori·ty or leadership s·~a:tus; the 
&Y!~!'!!'l2. :Ls disCl.HlBf3d and t::xtunined separately by offio:i.als of all 
relevant ·bureaux c.n-:td di vis1.ons w and no·~ at a joint meet:!.ne of the 
a.drnini.st:rcttors conce::~med; although the power to grant or withhold 
final approval for th~;,c; ~Q§JH~ lies with the highest e:xecuti ve, 
in actual p:~.~ac·t;ice he is expected to approve it tdthou:t che.nge 
because of the long proce:::s of scruting by all concerned with its 
fu:tul."e execution .. 
lt i.s easy to ove:.r--emphasise the !i!!t2:l~E2. as though it l.zerc 
the sole vehicle of consensus decision-making. Apart from verbal 
!!!!r.d and. e:x:ecuti V~) mee·tings, there are other informal disc·n.ssions 
\'llhich have an important :part "to play :i.n ensur:i.ng ha:r.·mony (!!;;::;) 7 
wh:i.oh ir:; tlw necessary pre-requiBite for achieving consensus~ 
B .. The informal d:i.scussion,r;t nemawaahi ~ :Nema>~Tash:i. is the rtame 
---rw:.m;ml'Jl'""--~"*"'"""-"""'_'""' __ .1111<~"'------~ ... ~---
given to informal J):r.elimina.ry discussions~ The primary reference 
:i.s to the p:r<S:parRtions rnade in a,.dvance of transple.nting a lctrge 
and be:nding the smalleH· roots around the earth clump that will "be 
moved.- According to Hoda16 ·t;his process of Pl'ior informal 
n.egotiatio:n.s and persuasion among concerned parties that V'Iill be 
involved in decision·~making and problem-·solving cannot be said to 
be unique to Japan, but when the par·t:i.cipants share lifetime 
employmen·t the weight given to suuh informal activities must be 
:i.nitiator rl'ants to establish a certain piB:,f:~:;b !Ioda says he spares 
no effort in the of major concer11.ed parties, especially 
th<H3e ~vhoBe consent :i.s expected to be difficult to obtaino If 
the J,n:-opem'i\ is very successful 1 the !~ may be merely 
th~1 formal procedure of -vn:i ting and detailing the decision. 
Hm,mver, sometimes the partioi.pan·tB in the ~~vas_~-~ may consi.der 
that the has impl.icationH that wez•e not apparent in the 
17 
disctu:ud.on. ~:hough junior a':ln~ff draft the !:?·n![~, 'Vogel vJ.ri·tes 
of the :mitiative exercised by Japanese executives 't'Jho can gu.ide 
it.>suo:;J through long periods o:f ?,?;.!;!!JlJ;l-~~.SJli.t arriving a:t decisio:r.1s in 
1.9,.,j.';?..:E.~!. ~ 1 P$458 16Noda, ~cit. 1 p .128. 
rtF;. Vogel, 11IrJ.t:r;·oduc·t:ion: TO\n'l.rds Nore Accurate Conr.::o s 11 
in E .. Vogel ((~d.), .cit~, pp.l49-·15l. 
theil" inteNst 1 and mobilizing pe:r.·sonnel to ':·,chieve these goals. 
J)epending on the complexity of the matter, the !.±~!E~l:l~§:~:i 
can be perfunctory or timo·-oo:nsuming.. 'J.'he consul tat ion varies 
from munda:ne detail to lJroad general issues. It may be folloHed. 
by social ga:theri:t1gs in a ·~eahouse or flilililar setting? so that 
18 diffioult:tes within factions may be settled. Nakane traces 
.~lihese meetings to group meetings in old-establiBhed villagee, 
l'Jhere the tradition has been to base any decision on maximum 
consultation. To thi.s idea ha.s been added the post-i•l'ar concept 
of 'democracy' which has tended to enlarge the size of gather:i.ngB .. 
'11his fl"equo:trtly results in long mee·cings dragged ou·t :i.ll the name 
of democ::c.•acy. This causes Naka.ne to say thc~t Japan is the 1a:nd 
of meetings, where it is not difficult "lie find a man '"'ho s:pend.s 
more thne a:!; meetings than at his desk. lf these ga:therings 
achieve consensus and co-o:pe:r•ation for the e\re11tual execution of 
the policy, management would not see these consultations as 
non-productive "liime. 
:mven though ·the sociaJ gatherings after ~~,l~,~E.hl may be 
hf;ld af1:E>"' hours, \<Jorkers would tHYt expect to be paid overtime. 
As has h::en explained, wm:·k group loyalt;j;es and orientation to 
·the ll!tn:•kpla,oe are very strong, so all would. l'Ta.n.t to participate 
in such gathe:.rings, and '1->Iould be upse-t; if they 1r1ere excluded. 
~!oda19 maintains that many Japanese employees are so :i.nvohnEld 
l'Jitb. company activities that they prefer sho:r:·t vacations, a:n.d 
even during wwat:i.on become restless to return to 'the daily l:i.fe 
of ·~he compe.ny .. 
G e The formn,l con:fe:r.enee: kaip,;i. After the informal discuzs:i.ons liv.<'$~·-·~M""I"'.!~>..,..,.~"!!'-""l<WII.I:!I\!'-'>I<WI>M'f __ ,,_y ___ '~ 
and soc:1.al ga;theringst it is often possible for the .£~(£,! to be 
draf·ted. immodia:Lely. Howeverf at other timt"?S it is necessary to 
l10ld a formal conference - ~~O The purpose of the conference 
j,s "to pull the threads together" (p.,!;t.!££';;;.;;::~) 1 to start off 
e:~::.em.rtion of the policy. As it is a formal meet).ng :tt usually 
if.j limited to st:rategio considerations, leaving the tactics and. 
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techniques to be 
k~:d.r,;i may the 
- ... ~JAA_«~_;._ 
handled through the ~~~~~i. In some cases the 
most important factor, and the :ring:i. me:r'Elly confirm 
_,.,.,,._-=?~0§ 
~che decirdon. A-t; other ti.mes though agreem<r:n-lt may be reached at. 
""·"·<"·U'"t .£.:a!.2i!•, pp.l49-151. 191~oda, ~:::~i:!:~r :p.140. 
20 AJ.1)ert Craj.g, nli'unctional and Dysfunctional Aspect~;; of 
Gover:nmE:n:lt 1Ju.:rea:ucra.cyt1 inTI:~ Vogel, pj>_~t~ ... , p.22i• 
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the meet:Lr1.g, the final approv,al occurs only when the .~~i_sh.£ ha~:J 
beer. stcnnped Nith all .. t~he neceEu::1ary seals~ 
CraJ.g suggests. ·that the over-emphasis that is often given 
to the :i.mpor·tance of ,r:i~£i~ in the decif•ion-making procesr:i may 
he due to th•~ fact that inf')rma.l consul tat ion is hard ~io see and 
meetirtgs so o:~:'dinary that they seem hardly worth mentioning, wh:i.le 
ring5.sei is high,ly visible and. peouliax·ly ,Japanese. It may w:rell 
also be due to the fn.ct that ·the v!eatern negotiator may feel tl1at 
the ~f;;;;~. is ·the <-md of the process, only to find that he must 
still wait for the ringj.sho to be completed. It can therefore 
~Mn:'>'hl1::h-~--"·-
be eM-lily seen Uh<'l.t such an o1rer-emphasis on the importance of 
J.i!!A:hf~ i. could dev€1lo:p. 
I·t is false to assum~~ that all scholars examh1.ing the -~2~lli2:. 
s·tyle of mtl"nage.ment v:i.ew it as u11critically as Dr"l:teker appears to do~1 
It is lioszible to identify both strengths and weaknesses in the 
system. 'I1he empha.sis of particular writers seems to depend on 
the Ministry of International Trade and Indued;ry vsri te1:1: 
~~~~~o give my im;>ressions, people in ·the ministries are not 
mnCih inte l.'-tHJtod in r:ingi: it i. s a mundane p:rac·~ ice e 
'Ne considt~J:' the 1:-~.!!FJ"octtment as part of off:i.ce (:J~uipmr::.nt 
alc1ng with pen.oils and p<:i,J;>er ••• 11 
On thr:~ other hand Noda Kaz.uo ~3Professor of l3usiness Administr'at:i.on 
at Hilc}::.yo University, dtHi!Oribes the \..ray that the t~management boom 11 
the IGovcment to modernize existing maxlae,-emEmt prac:tic<HJ on the 
mod€1l of .ArllOrioan company manage11umt, though it brought 
e:x:peJ:-irw.:m:tat:tcn a:nd 1:-eform, had eventually to l"eVive the 
Bystem~ i'lhen they came to realise "\;he di.fficulty of introducing 
execu.t lJ h:J. 'big bu:·'d.Tless iB l:i.gh.tened considerably "by the 
system.. Comparl:Hl Nith practices in the 19508, he believes tha.t 
.riE£1:. today :i.s a remttrke.bly mor·o :r.efi.ned system, used :in a more 
1--c ali Ed; i c ma,nne r. 
of 
s1::1 to D:ruc.kcr he admi"'H; hi.s OV"~':ll'-!i·dmplification 
hiB purpost~ 'f~if';,s not to give a scholarly analyci~:> 
l:n~:t to highlie;h"t Elome of those poli s 
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;;:.;;;.;;,~.;;;;~;.;:;;,.:.;;;.;., . ...;;;..;.._..,;;;,~,.·.,~,~lEJol::_§~ta£J:: AU.1ert C:raj.g24 suggests that one 
obvious advantage :i. s that young officials are given important 1110rk 
a.:nd v:t"tal experience from the ti1\1e they enter the minietry, for 
it iB the lortJer officials >.Jho draf·t the tl~. I·t is easy to 
exaggerate the junior 8tatus of the .!<-.?.:.~Ph!: or plan ini ti.a.tor, for 
according to Noda 25 he is generally a section chief. Crv.ig25 
admj:l;s that wl.::.oever actually :prepares the dl~t:,ft, it is the sec-'cion 
chief who bear~:.> ·the P:t•imary responsi bili·by and h:t.s bureau chief 
who takes a share of it. Aoknm'lledging this qualifying factor, 
it wot1ld still seem that ~y-ounger :people are given opportuni·ties 
for m~an:i.ngful work. When Craig queried this, senior Japanese 
officials justified the:i.r syntcm on the grounds tha.t the young are 
ener€:,-etic and i:rmova:tive while older officials hav1~ the v.rifldom 
needed to tone down the final product. 
~~~he weakness :i.n this practice is 1;ha.t, according to Arai 27, 
it can lead. to an over-powerful junior staff, if slothful or 
incapal)le managers merely approve pol:i.cy originating at lower 
levelB. Expose"' literature on Japanese bu:t:-eaucracy sees the 
tmdue influence of junior staff as one of the major dysfunctions 
~;>Q 
of the system, <.:raig'-v identifying with:in this literature tl.ro 
kinds <:>f e:;mmplE\S of ·~his phenomenon., 
Fi:!'.•st, thex'e are those who wri·t.e a·bout the influence 
exercised by subordinate officers in the decisions that led to 
the Paoiffc Uar. Craig emphasises "'Ghat the majors and colonels 
who se:r:'ved as section chiefs were :in their middle or late 
thi.rt:i .. (H:>, so i>lere not that young. 
attaches in Ge:r'lna.ny and therefc·re favoured a :strong pro-·German 
poliey~ He suggests that the ideological difference ivhich set 
them off f:rom the sanior officers t-m.s a s::i.gnifloant factor. It 
was their job to draft policy c:..nd strateii;,JI' for the servio~>s, and 
they did not usurp ~,his function. He suggests they were ablt:: 
to make their :i.nflu.e:nce fel·!J only because the gener•als and admirals 
·themselves i·le:re divided on questions of :policy. 
'rhe second example that Craig identifies centres on the 
figure of the assistant secticn oh.ief, i~ho may be a clerk who h01s 
not J)assed the higher e:xamina:t;ion, and may have a fa:i.rly l01~g 
tenu:c<;; :i.n the post \llh:l.le ca:t•eerist sect:i.on chitlfs come and go. 
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vlhile Craig wouV\ J:H)t deny th<3 :po-vmr that such subordina.ten may Hieldt 
he argues that it is office pot-ter not policy-plaxming power. In any 
system thoro are lOi'l'-rankine staff members of long standing, who can 
make life very difficult for newly appointed senior officers, so th:i.s 
is no·t unique to the Japanese uystem. 
~:~~~l1Ji~£:.~~l.J:.:?~<:::~~£EJLi:J2 ~ Arai 29 cons ide :r.s tho:,:-._, is a tendency 
f'ol' a gradual decline i:n managerial ability to. occur as a result of 
many years in the bo·ttom-·weighted ~ system, for ext.~cutives come 
to rege,rd ·the processing of the deluge of papenwrk pouring in 
f:rom all directions as a subBti tute for work, leading to an inability 
.1. t k 'b . . t. t. T .. 30 f th . h' . t. ' 110 a e ·::; Le uu. :t.a 1ve Q SUJ:L goes even ur · er ln :ts orJ. lCl.sm, 
claiming that £:~~:L~ prevents the minister and higher civil servants 
from assuming a, role of leadersh:tp in decision-making. He relates 
the experience of a fr).end of his, a higher civil servant, rr1ho, 
l'Jhenever hf:l thought of a plan Ol" policy that he wanted to effect, 
could only send it as a. mere proposal or i tern for future l"eference to 
to the appropriate lo1'll·-l'al'!king admi:nistrator. Even if thi.s loNer:~t 
ad.miniertrator accepted and acted upon it, he still had to t<Jai t a long 
time until the concerning that policy reached him. Should. 
h<':l have igno:ced the protocol of £1X~.fti.:!: .. ~2.A.' he would have cmtagonizcd 
hi.s amwcie:tcs and created disturbarwes in the office. 
ThiB s&cms to be placing too much emphasis on the· E..E:.ii~ ... ~~ 
ignoring the long periods of ~1!!..~.~?11}. \,jbere executives can e::x.eroise 
ini tia:ti ve., 
.2.:.-~-~il'l~.::::£Sll1"!ill£1P\l.J2J;:?2.es.::!: It is obvious that by the -time the 
,.tl_:tlfr;L~b.~?.. been com:pl.eted a gre11.t deal of tj.me will have ele.psed. 
T .. 31 J . th t *1 . . t . b SUJl. comp .a:t..ns .a ,, 1e Q!';,e1E.h£ mus · be examJ..ned oeparr~tely y 
each section, di v~ision and bureau. 
absent; when it arrives, o.l:> the 
The proper officials may be 
.;w;;.,.~.,, ........ ;,.;. .• ~w may 1)e inadvertently set 
aside, OJ:' even deli beratoly held \ip ))y an administrator uho disagrees 
ldth its :t'Ocommendations. lJ.'suji <.n~plains that it :i.s often difficul".; 
to expl""esf,; explicit dinagreement in the face of pressures from 
i:nfluential fii!Jllres or :ir.d;eres·~ groups, so sometimes an official 
may display :i.mplicit dir,:agreemen-t by keeping the &!!£?~~ for a 
long t:i.me. If he were to makEi his disagrE;ement e:xplici t t "t!tew 'I'Jould 
be frict1on be·tr7een. him and his C<>llE>agues, and this must 1JB avoided at 
a.ll oosts. Ho1;~eve1'• surely tl:e deli berato del<:1.y:Lng tactics t-Jould catu:>e 
. , 
-"'·-·~·- 6 ' 11 I)...!- 30 l •• r.J: ZUJ:l. t 
f:r·ictio:n too. ~~r<d 32 points out that the revolution in office 
copying maohineEl has made it possible to distribute copies of 
the !':l:EJrL§lll2 in advance, so that 1tJhen the original ever1tually 
comes around, the contents are knm,m and each person can put his 
stamp on it immediately. It \ms ~lways possible for "the 
init:La:tor 0f' the proposal to ci:rculate the document in person, 
b0\vix1g loi\l' before each participant and l'eqtJ.esting his sec,tl. 
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Del.ayr> in approval a:r·e not unique to ·thE:; Japanese system, and in 
many respects the process is sim:tlar to a'ljsubmisBion that rm.tst pass 
through the :ranks to the responsi.ble off1.cer. 'l'he main difference 
is tha:t the ~E~'?. is no·b circulated on a merely hierarchical 
path, as l!"'igu.re 1 clearly demonstrates. "'b h :. . . . •t ..~. oug !±,.~~ :1.n :1. ·s 
tracU.tio:nal form is ori t:i..cised for mai:ntai. nine a strict sense of 
l~ank among adminir:rtrators, in its present communications sys·~em 
it is Uf>ed as a method of consenEms dec:ieion-maldng7 so its 
horizontal aspects at the lowel" level ax•e as important as the 
streng1hening of vertical relat1.C>nshipa. The possibility of delay 
in the oi.rculati:ng process can be oompenaa:ted for the lack of delay 
in the e:11:·ec~.rtion ~!'ooesst to wM.ch reference has already been ma.de. 
Verbal !.ii!£.;.i also eJ::ists. Ara:t33 explains thir:'l is simply 
a procedure whereby the staff member checks ver·1x':i.lly with the 
mcmager to get his approval for a. plan, before filling out a full 
formal This procedure, thou.gh a grea·l: ·t:lme-·s<:nrer, has 
caused some gTave problems, Ars.i maintains, for the J'apanese 
spoken language is vague and more ambiguous tharJ. thf:) vlri tten 
languag-e .. The su'bo:rdina;te may 'therefor<? obtain gene:ra1 permission 
bu·t be l'equ.ired to prepare a Wl"itten 
documeni; \llhioh ·thE~ e:xecu.ti ve \·zill often feel has implications that 
differ distinctly from ·those of the verbal proposal which i:aas 
approved. I•leanvJhile the staff may have already started the project 
on the basir> of th.e verbal appro·va.l, and ·Uw resulting confusion morq 
wa..ate more time than ha.d the usual procedure 'been foJ.J.o1r1ed. 
IJhilE\ a.lJ. relev1.u:rt admin:b:rtrators 
hardly be expected Jt:io have a strong 
sense of responsi'bil.i·ty fo:r• the policy involved 1 beea.use the 
responrsd."t.;il:i:ty :i.s not reaJ.ly th.eirs~ rl1suji 34 fJUggests th<:•t each 
~cit$~ p.136 • 33Arai t .?J?.!c:!:,! ¢ 7 pp .135,136 Q 
• c:i:t. .. , p .. 462 
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adminhrtrator' s co~se of :t•esponsibili t;y· is aff.:;oted by the fact 
that hH k:novm his see.l is only one of many seals, and apt to mean 
no more ·than that. Foreign negotiators may ilm11 complain tha:t 
i·~ irJ impor;sible to discover lNho is the person respon:sibler f:or 
they are accustomed to responslb:Ui ty being specific :not g.;:;:neral. 
Acoo:rd.ing to Nooa.36, h0\.;rever 1 it is a mistake to a:::;suro·s that 
decisicn-makh'lg by consensus mee.ns tha:t no i.l'ldi vidue.l assumer:J 
:t."er.::ponsi bil:i:ty 1 for it is divided c:J.mong all members. He claims 
that the f:i.ual complete consensus is e:ntirely separate f:t•om the 
Cftlel:rtion of attributing; l"eBponsi bili ty for success OI' fa:'ilu.:x.'e .. 
Fhren in cases when a dec:i.sion is made by all members, if the 
rosul·!; is a serioue failure, tb.t':l rep:resentati ve di:rf~cto:r - the 
company president - either aJ.ou~ or with a small group of a~mior 
dil'eotorS~ rnay take :respo:nei'bility for the failure, or a junior 
director who has had no aotual i.l:l.fluence in a final decision 
may be forced. to I'EH:dgn. 
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Craigl'l m<'.dn·taim; thai.; the p:rolilom of :responsibility o:t• ls.ok 
of it in the Japanese bm:>eaucracy i.s even more comph;x:. The 
tendency to ves·~ all responsi'bility in the head of the or·g~m.ization 
He cites a~~ an example g :i. f a t; rain. 
crat::hes and 1iWJS a:r't:~ lorrt, be it aa·botage or ·the 11.egligenex.1 of a 
s1~itchman, the d.i:r.ector of the 11ati.onal raihm,ys may offer his 
resigl:1ation., 
H:.tnir:rter offering his r-esignation following criticism of his 
deJHa:rtmcmt ~ 8 dE>c:Lsio:n not to requ.est the return of the ransom in the 
notion of re sponsi 1'l:i.li ty was infltwnced by German legal concepts 
adopt eel during the Mei j:t period, accord :i.ng to \·lhich tota.l 
l'EHJpo:.nHibility ~r.t:ts vested in each minister, but it a.lso reflec·tr~ ·the 
fact t1w,t o:rga.niza·t.:i.o:nal solida.ri ty in ,Japan is s;y'1n.bolized by loyal:ty 
J:'i; is the leader who thu.s has 
the x·esp-:.mr..;ibil:i:ty, even -though in the negotiat:i.ng stage he is not 
the r.~ole }Xll'Bon corrt:ri bu.ti:ng to ·t;he fir.al decisicm. 
J8 Noda · conrdiders that a eri t:ical factol' in oomple·tG consensus 
p .. 12.2f. 
p •. l2~~-
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the e::r.pansion <:Jf the ecoilomy :i.n ·~he mid 19:;.:.-,a~ the number of 
clir0ctors f.n:(m in :t"air1y lare;;'e-scale ente::rpris~;js never e::cceedE~d 
ten, but J:lO\i a number of companies have tv,!eniiy to Jchir"ty 
d:l.:rectors. The inc:r'(ease wae j_ntended to strengthen top 
management id i;hin each en"l e::rprilile ·to ent3ure that they cou:~d co:pe 
effectively with the rapid changes in the 'business environment. 
rrhe nuclerts of this effort was the l;;)stablishment of e, compa10.y 
organ composed of only Benio:r directors, tlH:'i _j~~ ( execu:tive 
committee of managing directo:r·s). In addition to the company 
president, memberrt~ of the e:xecu:t:i.ve committee number five to ten. 
A.deq:uate da:i.l.y commu.nica:t:i.on is easily possible among a group of 
this size 1 -thus put·ting in·to practice the Pl"'i.nciple of consensus 
decision·~·maJdng '<lhen it comes ·bo items of' se:rioua consEHJl.lG:!),C(l .. 
It also enrtbled the e:x:ecuii ve committee to carey ou·t much greater 
top-·ma.nae;omEmi functions than previously, for though Noda speaks 
of consensus decision-·making, it is oonsemm.s mer-ely among the 
It would ii;eem that it is therefore easy i:ro 
ElY..aggerate the undue influence of subord:i.na.i;e officers, who will 
not. b.ave m1y part in these daily meetings of -'q.;he executive.. The 
e:x::i.stence of r.mch an e.xeouti ve a.lso indicates that :f.t is ea.sif:!!" 
to iden·tify tho8e rt::~spons:i.ble for the most important policy matte:~:-sf)> 
By e:!{:amining the total p:roeess of co:nsensua decision-maJd .. ng 
i·t ifl ap:par<::tlt that it is an e:::-tremE~ly comple:ii: aspect of ~ra:pa:n.ese 
management. Co11sensus decision-·ma.ldxlg if:.; an active conrJc:Loufj 
process :Ln which the leadersh:i.p e:1r:plores all options offered by 
a broo,d range of company employees i:n the hope that an ol>vious 
solu·tion will emerge from the long discuss:i.ons so that, l-vhen a 
decis:i.on iB finally made, the ovex1vhelming majority ht the company 
can 13Ce \-ahy StJ.ch a dec:i.sion is desirable and necessar~r~ f:10 Noda39 
asseri£1 that leadership is much more vigorous and adaptable ·than 
many accounts of co:nsensu.r~ decision-making allow .. 
many larg<c1 Japanene corpo:~:·ations ·testifies to the ef:fe~~tiveness of 
such a ~:wstern of dec:i..s:i.ou-makingo 
It is conseque:rr~ly unreasonra.b1e to expect thii;:: Ja.pax:.ese to 
abandon thoi:r form of dec:l.sion-mak:i.ng lvhen they fi:nd i.t is 
successful :in t:(~Jir Oi111'1l business dealings. 'I1he Japanese have made 
long-te:cm oontil'acts Hi th Au.atra1iat e .. g. 1\ustral:i.a. supplies thirty 
mill:i.ott tonsof coal and over fifty million tons of :i.ron o:rc ·~o Japan, 
all under long-term (·ten- to fifteen ~mar) corrtrac'ts. 40 G:x:egory 
Clark41 poin·ts out tha:i; if Je.pan hftd im::is·ted on Anstrrdit?. stioki:ng 
Flexible contracrts made as the x-esult of a. long process 
of informal discussions, conferences and adjustmen:ts to lrH'i tten 
documents, can '\I'IO:t'k for the mutual be:nef:i.t of both pa1•ties. Clark 
suggtHrts 'Vle oan.not mainta:i.n ~che 'bland Anglo-Saxon assumption that 
the Japanese have "'lio learn our way of doing bua:i.nefJ!iJ - or else! 
Such an a.ttttude reflects a tendency to Ov"creertimai;e our· :t'esou:J::•ce 
importance to Japan, and to minimise om." de}X3ndE~nce on J'apm'l as a 
buyer of our raw materiah~. 
lilorgan42 reportl:l that in his expertence, although the 
Japa11ese may make oo:n.cessions to \'!estern ways of doing business, 
negotia:tions he ha.s had \'lith the Japanese in the past eleven 
years have not been nego.Jciated. i.n a \'lectern style. 
of e 4..:hios is e:n:t:i.rely different fr·om their o~m, must know thf~ 
l"Ules wh:ich arE~ actually ope:ra:ting in the negotia:ti.ons~ aJ:ld this 
l"equi:res a priol:- knoltledge of the rules by which the other side :is 
accustomed to pla.y. 
and. r.tn e:wa:r,em.ess of possible p:ttfalls to be avoided should :r-esu.l t 
in mOl''C ElUCCe L~ Ed\1J. :rw got i.a t i OT1S • 
This adv:i.ce is a:ppl:i.cable to rtE:gotiat:Lc,ns \1ri"t;h any :fo:t>eig"ll 
country, not only uith Japan. It may well be asked wThy an 
\tnderstaxtdi:ng of .. Ta:pa.neJZ,e px·acti.ceo is of' special Bignificaneo to 





'1\h'I;j 1~.hi11:D FOH AUS1l'llALIA:NS TO UNDimS'l'JI.NJ) .TAPANli:S.m :BfJSINESS PHACTIC1~S 
At a conference sponno:red 'by the Aust:raliax1 Insii tu:te of 
International J':.ffa.irs on 'J::tpan and Austral:i.a in the Seventiest 1 
held in. Sydney in .Tu.ne 1971, Sh• ~IJ:i.lliam Ivlc!•laho:n; 1r1ho was theu 
the Prime r.linister 1 sa.:l.d he believed that when the hiBtory of 
this decade is lvr:i.tten "t;he changes in 1\.u.stralia:n=·J<:-tpanese 
relationH 'I'Ii11 1)e seen as one of .. the. most sigrJ.:Lfica.nt developme11ts 
of our time~ rl'h<il decade is noV>r mox'B than half' over and it is 
possible tha·';;; the recent ~:·rttification of the Jmstralian Basic 
Treaty of l~"riendsl:tip a11d Co-·operation may be considered a most 
signif:i.cant dewJlopmerd; 7 :t-eflec·ting the cha.11ges in the relations 
bet~reen JGhe two countries .. 
'l1he purpose of th:ls concluding chapter is to e.xa.mine Japan--
Australia :r.·elationa, beariJlg in mind ·the previous chapters on 
Ja,paner:!e business practices. Such an exam:tination will include an. 
assessment of how significant an understanding of Japanese busineru;; 
Si:<wc : t may not 
that :t-ela:tions with Japan have been seen as inrpor1irmt to 1\.u.stral:i.a, 
Et b:t>:'t.(':d' fmrvey of "~;he history of these relations ano. the1.:~:- :preserrt 
si.tuatio:n it~ necessary .. 
Hhe·t;l:H~r viev.red :from the Japanese or from the Australian side, 
the M.story of Japan-Ju.urtralia rel.:rtions l'eveals bitter memories. 
On'il of the first le;.ws passed. by the newr 1\.ust:t:-alian Parl:i.ame:n.t 'lr:as the 
l"ed.E)raJ. Immigration Re riction AQt, llhichs when. it c;amt:} into effeot: 
:i.n li'e·r,,ruary 1902, comple:toly closed. Australia to fur·thcr E!ettlemen·t 
by .1ap8.neso. ll:t "that date the Japanese popu.lat:i.o:n in Ausi;ral:i.a 
uas 3f593 1 and. tha:t ·total .haa never since 'bee:n e:J~:ceecled. 2 The 
:remained an :i .. mJlO!"'tant umue :i.n Australian-Japanese :r.elat:i.om~. It 
~w.s rwt res't:rj.c·ted to the question of' immig1•ation, for la~Js i'lere 
}.lfi.Bsed the rights of th~' Japanese already in .Atwt:taliao 3 
.:-.'"'--··~~~ ~ ~ I>- 2 • 
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In 1915-·1'7 .i'<l.pan tr·iod to romow these di.sa.bilHies, as well as t.o 
sc:cu.:rt:~ her e:xpo:rt markets 1 when Hhe tried to barter additional 
n<:wa.l asai~:rlinnce to the Allj.ed cauoe :i.n excha11f>l'0 for J'mstx·alia' s 
entry to the ll.nglo-Jap&mese 'J.l:r·eaty of Commerce and l~avirsation, 
but Auat:t•alia, :t'Elfused to end her discl~imin:'l:t:i.on. 
S:l.mi.la,:Y.•ly at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 it lias 
ll.ustl-alia that played a prominent role in l1:r:·inging about the 
def'ea,t of .Japanw s G>vt"cempt to insert in the Covenant of the Leagu.e 
of Nations a. cla.u.se ~~hereby members \'lOuld u.nder-talce to accor<t 
ecrual trea:tment to alienEl in the:i.r ·i;cl'r:i:l;ories~ i:rrespeoti ve of 
race .. 
4 At ·the ou"tb:t•eak of war in 1941 all Japa.nes(.'l residents 
in Austra.l:ia, and with a very few exceptions their Aus-tralian-born 
children -· a total of 958 - ltCl"e ilrterned. 
the Au.st:r.ali<mQ~born 'N0l"'E.l permitted to remain though all but seveni;y-
5 five of the .Tcl.panese l1orn \iere compulsorily returned to Japan • 
.Auat:roJ.:ta was a very reluctant sig;n.ato:ry to the San 
Francisco Peace r.I.'re;;rty of 1951, especially due to the prdlvision of 
l:i.mited J.'ev"a:rmament considered necessary for Japan's SE'Jlf-defence., 
of A:u.otra1ia:ns questiol1t.lci were opposed to t-h\~ ra:tific<'"ti.on 0f the 
6 
treaty. It \'las only ar3SUl'ai1.Ces by the Un:i:ted States that 
persuaded Au!:rtralia to :ratify the treaty, despite locul opposi tioll· 
Jl]ven the trade tre:.:~·ty of 1957 l'las g:~.~eeted with host:Ue ou.tbu.rsts, 
though -r;hen H \-ras renewed in 1963 it was generally \'il'elcomed. 
F'ror;l the Ja:.pe~.le:S~e point of view the history of ,Ja.pancse-
Atu:Jt:r.·al:La:r.l relations have been mat·l~ed 'by .A:u.stralian rae:l.st ati::i tudes 
·to~'il'ards them., li'rom the Aust:ral:i.an poj.nt cf v.:\.ew the history tE~ 
. equally b:i:c"te!'~ E:nceJ:7 traoeB Amr!;ralia.n fecl,l~a of ,Tap:st:tlose 
ommrds, Japan \\l'aS the focus of concern, and for r£l<my yeai•s Jche 
Au~Jtralian outlook on defenoa 'll'aa dominated 1}y the convic:ti.on tha:~ 
J3ri .. cain \lias incapable of understanding the ,Japanese threat. 'I' hough 
Au.~:rtr<;:~,lia aui;:omatically joined iu ,.,xars aga:i.:n..st Bri ta.i:n' s enemies 1 
·l;he AustraJj.an government st:re~:wed ·t;heir coun·Lt."Y' s ill.dependen·t role 
i:n world affairs by ··taking frteps to enable ·the Governor'-··GenerB.1 1 
.. Scott 1 
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oe of his ministers to proclaim a stato of 
Fifty yearo of fear and 
suspic:ton !'~:')ached their climax in the Pe.cific ~Jar of 1941·.-45, '«hich 
r-momod 'to ilindicF:te all the Y'Jars of talk of a yellov~ peJ.•il of 
invading ho:cdes of blood:th:Lrs·i;y Asiatics. 
{">. 
Erwel;:l recalls that tho j,mrnediate result of th0 war ~ras a 
gene:eal i:ru:::i£rte:rwe on a. tough. policy towards .Jap1m, one symbol 1.leing 
the hostile speech of: the Australian oommrulder-in.-·chief 7 Sir 1.PhomcLS 
lnamey 1, lvhen he received the surrender of the Japaneae Second Army., 
This corr'~inued with a pol:i.cy of non-fraternise:tion laid dm-m in a 
di.:rective issued by General Northcott, the f::i.:rst command.er of ·t;he 
J3:t•:i.tish Commom1eal th Occupat:Lon Force in Japan, a body in i>thioh 
Australian :i.nfluencr::J predominated. Australia was determined to keep 
,Japan disarmed, bu·t 'l'~as i:neffeo·~ual in the face of American 
dete:rm:i.vation to build up Japanese strength to oounte:r the Comrnunist 
threat .. 
JJ;noel10 suggests that a deep-seated foa:r of the Japanese may 
still lurk in the psyche of many Australians, even. though its 
expx•esrd.on is 'beset by inhib:i:tions and :r.·eserva:tiolu.l j_n recognit:i.on 
'l'he loose:n.ing· of 
li:n.k:s 1:1~da11een J3:rj:tain and Australia may have :reduced any remaining 
resen·tmcnt Austral:i.a:r.w feel tm·mrds Britain• n former enemies~ but 
the ei"tuation is not the same for the J·apane se 1 as ·they are tho only 
people to have invaded Amrtralian territory. Australian lmsi:nessmen 
a:n<l pol:i.ticians are of the age to have e:i:~her pa.:rt.ieipated in the -vm:r 
aga:Lnc:rt ,Je,pa:n; o:r t<> have b<:HJ:n children in the war, gro'Wring up in an 
a:t;mosphere of Pl."opagfmda withottt the maturity to recognise that it 
~vas pr·opo,gand . .;J.. It is no·t easy to be awa,re -'co the~~e long.-held 
p:rejuclic}Ot:1o P6ter H.obinson 9 11 edito1• of ·t;he _!.u~_it,<.::,~J:.S:!!:.l2:!~<m_£~~:1 
!£.!.!.~!:! r;~ai(t in 1971 that there had been ve:ry 1:l.tt1e :real improv{;ment 
in the Z'13la·tionship be·hreen .. r.:.1pan a.nd. Australia \-¥i thiD. th<.:l preceding 
decado. He had reported. on eleven annual meetings of the Am:rt:rali.a,.., .. 
Japan l3u.sineos CoM~operation Committee, and had found it diff:i .. cuJ:t 1lo 
discern much difference behzeen the iss1.HHJ raised a decade before and 
and li ttl~:3 improvement in the level of delmte. 
If the r~1,tification of the Australia.-.Japmt ]<M:dc 1l'l~l:'a .. liy 
ot' J.i'ricmd.ship ftnd Co···op,3ration l"'eti..lly marks an im.prov.ement since 
. he wro'tt:1, it h:.dioa:tct> the amount of p<:d.n~:d;aki.ng negotiations 
that must ha'll-e been undertaken to overcome the bitter history 
of our :relations, together wi·th a growing reoog:ni'tion ')f our 
mutual interdependence., 
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It is posa:\.1)le to examine the importance of :t'ela-'liioru:~ 
bet't.;e~m At.:u:rtral:la. and Japan in terms of economic in:ter".ependenoe t 
in ·terr£1S of str<;.~.tegio considerations in a wo:t•1d. context, as 
poasi hle pa:r·~ners in aid to developing countri.es, and as a vxay 
of strengthening mul't:i.-lateral 1.-elat:i.ons. Sinoeit is the 
inte:nt:i.on of t:Jho~r:i.ng the significance for Australians 'to understand 
l,Tapanes~~ bu.siness pr~1.ct:i.oes, each of these asrx;~cts of Japan-
. Austr<:J.lia rola:tions is 11Jxamined "briefly. 
Sta1-ting 
from zero in 1945, Austral:i.a-Ja:pan ·trade developed :rapidly, reachj.:ng 
£.A62 milli.r.m in Australian exports to Japan in 1950·-1951. Of' th:~s 
amou1:rt, 
barley~ 
2 million )-Jas for 111001 and ·.;he remainder fol.' uhea't a:tld. 
111 the same year Japanese ex.ports to Aust:t·e,lia we1~ 
£Al6 milJ.ion b'u.t rose to £A44 million in 1951-1952f due to tho 
rar>:i.d development of the Australi.an !i)COJlOmy aJJ.d the oonsequem~ deman~:l 
for J"apanese steel and other prodttots12• The exp<:tnsion of tra.de 
since th.en, both in i tr::~ volume and f3l:w.l~e of the market is evident 
f:x·orn Tt'1ble 4• 
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470.,4 17-3 2B0.2 
586~5 19·4 29600 
642.1 21.1 343e3 
822 .. 1 2494 414 .. "'( 
1 021-4 24 .. 7 481.,2 
1 lf:\7.6 27 .. 1 573.,6 
l 360 .. 0 27.8 629 .o 
1 934 .. 0 31wl 739.0 
·Shell~ 
(~~) 








12 .. 4 
13~8 
15·7 
1 '{ 9 ., . 
for 'I'Ib.oh~ :pa:ragTa:ph and <'J,ccomprmying table from 
P•-47 • 
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J'apan and Austral.ia are .rto\,t of firc.;t· runk importance to 
each othrn' econom1.ca11y. 13 Japan is Australia's chief tr'a~..H.ne; 
partner, taking· some ·thirty per cent of Atu:rtralia' s c:x.po:t•ts <1nd 
p:r.ovid:i.ng eighteen per cent of its imports. Australia :i.s Japan's 
second t:x.~ading pa:r·t:ner (after the U:n.ited States), nor·mallJ" 
Bupply:i.ng eight per cent of .. Tapan's imports, including half its 
iron o::r~e e.n.tl a thix•d. of i.t s :i.ndusia~ial coal, and taking 3 .. 5 
)?er cent of Japan's elxport s. Apart from the increase in volume, 
the other main sit,f'llificant fac·tor is the change in importance from 
primary products to :r.a\'1 materialsr esp<~cially since 1960, as the 
analysis in Table 5 demonstra-t~H>~4 
TABU~ 5" 
CHANGES IN 'rlffi: STRUCTUilln OF J'APAHms:n: INPOHTS FROM l1US'l'HALIA 
(in millions of Aus·trr;,lian dollars) 
Ha.w Wool 



























46 2 .. 6 
·1 752 100.0 
Th(:t mos·t vi-tal part of the trade for both nations :i.s Auatrali.af s 
ra'lrJ materials. Kahn15 list~J the discovery :i.n Am:rtr,a1ia and 
el~;:;owhere of' 1arg\:? new mineral deposits as one of the :f'avo:.J:rablc 
inter:na"'donal concLi.tio:n:s that contributed to rapid Ja1)anese gro'i'rth 
. . , . 16 
ra1ies, wh:tle l<;a:~.·tut claims ·that Austra.lia 1 s pror.;;per:l.ty depends on 
th.eir £H'!.tle 7 for there is no p:r·ospeoti ve a.l te:r.xmti ve 'buyer. Japan 
l-Ja.:rrts to assure access to mi:nere.ls, and ~d.ghty per cent of Japanese 
:i.nvastment in Am.lt:t:•alia it~ in mineral erll"aotio:n, primarily in the 
fox·m of a minority equity in joi1rt v~mtu.res. 11obirwo:r?7 suggestfJ 
·thr:.::t as the Japanese 1 unlike ma11y o·ther ilnrer,rtors t are not basically 
in'teresi;ed in setting u.p \'lholly-ovmed su'bsidiar::i.es, ·~hey should. be 
_,_ .. _·~r~~i ~~~:;~--~-;;his pO:.ragraph 
i-.Table taken from Heed, 
1 ~!CahY:l f p .<36 Hob1nson, ., p~l55· 
from ~lartin 1 £,!?:..£~!.!.~, p .. c:l'{. 
P••rl• 
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encou:rag3d to :i.nve st :in Aust:raJi.a. 
to ex:pc:md depends pa.:rtly c.n the a;tti tudes of those governi.ng Au.~rtral:ta. 
111he main assurance that Japa:nf:HJ8 ::requ:Lre iG that if :~:•est:rictions are 
made 1':1-ga:i.ns·t foreign inves·~oment, they apply equally to all fo:x·oign.ers 
irres:pec·tive of raee. 
Mart.:i.n18 devotes a whole article to "" discusRdon of :pro1,1ems 
in Amrtr·alia.n-.. lapa.nEH:~o relations, each of \vhich highlights "the need 
for an undE;rstanding of Japanef3e businoso practiceB. One of the 
main economic problems concerns the pe1•enn1.al bi1a:teral trade balance 1 
\vith .ra.:pan reguJ.arly htying ttiice as much f:y•om Au~rtralia as it sells 
In an effo:r>t to correot tho imbalance 1 the Au.stra.liru1. 
oar max•k<:~t vlas irmnda.ted Vii th Japanese Cal'S, causing repercussions 
for Aucrtralia.n car manufactu:r•ers and theb• employees. Thi~ led to 
nego·ti.a:tionr:J to entice Japanese oar makers into joint venture 
manufactur:i.ng in Australia, jiggering the tariff to p:romote joint 
ventures, and pt.:rtting restrictj.ona upon car imports. It is obvious 
that a g:rea:t deal of patient negotiating must have been necessar:v 
h3fo:rc 't.hc agreement 1tJ<::ts reached in July 1975 for the government of' 
million plant in Ausi;ralia to make •royotas and Datsun13e IJ.'hese 
joint s -vdll have Japanese and Australianr;; ""rorld.ng togethors 
so it 111ill be necessar·y fo:x:• ltt.ls·t:ralians pal"t:i.c:'tpating in these 
vent'I..U'01'> ·l.;o understand the Japa.nese approach to rnanagement p:r.oblems .. 
TlH~ second major economio problem Martin considers t<.~ have 
lieen ca .. u.s01d by tho b:t~oakdo~m. of the internat:i.onal mcme·~ary r-:JyGtem* 
Prior to Deeember 1971, long-·te:r•rn supply omrtracts 'botN·een Aus"'~l~alia 
and Sapa~1 Here w:r:l.tten in United States dollars a:nd made no a1lo1.n:tnoes 
for fluc·tuaticn"ls. When a Japanese trade and investment 
survey m:i~~sio:n. sited Pe:r"th in March 1973, the Premic"r of HeB"ter:n 
In the en. suing talks vii th 
.rapanBfiW pl.u·ohaserr:> 1 i:.he A1.J.Stl~a.l::Lan companies vigo:r·ously liJupported )G 
by the Jnu.rt:ral:i.an governmcntf mana.ged to adjust the contracts>~1 
'11his 'N<'dil due mos-t likely to the ,Japanese recognitio:n that the changes 
in the rate made the o:rigi:nal termB of oon·l.i:r,aot unf'a:i.r. 
It 1.B to l;e regretted that more recent long--te:t"ill contr.n.ots have not 
1-eoeived f1e:x:ib1e :response from the Australian side. 
One can St~e thai thE~ traditiorml Japan.ege attitude to colrt:t"acts is 
mo::r:'e in keeping vd.th :rapidly changing c:i.rcumst~tnces, and could 
benefit eitber party, ensure a more harmonious \-Jerking 
All the economic 
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problomB Martin di.scunses sho11,r Ule :neE1d for Aus·tralia..ns to understand 
Japanese butdnesf:; p:t•actiees, 'because of the great ecoll<:.Ulic 
interdependenc,e that e:xisis bE~tvJeen the ti'ro countrio~., 
!!,_:£~:!2-.~£!~£J.:;L~""im,P-9..~E.£::L o:t:.J:~~:~l:i~~d: J!:PG!:!:.;: IJ.1hough Expo • 70 
may have been the fil•st ·time to have highH.glrte:d. the fac·t that 
Australia a:ncl .Japa:tl ar-c ncd.gh1)ours on longitude 135° r Aust.ralia has 
ahl<'1Yf.l 'been a.w<:u'El of Japa:n's proximity, for many years as the source 
of ·t;he ·th:r'EW/t from the north, and in more :recen·'c yea:r.B as a close 
.Jap.:J>n·~lmf3tra1ia rclat:Lons oarmot be oomddt~red :i.n 
isoht"tion, for they ar-e a,ffeoted. by the inte:c'lla.tional scene. Japan 
a11cl Austr•e,,_lia ha:~rtl <1 common :Ln:te:.rest :in political ;;.rt;ab:i.lity in their 
x-egion, and the th1i ted Sta:tea and G:r<eat Bri tai:n' s clisentangleme:n:t 
from Sm,'!.th··~ilat:rt Asia is obviously an important factor in drawi:ng 
J'apan aud. AtuJtl."alia. oloaer to on.e ano·t.her. Hichar<l ~1aso:n20 po:i.nts 
Ilri the:n H1.0 United S·tat~s, and l'.l.OW could come to rely too 
m:J.ch on ~Japan. Miller21 , on. the o·the:r ha.nd, does not ooxu:;icler tha·t 
from ~)ou·th-IUast Asia has created, aJ:ld wi11 1:1:ot of'fc:r any 
ooun-'liry ·~he kind, of gu.a:r.antoe i;hG~ United S·tates gave to non-communis-t 
count. rJ in the axoea .. 
:i.n asserting its mm inde]xmdence wh:l.le oul t:i.vating friondohip l'Ii"'lih 
t:ts rnr:u1y <)tllOl' GOT.tntries a.s poas:tble. He ackrw~vledge s the 
pclsHi1)i1ity of ,Ta.pan arranging joi:nt defence p;,:-ocluction agreemen·ts 
w:i.th othe:t' such as Aturtre.li.a, and of acti-.. d:ties r:mch as 
join·t l!J.a.vn.J.. eJ::eroisEH> ;d:th :nav.s.1 po'ljJEJrs in the Pa.ci.fic, irwlucling 
Au.str.'alia~ 
Such a.grce.ments and .joint exercises will req:uire 
c.onsu.J:ta·ticna a:!~ government atl.d d~,;partme:ntal levels, requiring 
il:ust:ral:l.ans Norking :i.n such aJ't.'H:ts to understand. the Japanene 11rays 
of hr..mdling and the u.Be of consensus iieoisiol:l·-makine;. 
J);;; pJ".'oduction ·~dll :i.nvol 'V'B the laJ•ge onterpr:i.~'>eB being b:r'Ought 
in·co tho consuJ:ta:tio:ns, so one can ~·'lOHZ: t;b.;;:d; A,.~.st:.t'al:ta.ns will need 
"to be al•nt:t.•e of ·lJhe cornplex linkages betrJeen Japanese government, 
bu.:rea:uo:racy and "big business, for strategic and not o:r.•ly fo:x• 
economic conside~rations. 
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At the Conference on • Japan and Aur:rliralia, :i.n th'.:.· Seventies' r 
·there "i'ter-e d:it~ousEiions ahn•·t the desirability of joil1t-aid projects 
fo:r i3outh~"Ea12di Asia. Miller22 claimed that the Japanese notion of 
economic aid is diffc:r"ent from Australia's. He attributed this "l;o 
a, lack of <:t t~ense of t:':Uilt that characterizes Western people~ s 
att:i:tude to the und.e:r·-dev-eloped countries, and a lack of that 
lrumanitaria-il urge on which so much \·iestern effort in the aid. field 
He mai:n:ta:i.ned that the Japanese see no sense in 
givi:r.tg other peoplE) money to spend as they please, but consider it 
sens:l.'ble to provide them 'l'd.th things wh:i.ch ;.fill develop 
part:i.oule,r· J:'l:~::Jources on which an increase in bila:tera1 t1•ade can be 
h:tsed. D:r;yr>dale 23 1 on 'the other hand, while a.ckncndedging the 
em:phasis on. mutuality :b1 the aid ope:rat:i.on i:n Japanese aid policy, 
ma:i.nta.irlC:d that there :i.s a humanitarian elemeirli in Japa.neae aid 
p:t•ogrammes, a~Hl Australians n:::~d to avoid being cul ture-cerrtric in 
jttdgments on su.ch impo:t~tant policy matters. 
Ja.peJ1 t:t.nd. An.fatral.ia a:r:e already members of such multi1e..tera1 
o:t'g<m:t;::at:LOns a13 :FJiGAF~~, ASPAC 1 the Asian Developme:nt Bru1k, the 
Cc>J.orr1bo Plau and the Develo})ment Af:l~3istance Comnd.i:tee of the OECD.., 
I:f ·there are also to be jo:i.:n.t J'apanese-1~ustralian aid projects in 
South-East A~dr1, 1 it ifJ obvious tha·t nothing is to be ga:i.ncd by 
aelcnmdcdged tha,"t th<.~ <>ff:l.cial aid componen·t is very high i.n the 
AuBtralin.n r.dd pr'oeramme, while "the investme:n·t; c:>.nd credit a:i.d 
component is vcl.'Y high in the Japanese aid progl"'axnme .. 
plaoe for eacht so there i!:J a. n~;ed fo:r:· JaiJo.rH:H::;e and Au~:rtralians to 
\'l'Ol'k togt;'ther ·co p1•oyide an i>:r~eg:rated programme that 1·Jill allo\'J 
the developing countries in -'tihe a:t">Oa to rece:\:lre the ma::dmum be:nefitG 
I't :Ls apparent tlla;t this is another area in \~hich Japanese 
and ll.:ttstrali.anr:t need to understand one anothe~.·· The J·apanese are 




Ame r:i. can aid • 
othe:r impor'ta.nt. f<1ctors in J<:'tpa:nt s economic recovery l·Jas the 
co~·ope:r.a:ticm of government, bu:recmcr•acy and bu.r:.dr.1ess: interests, 
·~oguther >"f:l th the hard wox·k and dedication of the .Tapan<'H>(~ people. 
All money given in aid h'lt been rE3p<:dd to the United Statt:s, and 
,Japan is proud of its independence. If thei:r· idea of aid is to 
help develop particular r.-esou:r.oes ·!;o incr·ease trade, this ough·t 
not to be judc;ed to be mot:lvated by self-interest only~ for in 
the Japanese e:x:peri.ence th:i.s ll.e.s proved to ·be a way of regaining 
independence and e.xpand:Lng the economy. In the joint consultations 
that 'lllill need to taJce place, Australians m:Lght •~'f)ll acknm·Jledge 
the achiovemen·f.fl of the Japanese people and the cont:ribut:lon their 
e.xper:i.ence oan make in assisting th.e economic development of the region. 
~~~~.h~-~~ 1 ol~m~J}.:t..£.f.....!l1lh~~}J~~~~, . .!-'e !§!.t i ~~.~: fl1he Arne ri can 
futu:r.olog'i.st, Herman Kahn, foresees an incl"CF.H:d.ngly profound 
Japanese influence em Australia, socially and culi..ul~ally as -v1ell 
as economically, forcing Australians away from "their :rather 
parochial a.nd in'bred life :i.nto the most stimulating and ccsmopoli tan 
oxintence. r~ 24 Prior to the post-~~t~a.r migration Pl"Ogl'amme, Au.s·b·aJ.i<:t.n 
cuJ:ture \~las almost exclu~:d vely Anglo-Saxon :l.n origin~ No"-;,r many 
AuB'tralia:w:l <:J,l'e beginnj_ng to value the cul tura1 J.:uJi•itage of ·the 
Ji:uropean-bo:rn A?.tst:r.aliaxls, but \ve need also· ·!;o appreo:l.a:l;e i;he 
fm.'ther enrichment that an apprecj .. ation of Atd.a.n 0111 ture would bl'ing .. 
The:r-e are aspects of Japa:uese culture that have a gro1:dng 
po:puJ.a:r.it:.y- 7 from th;:; cult:i.vation of bonsai t:r-eesf traditional 
f1mver arrangement and ·t~~a ce:t•emony to Japan.es.n forms of self~-deferwe. 
'I'hese, hm'l<:Jverv tend to lAs s·b.iud.ied :i.n :i.solati.on, and may o'J"2Jr-em:phasise 
t:t•a.di t:ional aspeots of tho J'apanese \-vay of life~ iihat :i.s also :needed, 
lop a sensitivity to Asians 1 :i.s an tmderstamling of 
the way of life of Ja11anese people in a highly urbanised so:phist:i.e<';~,ted. 
As a, result of thouf:';a.:nds of yearf:l of 
h:i.s'to:dcal developmE.nrt in isoln:tion from other coun·tries, Sapan has 
developed a soc:iety .. chat is d.ecidedly homogeneous :i.n compa:l'iso:o. wi·bh 
othor oou:ntri<:J s. 'l'hey have consequently devised their m,zn solu:t:i.ons 
to ·the pro1)lems of their soc:iety1 but as many of these prvblem>'.l arr::: 
s:i.mi1ar to those of other countries, the. solutions ·bhey have fom1cl 
mol'it our r:d;udy. 
'l1he ratifica:tion of ·i;;b.e llaiJic Trea:ty of F'riendship a4!d 
Cob~operrtt:i.on pluoes Australia in a, k!pf;oial rel£d;ionBh:1.;o vJi th 
Japa::n. lie -therefore need to take every opportunity fox• u.nde:r'-
stan<d:it1g· Japanese practices to develop this friendship £tnd 
co-o J)€I'ation. A:t the r:mme t:une there is a danger that the 
t'ltlro ·eoul1.t:des could fol:"'D an exclusive affluen:t; club~ igr10ring 
other countries in the r-egion. Japan iE"> only one of otn• Asian 
ne i g.h 1Jours o t'l~;J need ·to develop :friendship and co--operation 
with <:rtllel"" coun-tries too. 
the J'apauese people and their way of life, this c:an lead 
Australians to develop a similar atti tuo.e towards other peo:plro 
in t:he :region and a similar e:x:amina:t:l.ort of the solu:tions th<:~y 
are a.dorrt;ing in coping with trH?- problems of a :t•apidly oha:ngi:ng 
socie-ty, p:r:•oblems that face most of Ul'h 
ill_~us i;2l!: 
'{8 
Fol' all theF.:e reasonn, :i.t has been a:rgo..1ed 1 an unde:rstanding 
of the .Japanese peopJ.e and, their business practicHs :i.s of t:r.t:"£:'lat 
significance i;o AuBt:ral:l.a.ns. 
thrc~:t tht'l J"ap<Ull'iH30 peo·ple have ivorJ-:.ed tog'l:;th('ill' to restore 
cou.n-t:ry• f3 economy, and. they ha"\re ~a..non to be pro1.1Jl of th.<~ir 
the t•JO:rld, and dt':!se:t"ves tJ:"ea:tment a.f,~ E\:l.l equal partner in. any 
nego-tia:~i.ons unde::r·take:n by Aur:rtraliamJ rd evel-:-y level - gove:rnmen-'c, 
It needs ·to "be 
I'fH;ogn:i.StCld tha·t tb.e links, "b<"3t"tH.~en gove:rnmtm·t, bu:r:-eaucracy 'big 
busi:n.ess have helped in the JapaiHH!le poEr'G-t-;a:r reccf<J(~l:'Y• At the 
same t:i.me ~ i 1; cannot be as~mmE;d. that an e,greeme:nt 'IIIith one is an 
agreement 'i'd.th all tl:u:-ee, for the linkages a1~e e:x."tremely complex .. 
T.he Japam~se go~•.re:cnment is subject to many co:nflicting demands f.:r.om 
pl.'(H:'lstu.'-e groups 1.-d.thin and. ou·tside the oountx•y. These eonf1:i.c'bB 
muBt be resolve through a sclrier> of consultations until a commusu.s 
:nego·l;;:i.a:t,:ion.s are ·tak:tng place 1, r-ealising ~;ha·t one''! the im:.,.ue 11as 
lx:Hm settled, a very speedy ;;~xeou·tion of policy l..rill f'ollm'll® 
It \11ould seem tha:t tho f':ri:'E;dom for 
ralia that nted :rn·:Lor to 1968 is not 
heigh"l;en the need for mol~ Australians to understand aspects of 
Jap~mesc managem<.m·t. rl~he Japanese for their part viill have to 
come to terms \'lf:i th Australian unions and award vmgea. ' On the 
other hand, there is much that Australj.ans might learn from 
.r~:.:pane~Je executives about n.aking v10rkers feel they aJ:•e peopl1::1 
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not 11hands11 , and can shot" them lV'ays of raising morale, working 
together in sm.::l-11 groups and responding to changing situations in 
more flexible 'lqays. At the same time the Japanese emphasis on 
sales volume arJd. ·the Australian emphasis on profit margins could 
c:r.e<J.:I;e difficulties. To avoid confrontation ·there will >:leed to be 
a rrilling:ness for both sid<-H-::1 to discuss matters to reach solutions 
tha·t 1tJ:i.ll sat:iHfy all p<;erticipatrts .. 
Japan vr:i.ll have a continuing need to ob·tai:n raw ma·te:rials 
from Australia, arl.d Australia l'Iill continue to want to sell her 
; 
primary p:rodu:Jt8, energy resources a,nd minerals.. While long-term 
· co1r~:racts may appear to be in Australia's interests fo:r long-range 
plax:ming, suoh commi.tmen·'l;s could become a :ri.sk. It is becoming 
cheaper for Japanese companies ·to Bt."'lt up joint ve11tu1-e factories 
in Korea and Tahn1,n, 
The se 
thus reduoi:ng the ne~::;d for E'm.e:rg:y at home. 
for coal and uranium could change, l'!hile on 
the oU1e:r hand a in the Austi·alian political scene migh·t make 
it difflcult for Australians to keep long-term contracts. A 
fle:dblc~ approach mol"'El in keeping with the Japanese traclitional 
t'lay wo1.:tld appea:t~ to be mo:re realistic. 
Above all there :i.s a need for a relationship of trust to be 
buil·t on both sidEHl, so that the bitterness of the 11ast history of 
Aus-tral se rela,tj,ons might be forgotten in a new 
unde:.t'standing for wi'hich the Ba:s:d.o 1r:rea.ty of :P.':t"iendsh:i.p and 
Cow·ope:t:-ation is the \vri tten word of intention$ Only then \'¥ill 
fuhu'e h:i.Ertory jmlge the development of J'a:raneoe-,Aust:ralian 
relat to h<:we been ·the mosrt significant development to have 
occu:r:red :Ln th:J.s decade .. 
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